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CHAPTER 1: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In March 1965, Northern and Southern political leaders gathered in Khartoum in an 
attempt to solve the conflict in the South by peaceful means at a conference called the 
Round-Table Conference (RTC). This was the first attempt by a civilian government 
in the Sudan to find a political solution to the civil war.1 The Conference resulted in 
the setting up of a Twelve-Man Committee (TMC), whose proposals were handed 
over to Prime Minister Mahgoub in June, 1966. 2  Some of those proposals were 
comparable to those of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which was followed by 
11 years of peace, but they were never implemented by any of the civilian 
governments of the 1960’s. 
 
The main focus of this thesis will be to analyse the work and results of the Round-
Table Conference (1965) and the Twelve-Man Committee (1965-66). Why and how 
did this first attempt to find a peaceful solution to the civil war come about? What 
were the main issues, and how were they approached? And finally, why did this 
peacemaking effort fail? 
 
The Sudanese Civil Wars 
What is commonly known as ‘the Sudanese civil war’ is in reality two distinctly 
different civil wars. The first one, on which this thesis will focus, developed from a 
limited uprising mainly in the Equatoria Province in 1955, to gradually turning into a 
civil war that by the late 1960’s had spread throughout the three Southern Provinces.3 
The second civil war once again set the Southern region on fire by its outbreak in 
1983, and lasted until a peace deal, the ‘Naivasha’ agreement, was signed in January 
2005. By then, violent rebellions had broken out in the West as well as in the East, 
protesting against political neglect and economic underdevelopment. Despite the fact 
                                                 
1
 Gabriel R. Warburg 1992: 133. 
2
 According to Abel Alier, the TMC report was presented to Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, and not 
Mahgoub. See Abel Alier 1990: 39. Although Mahgoub remained Premier until July 25, 1966, he never 
began planning for the implementation of the TMC recommendations, probably because of the political 
turmoil in that period, which eventually led to his overthrow and the coming to power of Sadiq al-
Mahdi. Thus, Sadiq al-Mahdi was the Prime Minister who reacted to the TMC recommendations, while 
holding that office in the period of July 1966-May 1967. 
3
 For details on this mutiny, see pages 11-13 below. 
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that the Khartoum government has signed peace agreements with both Eastern and 
Western rebels, these conflicts still inflict huge suffering on the civilian populations in 
all those areas of the Sudan: The Eastern, the Western and even the Southern region 
are still plagued by violent conflict. These conflicts have many nuances that are 
significantly different. Nonetheless, they have at least one root cause in common: 
Negligence of the peripheries by the Central authorities, leading to underdevelopment, 
mistrust and suffering in the regions.4 
 
In the first half of the 20th century, the Anglo-Egyptian government in the Sudan had 
worked by a so called “growth pole” strategy, which meant that they concentrated 
investments in favoured regions in order to create centres of growth.5 This policy was 
centred in the Capital Khartoum and its immediate surrounding areas, and it would 
become important for the way political power would be divided in the Sudan, as it 
laid the ground for political power based on sectarian allegiances.  
 
‘Sectarianism’ is an ambiguous term that has been given a particular meaning in the 
Sudanese context. The classical Western understanding of the term ‘sect’ is 
commonly a closed, inverted and dogmatic group, which distances itself from the 
political and ideological development of the majority society. This understanding is in 
many ways contradictory to the meaning of the term in the context of Sudanese 
politics: In this context, the term ‘sectarianism’ is an expression of the religious and 
political movements Ansar and Khatmiyya, and the political and religious conflict that 
has been a constant factor in Sudanese politics ever since the colonial period.6  
 
Ansar is a religious group under the leadership of the Mahdi-family. Originally the 
Ansar were the followers of Muhammad Ahmed al-Mahdi, who founded the so-called 
Mahdist state in the Sudan after a revolution, which he initiated in 1881.7 The Mahdi 
himself died in 1885, though the Mahdist state lasted until 1898. The Mahdi-family 
                                                 
4
 For an analysis of how this underdevelopment contributed to the separatist demands in the South, see 
R.K. Badal 1976. 
5
 Gabriel R. Warburg 1992: 130. 
6
 The use of this term is certainly not unproblematic. Nonetheless, because of the present lack of a 
more accurate term, this thesis will rely on the present understanding of the term. Ansar and Khatmiyya 
are understood as sects. That is valid also for sufi-brotherhoods in general in the Sudan. Gabriel 
Warburg 2003: 143.  
7
 P.M. Holt and M.W.Daly 2000: 85.  
 8 
still continues to be a leading family among the Northern Sudanese elite. The 
Khatmiyya was a sufi-brotherhood brought to the Sudan by another family that would 
establish itself as a significant part of the Northern elite: The Mirghanis. The 
Mirghanis established themselves as the leading family of this religious movement, 
which in the 20th Century lent its support to the first Sudanese political party, the 
Ashiqqa (literally meaning: ‘Brothers of the same father and mother’). 8  The 
Khatmiyya supported the unionist ideas of the Egyptians, and agitated in favour of 
such a solution throughout the period of Anglo-Egyptian rule. Largely as a result of 
the colonial policies, the Ansar became a dominant land aristocracy in the Sudan, 
while the Khatmiyya established itself as a powerful force in the urban centres of the 
country. 
 
In the South, neither sufficient educational systems nor other significant 
developmental projects were initiated during the colonial period.9 Researchers have 
suggested that it was the continuation of this policy after independence that was 
largely responsible for the growing suspicions of Southern and other regional leaders 
with regard to the good intentions of what they perceived as their new ‘colonizers’.10 
Those social groups, who had been given power by the British, had simultaneously 
been given the means through which to stay in power. Systems of education, 
economic incentives and political structures gave them the possibility to deny any 
other group access to power even after independence. This effectively hindered 
political and economic development in the peripheries of the Sudan during the post-
colonial period as, according to one author: “[…] those who framed government 
policy were not inclined to undertake a radical transformation of the country’s socio-
economic structure.”11  
 
                                                 
8
 Ibid.: 126. Ashiqqa was established under the leadership of Ismail al-Azhari in 1943. In 1944, Ali al-
Mirghani decided to support the party, probably in an attempt to strengthen his power at the expense of 
his main rival, ‘Abd al-Rahman, fearing that the Mahdi-family would attempt to establish a Mahdist 
monarchy in the Sudan. For more detailed information on the background, support-bases and 
development of the sectarian political parties, see Chapter 2 below. 
9
 The Zande Scheme, an agricultural project instigated in Western Equatoria in the late 1940s, was an 
exception from this, although it has been described as “badly conceived and ill-executed […]”. 
Douglas H. Johnson 2003: 19. 
10
 See for instance Gabriel R. Warburg 1992: 130, Tim Niblock 1987: 204, and M.W.Daly in M. W. 
Daly and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (eds.) 1993: 13. 
11
 Tim Niblock 1987: 204. 
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The ‘Southern Policy’ 
In 1898, Anglo-Egyptian forces reconquered the Sudan, and in January 1899 the 
British and the Egyptians signed their agreement of cooperation, the Condominium 
agreement, which was to last until 1 January, 1956.12 The power-struggle between the 
British and the Egyptians would become significant for the development of colonial 
policies in the Sudan. Resulting from their need to curb Egyptian influence in the 
1920s, the British implemented policies to restrict the growth of the educated class, 
for instance by closing down academies and preventing the building of new 
elementary schools.13 As Holt and Daly describes, the system of Indirect Rule was 
implemented in the Sudan as a means ”to ’counteract the preponderating influence of 
religious leaders’ and to minimize the numbers and influence of the educated urban 
class […]”.14 In the South, the impact of the system of Indirect Rule would become 
even more decisive for the future development. The British had since their reconquest 
of the Sudan in 1898 attempted to limit Islamic influence in the South, and by 1922, 
the Southern Provinces were for the first time classified as a ‘Closed District’.15 In 
1930 the ‘Closed Districts Ordinance’ was introduced, and the isolationist policy that 
followed from that ordinance would be important for the prospects of developing a 
common Sudanese national identity.  
 
This policy, which would become popularly known as the ‘Southern Policy’, 
excluded Northern merchants from operating in the region, restricted the rights of 
Southerners to travel to the North to find employment, banned Islamic missionaries, 
and advised Southerners not to adopt Arab names or traditions. Christian missionaries 
were given the main responsibility of education, and English was introduced as the 
language of instruction in Southern schools. The British governors in the region were 
encouraged to learn local languages, in order to ease communication with the local 
population as well as make it less necessary for the natives to learn and practice 
                                                 
12
 Gabriel R. Warburg 1992: 62. 
13
 P.M. Holt and M.W.Daly 2000: 119. In the period of 1920-1929, not one elementary school was 
built in Northern Sudan. Moreover, the military school in Khartoum and a school for training Sudanese 
sub-mamurs were closed down. The British fear of an influential Sudanese educated class was 
strengthened by protests in 1924, instigated and organised by the so-called White Flag League. 
14
 Ibid.: 117. 
15
 This resulted from the provisions of the Passports and Permits Ordinance. Ibid.: 119. As a means of 
Indirect Rule the British sought to transfer local administrative powers to native authorities, but as Holt 
and Daly states, such authorities often did not exist in the South. In such cases, it was encouraged to 
‘re-create’ tribal organisation, in order to make the Southern societies more susceptible to the system of 
Indirect Rule. 
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Arabic. Moreover, it was considered a “Fundamental necessity” that British staff 
learned about beliefs and customs of the tribes in their regions.16 All in all, though, the 
main aim of the British administration in the Southern region was economic control 
and maintenance of the status quo.17  
 
The isolation imposed on the South by the ‘Closed Districts Ordinance’ preserved the 
differences between Northern and Southern Sudanese, actively counteracted the 
development of a common national identity and as such probably contributed to what 
was to become a violent conflict between the two regions. As Johnson states:  
“It is not necessarily the case that Northerners and Southerners would have developed a common 
national understanding had the policy of administrative segregation never been imposed, but the gulf of 
misunderstanding which separated the North and the South was all the greater as a result of that 
segregation.”18 
 
This “gulf of misunderstanding” was still apparent when Northerners and Southerners 
met to find a solution to the Southern conflict in 1965-1966.19 
 
The Juba Conference 
In 1946, the British took the final decision about the future of unity for the Sudan, 
when introducing a new ‘Southern Policy’. The Juba Conference of 1947 was 
initiated by the British in order to allay Southern fears of future Northern domination, 
by presenting to the Southern Sudanese elite the new plans for a common Sudanese 
Legislative Assembly.20 The conference took place in the town of Juba in Southern 
Sudan 11-12 June 1947, and was attended by British representatives, as well as 
Northern and Southern delegates.21  The main issue that the British aimed to get 
Sudanese approval for at the Juba Conference was Southern representation in the new 
                                                 
16
 “1930 Memorandum On Southern Policy.” Letter from the Civil Secretary’s Office to the Governors 
of Upper Nile, Mongalla and Bahr al Ghazal Provinces, dated January 25th, 1930. Appendix 1 in 
Dunstan M. Wai (ed.) 1973.  
17
 Douglas H. Johnson 2003: 12. 
18
 Ibid.: 25. 
19
 The ’Southern Policy’ was a policy with complicated background, justifications and effects, though it 
would be outside the scope of this thesis to go into further details about these. For more detailed 
information, see P.M. Holt and M.W.Daly 2000, Chapter 10: “A period of reaction: 1925-36” and 
Chapter 11: “The development of Sudanese Nationalism: 1937-52” in particular. 
20
 Mohamed Omer Beshir 1968: 65. 
21
 The complete minutes of the Juba Conference are published as appendices in both Ibid. and Dunstan 
M. Wai (ed.) 1973. 
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National Legislative Assembly.22 The Southerners at the conference expressed doubts 
about their possibilities to be heard and gain real power in a common Legislative 
Assembly, because of their inexperience with political institutions and lower 
educational level as compared with the Northern educated elite. Nonetheless, at the 
second and last day of the conference, they agreed to consider unity with the North, 
although not unanimously, and, as has later been argued by Southerners, probably 
under the conviction that Southerners would gain new opportunities later to consider 
the constitutional relationship between the North and the South.23 As will be more 
thoroughly accounted for elsewhere in this thesis, the Northerners at the RTC and the 
TMC argued that the Juba Conference had taken the final decision on the question of 
unity, and that Southerners at that conference had then opted for this solution.24 The 
Southerners at the RTC and TMC unanimously agreed that the Southern region was 
insufficiently represented at the Juba Conference, and also that the conclusion that 
Southern representatives agreed to unity at that conference resulted from a wrong 
interpretation of the minutes of the conference.25 
 
The 1955 Torit Mutiny 
The general view expressed in the majority of the research literature is that the civil 
war in the Sudan began by a military insurgency in the Southern town of Torit, on 18 
August 1955.26 Some researchers have disagreed with this, though, and claimed that 
from 1955 until the beginning of the 1960’s, the warfare was just not intense enough 
to label it a civil war. Douglas H. Johnson is among these, stating that the insurgency 
in this early period was more of a “dormant insurgency” than a civil war. 27 
Considering the events in this period, as well as the lack of organized and efficient 
rebellion, this thesis will endorse the latter conclusion, as it seems to be a more 
accurate description of the events. 
                                                 
22
 Abel Alier in Dunstan M. Wai (ed.) 1973: 17.  
23
 The agreements and disagreements of the Juba Conference are disputed in the literature. The 
Northern historian Mohamed Omer Beshir concludes that the Southerners agreed to political unity at 
the conference, while Abel Alier and other Southern authors have argued that this cannot be read out of 
the Juba Conference Minutes. See Mohamed Omer Beshir 1968: 66, and Abel Alier in Dunstan M. Wai 
(ed.) 1973: 17. This was to become a thorny issue at the Round-Table Conference in 1965, which will 
be accounted for in Chapter 3 below. 
24
 See Chapter 3 below. 
25
 See Chapter 3 below. 
26
 See for instance Cecil Eprile 1974, Edgar O'Ballance 1977, Peter K. Bechtold 1976, Bona Malwal 
1981, and Deng D. Akol Ruay 1994. 
27
 D.H. Johnson in Christopher Clapham (ed.) 1998: 54.  
 12 
 
In August 1955 the Khartoum officer in charge of the Southern troops wrote a letter 
ordering Company No.2 in Torit to leave their hometown to come to Khartoum and 
celebrate the evacuation of foreign troops from the country. But the Southern soldiers 
were suspicious towards their Northern leaders. Convinced that this was a trap, and 
that they would be fooled to the North only to be killed by their Northern officers in 
Khartoum, they refused to follow orders. They mutinied against their Northern 
officers in Torit, a mutiny that according to Deng D. Akol Ruay “spread like a forest 
fire throughout the length and breadth of Southern Sudan”.28 The rebellion continued 
throughout the Southern region for more than two weeks, killing 336 persons. In this 
period, the rebels gained control of most towns in the Equatoria province. They only 
gave up their arms and their resistance after receiving assurances from the British that 
they would be guaranteed fair treatment and a thorough investigation of the 
accusations that had started the riots.  
 
But the British promises were not upheld, and when law and order as well as Northern 
control was restored in the South, the British representative, Sir Knox Helms, left the 
Sudan –and the Northern military in control of the Southern rebels and their leaders. 
Those who had not fled the country before the return of the Northerners were either 
summarily executed or put through unfair trials -that were in some cases judged by 
the same Northerners that had been victims of the violent rebellions.29 The roots of 
the 1960s rebel movement are to be found in those groups of people who evacuated 
into the bush following the surrender of the August disturbances in 1955.30  
 
Nonetheless, as Douglas H. Johnson and other researchers suggest, there was no 
ongoing violent conflict in Southern Sudan after 1956, until the military regime of 
Colonel ‘Abboud took power in 1958. R.O. Collins’ claim, which this thesis will 
support, is that the violent conflict only surfaced subsequent to and indeed as a result 
of the suppressive Arabization and Islamization policies imposed on Southerners by 
that regime:  
                                                 
28
 Deng D. Akol Ruay 1994: 81. 
29
 The procedures of these trials are documented in Report of the Commission of Enquiry: Southern 
Sudan Disturbances August 1955: 95-96.  
30
 Cecil Eprile 1974: 45, and D.H. Johnson in Christopher Clapham (ed.) 1998: 55f. For more details 
on the establishment and development of the Anya-Nya, see Chapter 2 below. 
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“General Abboud and his officers naively assumed they could achieve national integration and unity by 
the application of proper military discipline to impose a rigid and insensitive policy of Arabic and 
Islamization upon non-Muslim, non-Arab southerners.  The southern reaction was that conflagration 
that would burn uncontrolled for another fifty years.”31 
 
This claim is supported by the few studies that have been done on the establishment 
and development of the Anya-Nya.32 Elias Nyamlell Wakoson states that prior to 
1960 the resistance movement in the South was not an active or organised movement, 
and even in the early years (1960-1964) the rebel movement concentrated its activities 
on propaganda, training and organisation, and not on active warfare. 33  H. Hayer 
similarly argues that the situation in Southern Sudan between 1956 and 1965 cannot 
be legitimately called a civil war, and that the outbreak of civil war in the South could 
in fact have been a result of the failure of the RTC. 34  In this perspective, the 
widespread claim that the civil war in the Sudan began in August 1955 is inaccurate, 
at best. 
 
The rebel movement that eventually came to be known as the Anya-Nya was in the 
1960s a fragmented movement lacking coherent strategies, ideology and command. 
Until Joseph Lagu in 1970 gained control and managed to lead the guerrilla in 
efficient warfare, clashes between different rebel factions were common, a situation 
that made both negotiations and implementation of any peace deal difficult in the 
1960’s. 35  Both international and national forces pressured the military regime of 
Colonel Jafa’ar Nimeiri to seek negotiations with Lagu, and in 1972, a peace 
agreement was signed. This peace accord, known as the Addis Ababa Agreement, 
applied religious freedom in the entire country, admitted a certain degree of self-rule 
in the South, and allowed the Southerners to elect their own leaders to represent them 
in central political institutions. 
 
                                                 
31
 R.O. Collins 2007: 24. 
32
 ’Anya-Nya’ originates from the Moru and Madi languages, and literally means ‘snake venom’ or 
‘incurable poison’. Mohamed Omer Beshir 1975: 53. 
33
 Elias Nyamlell Wakoson in Mohamed Omer Beshir (ed.) 1984: 141-142. 
34
 H.K. Hayer 2006 (MA thesis, University of Durham): 33. 
35
 For more detailed information on the Anya-Nya, see Chapter 2 below. 
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Sources 
The normal Sudanese procedure for conferences and committees like the RTC and the 
TMC is to produce and publicize written minutes. This was not brought about after 
the RTC and the TMC, although taped recordings of their meetings do exist. The most 
important sources for this thesis on the RTC have been documents published by the 
“Sudan Informazioni” News Agency. 36  These consist of printed copies of the 
introductory speeches presented by the delegates and international observers, the 
Schemes of Proposals and final RTC Resolutions as well as a large amount of selected 
newspaper cuttings from Southern and Northern newspaper and additionally some 
newspaper cutting from foreign press, relating to the events of the RTC. For 
additional understanding of the procedures and chronology of the RTC, a M.Sc. thesis 
written by Mohamed Ali Mohamed Salih, submitted at the University of Khartoum in 
1971, has been very important.37 The two books written by Mohamed Omer Beshir, 
the Secretary General of the RTC, and their appendices, have also contributed 
significantly by presenting facts as well as historical and political context for the 
1965-66 events. The volumes of literature written by other actors to the Sudanese civil 
wars have also been important for understanding the conflict and the different 
historical and political perceptions forming the foundation of it. The most important 
among these are the writings of Abel Alier38, Oliver Albino39, Bona Malwal40, Oduho 
and Deng41 Mansour Khalid42 and Dunstan Wai.43 
 
                                                 
36
 Information about the “Sudan Informazioni” News Agency has been difficult to obtain. According to 
Massimo Zaccaria (Pavia University), this is probably a News Agency formed by Italian missionaries. 
Some missionaries established such organisations subsequent to the dismissal of all foreign 
missionaries from Southern Sudan in 1962. As the missionaries in Northern Sudan were allowed to 
stay in the country, they had to be careful not to reveal to the Sudanese authorities that they were 
continuing their activities counteracting Arab-Islamic influence in Southern Sudan. Thus, “News 
Agencies” and other organisations were formed, so that such activities could continue without being 
traceable back to their ‘mother-organisations’. Personal communication with Massimo Zaccaria, 11. 
May 2007. 
37
 Mohamed Ali Mohamed Salih 1971 (MA thesis, University of Khartoum) I owe great thanks to 
Professor Fadwa Taha, University of Khartoum, for spending time and efforts in bringing this thesis 
from Khartoum to Bergen for me. 
38
 Abel Alier in Dunstan M. Wai (ed.) 1973, and Abel Alier 1990. 
39
 Oliver Albino 1970. 
40
 Bona Malwal 1981. 
41
 Joseph Oduho and William Deng 1963. 
42
 Mansour Khalid 2003. Mansour Khalid was not an actor in the RTC or TMC, though an important 
Southern official in the Nimeiri period (1969-1983), when he worked as foreign minister in the periods 
of 1971-1975 and 1977-1979. He later left Khartoum and joined the SPLM/SPLA. 
43
 Dunstan M. Wai in Dunstan M. Wai (ed.) 1973, and Dunstan M. Wai 1981. 
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For the sources on the TMC, I am greatly indebted to Professor Robert O. Collins and 
the staff at the Archives & Special Collections at the University of Durham. The 
documents and materials that Professor Collins donated to the Durham University 
Archives & Special Collections have been the main foundation of Chapter 4 of this 
thesis. These consist mainly of Collins’ notes to the recorded minutes of the TMC 
meetings, as well as proposals by its delegates, and have been crucial to this project.44 
In addition, Salih’s thesis has contributed greatly to the understanding of the 
continuity and details of the discussions and negotiations.45  
 
For the Arabic definite article this thesis will consistently use the form al-. Exceptions 
has been made when a person’s own preference have been known to me, as, for 
instance, in the case of Abdelwahhab el-Affendi. 
 
Literature 
No thorough in-dept analysis has been done on the RTC and the TMC. Most writers 
only briefly account for the main views presented by the two sides at the RTC, and 
most barely mention the TMC. It has been widely accepted that the initiative was a 
positive contribution towards a resolution of the conflict in Southern Sudan, as the 
combatants for the first time met face to face and were given the opportunity to 
express their different views on the causes and possible solutions to the conflict.46 
This probably increased the understanding of the causes of the conflict, abroad as well 
as inside the Sudan. Nonetheless, it has also been claimed that its failure in effect 
sharpened the conflict as it led to disillusion in the Southern society and consequently 
motivated for mass recruitment to the rebel movement.47 Indeed, violence increased 
drastically in the six years following this peacemaking initiative (1966-1972), and it is 
only after 1965 that the rebel movement can be legitimately called a guerrilla.48 Thus, 
the efforts that were supposed to reach a constructive solution that could enable the 
South and the North to live in mutual cooperation rather than conflict had failed 
miserably. It is hoped that this study will find a more extensive explanation than those 
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that have been given so far, to why the RTC and the TMC failed to conclude this 
conflict, which was gradually turning into a civil war. 
 
The opinions expressed in the literature on this topic can be divided in three main 
categories: Firstly, those that mainly blames one party to the conflict, either the 
Northerners or the Southerners, for the failure. Secondly, those claiming that the 
reason for the failure was the timing of this peacemaking effort: That the time was 
unsuitable for a negotiated peace, as the main actors were not sufficiently motivated 
to make the necessary compromises. In the third category we find authors that 
conclude that the failure of the RTC/TMC effort was linked to the implementation 
phase: Either that it was the failure to agree on implementable solutions to the key 
issues or that it was the lack of implementation of the terms that were finally agreed 
upon that led to continuation of violence after the RTC/TMC. 
 
Unsurprisingly, Southern and Northern Sudanese authors are the major contributors to 
the first category. Abel Alier, an educated Southerner who participated at the RTC 
and TMC as a leading member of the party Southern Front, has written extensively on 
the conflict in Southern Sudan.49 In his opinion the Northerners were uninterested in a 
solution based on compromise, as their major goal was to maintain their dominant 
position in the Sudanese society. Oliver Albino, another Southern representative to 
the RTC, similarly concludes that the Northerners deliberately spoiled these 
negotiations, refusing to admit to the Southerners their legitimate right to self-
determination: “The North […] tends to pitch its refusal on the assumption that if you 
give anything to the needy you only run the risk of increasing his demands. All efforts 
are therefore directed towards frustrating any demands from the South.”50 Deng D. 
Akol Ruay, a member of the movement that organised the Southern rebels throughout 
the second civil war, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), 
joins Alier and Albino in their analyses. Ruay claims that the Northern unwillingness 
to compromise is proven by their failure to produce a second Scheme of proposals to 
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the RTC.51 He states that this was the main factor that led to the deadlock at the RTC, 
and consequently the Northerners were to blame for the failure of the conference to 
reach a solution. Clement Mboro, a respected Southern politician who represented the 
South at both the Juba Conference of 1947 and the RTC, was of the opinion that the 
failure to reach a political solution for the conflict was that the Northerners did not 
respect democratic principles. For instance, the Northerners kept insisting that the 
Central government should appoint the Head Executive of the South.52 Mboro states 
that had the Northerners agreed to allow the Southerners to elect their own leaders 
without interference from Khartoum, an agreement would have been reached “much 
earlier.”53 
 
Most prominent among the Northern authors on this topic is Mohamed Omer Beshir, 
a respected historian who knew the conflict intimately and worked as the Secretary 
General of the RTC. Beshir complains that Northern parties were not fully committed 
to the RTC, as they were busy preparing for the April 1965 elections. 54  He is 
particularly critical towards the Islamist segment of Northern politicians, when 
claiming that their insistence on an Islamic state alienated the Southerners and in 
effect confirmed their preconceived hostility towards the North. While admitting that 
the personal manoeuvring among Northern politicians and the resulting political 
instability created unfavourable conditions for a peace agreement in the 1960s, Beshir 
nonetheless blames the Southern fragmentation and lack of negotiating skills for the 
failure of this peacemaking effort: “Inside the Conference they were not only divided 
but also unable to recognise that there was a sincere desire on the part of the North to 
reach an honourable solution which would meet most, if not all, of their aspirations 
[…].”55 He also argues that external forces intervened in the conflict, a factor that 
eventually fuelled it into an unmanageable civil war.56 
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The Southerner R.K. Badal, commenting on the RTC only briefly and in comparison 
with the successful Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, seems to agree with Beshir that 
the main obstacle to the RTC was the fragmented and inexperienced Southern elite, 
when concluding: “[…] while the North showed the will, the South did not have the 
capacity to negotiate.”57  
 
Peter K. Bechtold is a proponent of a view that can be placed into the second category 
of analysis. Although not suspecting the politicians to be insincere, he states that the 
RTC was convened at a time when the main focus of the parties, the Northerners 
especially, were not on finding an applicable solution to the conflict in the South. “[…] 
no observer could avoid the impression that the parties failed to address themselves to 
any realistic analysis of, or solutions to, the problem at hand”, Bechtold states.58 He 
explains this by the political confusion at the time, as well as the factor also pointed to 
by Beshir, namely that the Northern politicians would not abstain from exploiting this 
unique opportunity to position themselves for the planned elections. This analysis is 
not objected to by the authors in the third category, though they tend to place more 
significance for the failure of this peacemaking effort on its implementation phase. 
 
In the third category of explanations, we find authors with a variety of backgrounds. 
The Southerner Dunstan Wai is among these, claiming that although both parties to 
the conflict agreed that devolution of power was needed to solve the conflict, it was 
the disagreement on the degree of devolution, and what powers to transfer to the 
region, that led the RTC into its final deadlock.59 According to Wai, the RTC and the 
TMC made important achievements that would prove significant in the future, and 
thus, it was the unwillingness to implement the TMC recommendations among the 
responsible politicians that led to the failure to reach a peaceful solution: “In essence, 
the potential achievements were eradicated by the lack of implementation of the 
conference recommendations.”60 Wakoson agrees with Wai in this analysis, and states 
that fear and suspicion towards the Northern elite dominated the mind-set of the 
educated Southerners, and prevented them from presenting implementable proposals. 
Wakoson takes this one step further, though, and claims that the presence of 
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mediators might have been helpful in convincing the parties to commit themselves to 
the process: “However, the absence of a third party to mediate between southerners 
and northerners coupled with a lack of committed and unified leadership on both sides 
also contributed to the failure of the conference”.61 Wakoson gives additional weight 
to the argument that the timing of the RTC/TMC process was crucial to its failure, 
when he points to the fact that many of the TMC recommendations were actually 
implemented by President Nimeiri as part of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972.  
 
The American historian R.O. Collins also concludes that the implementation phase 
was the main spoiler to the RTC: “It failed, not so much by what took place during its 
deliberations nor by its resolutions but by subsequent events”, he states. 62  He 
substantiates this claim by the facts that the RTC resolutions were never implemented, 
the conference was never reconvened as originally agreed to, and the agreement on 
procedure of appointments of members to the TMC was violated. Moreover, he states 
that the decision to go through with the plans to hold elections in the North only in 
April 1965 was the last nail in the coffin for finding a political solution to the conflict 
in the 1960s: As the forces that came to power subsequent to those elections were 
hostile to the South, and unrelenting in their denunciation of the ‘terrorists’ in the 
rebel movement, the probability for a compromise solution was from then on 
diminishing.63 Ahmad Alawad Sikainga agrees with R.O. Collins in this analysis, and 
states that Mahgoub’s plan for ending the warfare in the South, which he proclaimed 
in June 1966, “[…] represented a complete departure from the recommendations of 
the Round-Table Conference.”64 Moreover, his predecessor Sadiq al-Mahdi added to 
this when he refused to reconvene the RTC and ignored the recommendations of the 
TMC.65  
 
Theoretical Approach: How civil wars end - or why they do not 
As a general observation, peacemaking processes can be divided into 3 phases: An 
initiating phase (finding the ripe time to initiate negotiations), a negotiating phase and 
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an implementation phase.66 Traditionally, the first two have been considered the most 
crucial for succeeding, but Barbara Walter argues that although these steps are indeed 
important, the implementing phase is more difficult and crucial to the possibility to 
succeed than previously realised. Walter divides the traditional analyses that have 
explained the successful settlement of civil wars in two categories of explanations.  
 
The first category of explanations states that the crucial point in reaching a lasting 
settlement, is finding the ripe time for negotiation: When the economic, military or 
political conditions are likely to convince the combatants that a negotiated settlement 
is the most favourable option, then reaching a successful settlement is likely. The 
main factors that have been perceived as affecting the ‘ripeness’ of a given situation 
have been the costs of war, military stalemate and the degree and effectiveness of 
democratic institutions.67 Generally, it has been perceived as more likely that the 
combatants will choose negotiations before continued warfare if the costs of war are 
perceived too high to continue, if the combatants find themselves in a military 
stalemate where a military solution seems unlikely and if democratic institutions are 
developed to such a degree that popular opinion has an actual effect on the power of 
their leaders. All these factors are relevant to the study of the Sudanese civil war and 
the RTC/TMC. However, as this thesis will show, none of them are sufficient to fully 
explain the failure of the negotiations.  
 
The costs of war are commonly measured by two main elements: The duration of the 
war, and the number of war-related deaths.68 Walter’s study finds that these factors 
have a considerable effect on combatant’s decision to initial negotiations. 
Additionally, a military stalemate is perceived as crucial in this phase because it 
normally results in a realisation by the combatants that their military strength are 
somewhat alike, which, in turn, will often convince them that they will be equal 
negotiating partners in a peacemaking process.69 Moreover, Walter’s extensive study 
of post-1940 civil wars concludes that the consideration that democratic institutions 
and their effectiveness are significant for the likeliness of combatants to enter 
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negotiations is not valid as a general rule.70 This thesis will argue that the Sudanese 
civil wars, including the one under examination in this study, have been largely 
influenced by the sectarian basis of Sudanese politics, which, despite their root in a 
democratic system have proven unable to address the recurring conflicts in the 
peripheries of the country efficiently. 
 
The second category of theories argues that successful settlement is likely if the 
combatants have been able to agree to a compromise that solves the root causes of the 
conflict.71 Such explanations moves the focus away from the initiating phase onto the 
negotiating phase of the peacemaking process, and argues that although the conditions 
that enables the combatants to meet each other at the negotiating tables are important, 
the negotiation process itself must solve the core issues behind the conflict if the 
result is to be a lasting peace. Three main factors are seen as crucial in complicating 
this process: To which extent the contested issues relate to questions of identity, the 
divisibility of the stakes (to which degree the demands of the combatants are 
intertwined into each other), and the presence and role of mediators. The issue of 
identity in particular is especially linked to the added impenetrability of ethnic civil 
wars as compared to civil wars that do not contain ethnic elements. This is usually 
linked to the emotional character of identity-issues; as such complex questions cannot 
be solved through material or other rational bargaining, ethnically-based conflicts that 
have developed into civil wars are much less likely to be successfully solved by 
peaceful means.72 As for the divisibility of the stakes, it is commonly argued that the 
more dividable the ventures of a conflict are, the more likely it is that the parties will 
unite on conditions for a lasting peace agreement. Lastly, it is normally expected that 
the presence of mediators are directly linked to the success of a peacemaking effort; 
without mediators, the chances of successful settlement are slim. In August 1965, the 
Ghanaian President offered to negotiate between the Sudanese combatants.73 This was 
rejected by the Sudanese government, though, as it viewed the problem as an internal 
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one, that would not need external interference. This thesis will argue that such 
reluctance to include external mediation in the peacemaking process was a major 
obstacle to its success. 
 
The ‘Credible Commitment Theory’ 
The main argument Walter makes by her ‘Credible commitment theory’ of civil war 
resolution is that although the initiating and negotiating phases are crucially important 
for successful peacemaking these are not the main obstacles for achieving a lasting 
result: “In the end, however, the two most important factors in convincing combatants 
to both sign and implement peace settlements are third-party security guarantees and 
power-sharing pacts. Only then do we get peace.” 74  The main reason that such 
resolution efforts fail, she argues, is the basic problem of distrust between the parties 
of civil wars. Her basis for claiming this is that the phase where most peace processes 
break down is not the initiating or the negotiating phase, but the practical 
implementing phase.75 This results from the difficulties inflicted on this phase by the 
lack of trust between the parties.  
 
The implementing phase of a peace agreement inevitably puts both parties in a 
vulnerable situation, where they are required to give practical concessions that make 
them gradually weaker, as a result of, for instance, the integration of their forces into 
common military and administrative institutions. During this process, the danger of a 
surprise attack is closely felt by both parties, and: “Thus, even under the very best 
conditions – when combatants have initiated negotiations and signed a mutually 
agreeable treaty – the desire for peace clashes with the realities of implementation, 
and groups frequently choose the safer, more certain option of war.”76  
 
The fact that this phase is characterized in such a way by the impending danger that 
the parties would return to war, a mutually agreeable and signed agreement between 
the two warring parties will generally not be sufficient to make both stick to it, 
without a muscular third party. In fact, Walter claims that the third party in order to 
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secure commitment by the combatants should prove its own commitment by 
following up the situation throughout the peacemaking process: “The more committed 
a third party appears, the more likely combatants are to implement the military terms 
of a settlement and demobilize. Conversely, the less certain they are about a third 
party’s commitment, the more likely they are to cheat.”77 Hence, lack of trust between 
the parties in civil wars gives mediators a crucial role: It is vital that a strong third 
party put pressure on the combatants to stick to the bargain, as well as enable them to 
provide credible guarantees to each other that they will not exploit the fragile and 
difficult implementation phase. This option of verifying the credibility of the parties 
through a committed and muscular mediator is what Walter calls the ‘credible 
commitment theory’ of civil war resolution. Her crucial argument is that it is of severe 
importance that the combatants are enabled to prove credible commitment to the 
process of implementation, and that this becomes more likely when involving a strong 
third party. Thus, Walter’s theory concludes that the failures of resolution efforts 
often results from the lack of belief in the possibility of implementation of an 
agreement. Indeed, Abel Alier, member of the Southern Front and one of the main 
Southern negotiators during the RTC and the TMC, has claimed that even in the midst 
of those negotiations, neither of the parties believed that they would lead to any 
implementable solution.78 
 
While discussing the crucial implementing phase of peacemaking processes, this 
theory puts a lot of weight on the distrust between the combatants, and thus touches 
upon the psychological aspects that is analysed further by Kaufman’s theory of the 
‘symbolic politics trap’, which will be discussed in the following.  
 
The ‘Symbolic Politics Trap’ 
While Barbara Walter discusses civil wars in general, Stuart J. Kaufman focuses 
especially on ethnic civil wars, and analyses the particular problems that ethnic 
factors such as religion, culture and language diversity inflicts on civil conflicts.79 
According to Kaufman’s definition, ethnic war ”is a war where the key issues at stake 
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–that is, the express reason political power is being contested –involve either ethnic 
markers such as language or religion or the status of ethnic groups themselves. A war 
is organized armed combat between at least two belligerent sides in which at least one 
thousand people is being killed.”80 In the Sudanese civil wars, all those issues that 
Kaufman labels ‘ethnic markers’ were indeed contested. Although the existence of 
racial and ethnic conflict was strictly denied by the Northerners, Southern hostility 
and violence was claimed to be founded in systematic repression of Southern 
Sudanese cultures, languages and religions, and deliberate attempts to enforce the 
Arab-Islamic identity of the North on the population of the South.81 
 
One important aspect of conflict resolution pointed to in his article “Escaping the 
Symbolic Politics Trap: Reconciliation initiatives and Conflict Resolution in Ethnic 
Wars”, is that so far, no effective method for solving ethnic civil wars have been 
found. This is proved by the sad statistics for this type of conflicts: When counting out 
those that were solved through military victory, which is a morally unacceptable 
solution as it inflicts huge suffering, mass killing or other serious oppression, very 
few conflicts of this sort have in fact been solved. While the total number of ethnic 
conflicts worldwide in 1999 were 59,82 Kaufman’s “complete list” of successfully 
concluded ones after 1945 contains only six conflicts: Zimbabwe (1984), South Africa 
(1993-94), Niger (1995), Ghana (1996), Northern Ireland (1998), and East Timor 
(1999). Even this list is incorrect, the author admits, since all are still plagued by 
recurring violence. 
 
Kaufman attributes the low success-rate of conventional peacemaking in ethnic civil 
wars to the rationality approach that these have traditionally conducted. Actors of 
ethnic conflicts are seen as rational actors, whose main motives for waging war are 
material interests that have to be solved through compromise. When concentrating on 
material grievances and thus focusing on issues like political power, security or 
resources, traditional peacemaking have neglected those root causes that lay behind 
the mere practical grievances of the parties. Important features to address when 
searching for the roots of such conflicts are to be found in emotional factors: The 
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symbolic rhetoric that parties to ethnic conflicts utilize in order to form ethno-
religious identities and hostile images of the enemy form an important component of 
ethnic civil wars.  
 
The ‘symbolic politics trap’ is Kaufman’s theoretical construction, instrumental in 
illustrating how political agitation that exploits ethnic symbols and builds hostile 
images of out-groups effectively are driving forces in ethnic conflicts.83 Such popular 
emotions are utilized in order to legitimise the struggle and sacrifices, and are as such 
an important element of successful civil warfare. While this tactic is effective in the 
heat of war, it is likely to direct the leader into the so-called ‘symbolic politics trap’: 
Such mass-emotions are difficult to control, and constructs popular ambitions that 
‘trap’ the leaders in a negative spiral of hostile enemy images and irreversible 
demands. While moderation is needed when compromises are to be made, 
conventional negotiations addressing issues like re-distribution of land-rights and 
political and institutional power-sharing, need to add extensive reconciliation 
processes in order to create popular support for the peace-initiative. Because ethnic 
civil wars are basically conflicts between entire ethnic groups, and not merely 
conflicts between political or military leaders, measures directed to loosen strict and 
hostile ethnic identities while simultaneously promoting reconciliation on all levels of 
society are required for peace-initiatives to succeed. Dissolving hostile mass-feelings 
is a difficult task that has not been sufficiently emphasized when attempting to end 
ethnic conflicts through conventional peacemaking. Hence, according to Kaufman, 
this may well be the key to why such peacemaking has so far been largely ineffective. 
 
The peacemaking approach suggested by Kaufmann to be added to the traditional 
strategy of civil war resolution is thus a four-phase strategy aiming to reconcile the 
parties to ethnic conflicts as part of a comprehensive peace process. Firstly, he claims 
that timing the initiative according to the motivation of the warring parties is crucial. 
As long as any party to a conflict is convinced that there is more to gain from war 
than from peace, that actor is probable to spoil the initiative and obstruct the peace 
process. Thus, it is important to consider the situation on the ground and how it 
affects the motivation of the combatants, before a peacemaking effort is initiated, and 
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Kaufman gives one crucial guide-line to finding the ripe time: “Once the balance of 
power favors those who want peace, the time is right for a ceasefire.” When time is 
ripe, pre-negotiations and possibly informal ‘Track II-talks’ are necessary, Kaufman 
claims. At this stage the role of the mediators is vital, as the aim of this process is to 
bring together the opposing parties to the conflict to enable them to “(…) replace their 
mythical beliefs about the other side with better information and replace their hostility 
and fear with enough understanding to make a compromise peace look attractive and 
attainable”. As this thesis will argue, this was a major obstacle to the RTC and TMC 
processes, where the role of external mediators were deliberately diminished, as the 
parties to the conflict (the Northerners especially) insisted on the national character of 
the conflict, and the necessity of an internal solution to the problem. 
 
The second phase that Kaufman recommends focuses on “Negotiation and Political 
De-Escalation”. For this phase, Kaufmann suggests a range of efforts, directed to 
humanizing information-campaigns, educating all segments of the population on the 
human sides to the conflict in order to neutralize antagonistic attitudes. This phase is 
dependent on committing the leaders to publicly announce their commitment to 
reconciliation. Hence, key leaders on both sides should express understanding of the 
sufferings of their counterpart, and acknowledge their own partial responsibility for 
them. Such acknowledgements should be made a condition for continuation of the 
negotiations, Kaufman states, because the ability of the leaders to implement a deal is 
subject to doubt if they are unable to give such concessions. “At a minimum, this 
means prohibition against hate speech by leaders, and the media they control, when 
addressing their own populations”, he says. This is related to what Kaufman claims is 
the most important issue at this stage: That the leaders on both sides develop tools for 
obtaining support among their constituencies without turning to emotional nationalist 
appeals. As this thesis will show, this was not upheld by the delegates at the 
RTC/TMC. Both Hasan al-Turabi (ICF) and Gordon Muortat (Southern Front) 
publicly expressed doubts about the work of the TMC before the committee had 
finished its work. Kaufman also states that it is important to include all political 
groups in the peacemaking process, in order to prevent hard-liners and extremists 
from discouraging the negotiations and blocking ratification and implementation of 
the deal. 
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The third phase includes efforts to prepare the public for the implementation and 
conclusion of the deal. This should be done by diverse efforts directed towards 
middle-range and grass-root leaders as well as the masses. Major speeches by leaders, 
cultural ceremonies and other public relations efforts actively promoting the positive 
effects of the peace deal should be central components. Continuation of the efforts to 
counteract opposition to the settlement is crucial in this stage, and Kaufman suggests 
that veterans and émigré groups should be particularly enhanced to inform the public 
of the realities of the war. Fostering reconciliation among the masses is crucial, as 
these efforts should ideally culminate in some sort of a formal ratification, for 
instance elections or a referendum: “A successful vote can then be used to legitimate 
implementation as carrying out the explicit will of the people: charges of betrayal 
cannot then as easily stick.” 
 
The last phase of this process includes implementation of the deal. When referring to 
other research that has been done on this difficult and dangerous phase, Kaufman 
states that “Key factors that have been identified include supportive international 
interventions, well-designed and inclusive settlement agreements, and quick economic 
benefits that give ordinary people a tangible stake in peace.” Hostile emotions still has 
to be counteracted, as there is a tendency that hardliners continue their attempts to 
spoil peace agreements by reinforcing the hostile mass-emotions that used to 
legitimate the war in the eyes of the masses. Thus, a key factor in this phase is to 
make sure that the leaders do not return to their previous rhetoric of symbolic politics. 
This necessitates that the importance of group identities are altered and that feelings 
of group victimization are reduced, by downplaying the importance of the ‘chosen 
traumas’ that both the identity of the in-group and hostility toward the out-group are 
built upon. Measures that have given positive effects in this respect in the past are 
truth commissions and revision of school curricula. Practical measures to ensure 
cooperation between the previously hostile societies are also important, to make sure 
that hostile feelings are not merely temporarily repressed:  
“[…] the previous attitudes of hostility and fear cannot simply be excised; they must be replaced or at 
least balanced by some more positive feelings. It is also necessary practically, since failure to cooperate 
on issues of mutual concern will inevitably engender hostility which might contribute to re-igniting the 
conflict.” 
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One final point that Kaufman makes it particularly relevant to the peacemaking effort 
that this thesis will analyse: An effective cease-fire has proven crucial to 
reconciliation and successful implementation of peace agreements. The main cause of 
this is believed to be that violence breeds hostility, and thus counteracts reconciliation 
initiatives, no matter how extensive. Continued violence is thus a major obstacle to 
any peacemaking process. 
 
This thesis will analyse the Round-Table Conference and the Twelve-Man Committee 
in the light of these theoretical frameworks. By accounting for the main actors and the 
historical and political context of these negotiations, as well as the main issues that 
were approached and how they were resolved, this thesis will add to the present 
research status by providing an extensive explanation to why the Round-Table 
Conference and the Twelve-Man Committee failed. 
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CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL CONTEXT AND THE ACTORS 
OF THE RTC/TMC PROCESS 
 
After a range of debates concerning the status of the Southern region, the Northern 
political leadership gave in to Southern demands in 1955, and promised to consider 
federation for the South after independence. This promise became the key reason for 
the Southern politicians to vote in favour of independence, and subsequently the 
major formal grievance of Southern politicians in their struggle for self-determination 
during the next 17 years. This chapter will give a brief historical introduction to the 
political development in post-independent Sudan, before it examines how the main 
actors in Sudanese politics viewed the North-South conflict; its root causes and 
possible solutions. 
 
From Parliamentary rule to the ‘Abboud regime 
During the first parliamentary period (1953-1958) Southern Sudanese politicians who 
attempted to bring up the special needs of the South were marginalised by their 
Northern colleagues, and later, Khartoum governments consistently neglected 
demands of a federated status for the South.84 Southern Sudanese politicians who 
supported the continuation of the status quo, on the other hand, were rewarded for 
their efforts to preserve a united Sudan.85 The policy that was led by the Khartoum 
governments between 1955 and 1969 was consistently one of development in the 
North and central areas, and neglect of the peripheries. The British had produced a 
range of plans for the development of the Southern region before they left the Sudan 
in 1956. The Northern governments that took power after independence, though, 
never implemented them, and some of them were indeed realized, but in the North 
rather than in the South.86 As R.O. Collins states; “When the British left the Sudan in 
1956 there were numerous schemes for developing the Southern Sudan. Like 
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education, however, most of these projects had been postponed or abandoned in favor 
of economic undertakings in the North.”87  
 
According to one author, all the large political forces in the North, with the exception 
of the Communist Party, agreed that an Islamic constitution was needed and wanted, 
and “regarded the fast Arabization and Islamization of the South as one of their most 
significant missions.”88 In spite of this unison attitude, their personal disagreements 
were more apparent than their political unanimity, and personal rivalries and power 
struggles would tear the first parliamentary experiment in Sudan apart. The Umma 
party and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) won the 1958 elections, but the 
coalition was not strong enough, and the actors did not possess the needed spirit of 
statesmanship, to stabilize the country. The struggles over constitutional issues, as 
well as a deteriorating economy and the civil war in the South, led to the coming to 
power of the military in 1958, seemingly on the invitation of the Umma party leader, 
Abdallah Khalil.89  
 
Brigadier General Ibrahim ‘Abboud did not manage to improve the economy of the 
country, and both his political and economic reforms were disapproved of by the 
people.90 In the South, a policy aimed at fostering national integration and unity was 
implemented: Arabization and Islamization measures were implemented throughout 
the Southern region, intending to assimilate native cultures and traditions to Arabic 
and Islamic ones that had previously been successful in integrating the diverse 
cultures of the North. For instance, Arabic was introduced as language of education in 
the South, although in Northern secondary schools English remained the medium of 
instruction until 1967.91  It has been claimed that although this policy may seem 
arrogant and insensitive, it should be understood as quite natural and rational steps in 
the context of the newly independent Sudan. As Bechtold argues:  
“[…] fairness demands that this issue is placed into its proper historical and cultural context by 
examining the premises of northern thinking. […] in 1954 an international commission on secondary 
education, with no northern or southern Sudanese members, had recommended that Arabic replace 
English and that all mission and private schools be taken over by the government. The Abboud regime 
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merely took this advice at face value and proceded [sic] to implement it, just as it would any other 
program.”92 
 
However, the policies were a complete failure, and the discontent in the South soon 
developed into a violent insurgency. The military regime tightened its grip, and in 
1963-64 the region drifted into increased violence and disorder. 
 
The October Revolution 
The government had only just lifted a ban on public discussion groups, in an attempt 
to relieve the pressure put upon them by the increasing unrest and violence in the 
South, when flaming speeches over the civil war sparked the October Revolution of 
1964. It all began at a student meeting in Khartoum, where an emotional speech 
criticised the situation in the South, and claimed that the government was responsible 
for the situation. The speech stirred up anger towards the regime among the audience. 
The reactions were disturbing to the government, which withdrew its permission for 
public discussion groups, in an attempt to silence the criticism. But it was too late, and 
large groups of protesting students gathered in Khartoum on 21 October. It came to 
clashes with the police, and in a shooting episode one student were hit by a police 
bullet and killed. The government tried to explain the tragic event by a number of 
unfortunate circumstances, for instance that senior staff in the police and political 
administration were not present, and thus inexperienced personnel took important 
decisions. 93  But the Sudanese public rendered the excuses unacceptable, and the 
following day approximately 30,000 people joined the funeral procession for the dead 
student. Protests and large demonstrations arose in the week that followed, and 
general strikes were called to oust the military regime. The regime was overthrown, 
and succeeded by a transitional government, mainly consisting of representatives 
from the key groups that had taken part in and supported the Revolution. These forces 
were highly independent from the traditional sectarian parties, and consisted largely 
of leftist groups like workers unions and students.94  
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Consequences of the October Revolution 
Since the civil war was such an important factor in the overthrow of ‘Abboud and his 
military regime, it was impossible for the government that followed not to take the 
problem seriously. Sirr al-Khatim Khalifa was appointed Prime Minister, and he 
immediately started forming strategies for handling the civil war. Its central role in the 
October Revolution led to the acknowledgement among large sections of the Northern 
population that the conflict should be treated as a political problem. Prime Minister 
Khalifa was clear on his view that a solution had to be found, and that politics was the 
way through which to come to it. The Round-Table Conference was a direct result of 
this acknowledgement. 
 
Clement Mboro, former deputy Governor of Darfur, had been selected to work as 
Minister of Interior in the transitional government of Prime Minister Khalifa, and 
already 12 November, 1964 Mboro managed to convince the Anya-Nya to uphold a 
cease-fire while he and the Prime Minister visited the South on a so-called “fact-
finding tour”.95 The legitimacy of the transitional government was essentially founded 
on their commitment to finding a peaceful solution to the situation in the South, as 
opposed to the failed, violent policies of ‘Abboud. O’Ballance claims that the Khalifa 
government mistakenly believed that the insurgents basically had taken up arms to 
fight the ‘Abboud regime, and that they therefore would cease the violence when the 
new government showed its willingness to politically solve their grievances. If that 
was the case, the cease-fire must have been a disappointment to Khalifa and his 
government. Anya-Nya fighters exploited this opportunity to enter the towns, where 
they for the first time in years were allowed to move about freely. There, they 
intimidated civilians and attempted to recruit new ‘freedom fighters’. The response of 
the army to these activities varied greatly between the regions. In some towns, the 
army passively allowed those activities, whereas in other towns they were violently 
reacted to, and clashes occurred. The civilian population suffered any way.  
 
Violence spread even to Khartoum, when Mboro’s arrival from the government’s 
“fact-finding tour” was delayed and rumours occurred that he had been assassinated. 
Unrest spread among the Southern population, and the situation developed into a riot. 
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Serious clashes between Southerners and Northerners arose in the streets of Khartoum, 
and not until the following day did the police manage to calm down the disturbances, 
which resulted in 14 people killed and more than 400 injured.96 
 
As an answer to the increased violence, the transitional government increased its 
military presence in the South.97 Committed to its promises of seeking a peaceful 
solution to the conflict, the transitional government found itself in a difficult situation: 
While wanting to demonstrate its willingness to stick to the cease-fire, it 
simultaneously felt the pressure of the increased Anya-Nya activities. Additionally, 
Northern public opinion was intolerant of a “soft” approach to the problem. In 
January, 1965 both the Teaching Staff at the University of Khartoum and the National 
Front Congress publicly expressed worries that a one-sided cease-fire would weaken 
the government in the South and consequently strengthen the Anya-Nya.98 
 
The Anya-Nya 
Although the first civil war in Southern Sudan was not a direct continuation of the 
1955 rebellion, some of the key initiators of the Anya-Nya were survivors from that 
uprising.99  Many scholars have stated that the Anya-Nya movement was formed in 
1963. 100  With the exception of the 1955 mutiny, there was little active military 
resistance in the South before 1963, and even throughout the 1960’s it would be an 
overstatement to label it a guerrilla movement, due to its lack of organization and 
structure.101 Prior to 1965 it suffered from scarcity of finances and modern weapons, a 
situation that may have contributed to the fragmentation of the movement. As it 
proved impossible to finance and organise the movement through one central 
command, it was decided to organise the factions geographically, to allow each 
faction to take advantage of local knowledge and sympathies among the civilian 
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population.102 For years, the local population were their only source of money, food 
and other supply, as the attempts to gain support by international channels proved 
difficult.103 Consequently, army barracks and police stations for a long time worked as 
the movements’ main suppliers of military equipments, such as modern arms and 
ammunition.  
 
This situation was about to change as a result of failed government tactics in 1965. 
The transitional government, under international pressure, agreed to allow arms 
support from the United Arab Republic (Egypt) and Algeria, intended for the 
Congolese Simba guerrilla, be transported through Southern Sudan.104 This policy 
gave two main results for the Southern insurgents: Firstly, a number of weapons that 
never reached the Simbas, ended instead in the hands of Anya-Nya fighters. Secondly, 
when the Simbas lost and withdrew into Southern Sudan, most of their arms were 
given to or stolen by Anya-Nya fighters, or sold to them in exchange for food.105 The 
weapons they received as a result of the Sudanese government’s interference in the 
Congolese civil war came to them as a “godsend [sic] supply”, which was an 
important factor in enabling the Anya-Nya for the first time to lead efficient 
warfare.106 Thus, as the suppressive policies of the military regime of ‘Abboud had 
contributed considerably to the increased recruitment of new fighters throughout the 
Southern region, the policies of the transitional government added to this by 
contributing to the build-up of arms among them. 
 
Wakoson divides the Anya-Nya recruitment and activities into two phases. In the first 
phase the main focus lay on recruitment and training, and the activities were done 
randomly and uncoordinated in the different regions: The Western Equatoria and Bahr 
al-Ghazal units recruited fighters locally and gave them basic training locally before 
sending them to bigger training centres abroad. 107  The training camps outside 
Sudanese borders were in Zaire (Congo), the Central African Empire, and in Ethiopia. 
The former two were used as training camps for fighters from western Equatoria and 
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Bahr al-Ghazal, the latter recruited fighters from the Upper Nile Province. The Upper 
Nile fighting force was initiated in Ethiopia, and received all its basic training 
there. 108  Although exact numbers have been impossible to confirm, O’Ballance 
suggests that the Anya-Nya by the end of 1964 had probably grown into 5000 fighters, 
“[…] but only about 10 per cent had firearms”.109 
 
Neither the political nor the armed resistance in Southern Sudan were instigated as 
grass-root movements. Quite the contrary, it has been claimed to be an insurgency 
instigated by political and military elites that each in their own way and by their own 
strategies strived for the support of the Southern population:  
“The insurgency, in both political and military terms, was not, particularly in this first phase [1963-
1965], a mass movement; elite figures such as Deng and Oduho, in exile, were closely identified with 
encouraging political insurrection. Within Sudan, military leaders, such as Taffeng, were responsible 
for attempting to develop the fighting forces […].”110 
 
Indeed, the Anya-Nya miserably failed to produce political awareness among the 
Southern population, and thus made it difficult to gain support among civilians. The 
conflict between the political and the military wings of the Southern resistance 
movement increased throughout the 1960s, and there was a growing resentment 
among Anya-Nya fighters towards the intellectual politicians who would profit 
considerably after the war was won, although they merely talked while the Anya-
Nyas were fighting the war.111 
 
Emerging from a realization that any political solution to their grievances would be 
worthless, a group of military leaders got together and formed the Land Freedom 
Army (LFA) in September, 1963.112 This organisation soon changed the name to 
Anya-Nya, and a common strategy of military campaigns against the Army and police 
stations, although they most commonly affected civilians, was planned. On the 9th and 
19th September, 1963 the first somewhat organised attacks by Anya-Nyas were 
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carried out, when two police stations, in Pachola and Kajo Kaji, were attacked by 
rebels.113  Emilio Tafeng was appointed Commander-in-Chief, and a common military 
system, of formations, ranks and words of command, was agreed to. O’Ballance 
claims that the first Anya-Nya operations, which were launched from September 1963 
to February 1964 were a setback, which devastated Anya-Nya morale. 114  These 
attacks were not instigated by the military leadership of the movement, though, but 
rather by William Deng, a leading personality of the political exile movement: When 
the Northern army captured 60 Anya-Nya fighters and their Captain Bernadino after a 
failed attack on a military garrison in Wau, they found a letter on Bernadino. The 
letter was written by William Deng and authorized the attack on Wau. O’Ballance 
believes that Deng hoped to internationalize the conflict by these attacks, and that it as 
such was part of his plan to attract international attention and support to the cause of 
the Southern insurgents.115 
 
Until Israel initiated its support for the Anya-Nya in 1969, the movement hardly 
received any material support from foreign actors. 116  According to Douglas H. 
Johnson, the only international support the insurgents had in the early years came 
from South Africa and Malawi, a support that in effect may have harmed them more 
than it helped them, because they were merely attempts to lead the focus away from 
the unsympathetic anti-apartheid propaganda that those countries were subject to.117 
Other than that, the only foreign influence on their activities was the passive 
acceptance by Ethiopia, the Central African Empire and Zaire (Congo), when 
allowing recruiting activities and training camps on their territory.118 One reason for 
this could have been that the political aims of the movement were difficult to gain 
international support for. Their separatist demand was opposed to the public policy of 
the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), as one of the most important goals of that 
organisation was to maintain the borders inherited from their old colonial rulers. 
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Hayer concludes that the Anya-Nya was not a unified movement until the late 
1960’s.119 This is supported by Douglas H. Johnson, who claims that fighting between 
Anya-Nya factions was common until as late as 1970.120 This fragmentation was 
devastating to its efficiency and internal morale, and might even be the reason why 
the Anya-Nya were not represented at the RTC/TMC. In 1970, Joseph Lagu managed 
to unite the movement under his political and military control, and even though it was 
somewhat divided even under the leadership of Lagu, this period was the least 
fragmented in the history of the Anya-Nya movement. The opponents towards Lagu’s 
leadership either went into exile, “retired” from political work or were dismissed from 
the movement, and thus leaving Lagu to lead the movement without interference by 
rivals.121 Besides this factor, Israel’s support, which was channelled to the movement 
through Lagu, is commonly seen as a key factor in enabling Lagu to unifying the 
movement.122 
 
The Southern Political Parties 
It was not only the militant Southerners who were weak in the first decade after 
independence. The Southern region was represented in the National Assemblies 
between 1956 and 1958, but their opinions on the southern question were consistently 
ignored. In spite of their efforts, the Southern region was neglected politically, 
economically and materially, a situation which frustrated and disappointed 
Southerners either fighting in the bush or in the Assemblies, and it fuelled their 
suspicions towards Northern sincerity in the Southern question.  
 
When the Sudanese National Assembly voted for independence, 19 December, 1955, 
it was with the support of the few Southerners present. Their condition for supporting 
the declaration of independence was that federation for the South should be 
considered, a condition that was agreed to by the Northerners, but not upheld by any 
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subsequent Sudanese government.123 The first independent Sudanese government was 
a coalition government led by Ismail al-Azhari and the Khatmiyya based National 
Unionist Party. Two Southerners were represented in the Azhari government: Bullen 
Alier and Buth Diu. Both were dismissed because of their opposition to Azhari’s 
policy towards the South. When a committee to consider the Southern demand for 
federation was appointed, only three out of 46 members were Southerners, and all 
three of them withdrew from the committee long before its concluding report were 
published, because they were “always hopelessly outvoted”.124  
 
Abboud’s banning of political organisations had effectively forced all Southern 
political activists into exile in neighbouring countries. The actors that would be of 
most crucial importance to the RTC- and TMC-processes were those who in the 
‘Abboud period established themselves as prominent politicians working from exile in 
neighbouring countries. This movement developed without any direct links to the 
Anya-Nya, as the fighting forces in the South came to be known in the mid-1960s.125 
The popular overthrow of the ‘Abboud regime, and the conciliatory attitude of the 
Khalifa government, had direct effects on both the political movement and the 
fighting forces. For instance, politically aware Southerners were all of a sudden free 
to organise in political movements to fight for their beliefs, as the Southern Front did 
when organising Southern academics based in the North.  
 
Sudan African National Union (SANU) 
In 1960 the first Southern exile-based political movement began to surface and in the 
subsequent five years its founders and leading members functioned as the main 
political mouthpiece for the Southern cause, abroad and inside the Sudan. Whatever 
faction they belonged to, they claimed to represent the Southern people –even though 
no elections were conducted that could confirm this. 126  The Sudan Christian 
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Association (SCA) was established in Uganda in 1961. 127  SCA was founded by 
Joseph Oduho, Aggrey Jaden, Alexi Mbali and Saturnino Lohure. The latter 
functioned as a patron for the Southern politicians in exile until his death in 1967. 
Other prominent members were Marko Rume and Pancrasio Ocheng. In 1962 the 
headquarter of the organisation was moved to Leopoldville (Congo), and its name was 
changed, to Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU). By then, 
William Deng had joined the party-leadership, as Secretary-General.128 In 1963, the 
party moved its headquarter to Kampala, Uganda, and changed its name again, to 
Sudan African National Union (SANU). 129  SANU remained its official name 
throughout the RTC- and TMC-processes, although it disintegrated into several 
factions due to personal conflicts within the leadership, as will be accounted for in 
this chapter. These Southern intellectuals worked towards both international bodies 
and the local population inside the Southern Sudan. Appeals were sent to international 
organs, such as the UN and OAU, seeking support for their struggle.130 Additionally, 
exiled political leaders on at least one occasion attempted to utilize armed Anya-Nyas 
to create a scenario that would bring about a UN or OAU intervention of the South.131 
 
The conflict between Southern politicians and the Anya-Nya fighting forces was 
evident from the beginning. As political activity was banned throughout the Southern 
region, the political leaders were forced to work from exile, and thus their possibilities 
to control the Anya-Nya were limited. Ideologically, the political exiles deliberately 
distanced themselves from the militant groups inside the country. Oduho, for instance, 
while being SACDNU President, publicly denounced the fighting forces, and refused 
any connection with their activities.132 SANU continued this policy until they realised 
the potential of the fighting forces in late 1964. 133  This realisation initiated the 
struggle between the political and the military leadership, for power to command the 
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actions of the fighting forces. This struggle lasted until Joseph Lagu gained the upper 
hand and finally managed to unite the Anya-Nya under his command in 1970.134  
 
SANU was plagued by severe disintegration. The most crucial issue on which the 
SANU factions differed, were whether to demand complete separation or some sort of 
federation or con-federation. The two factions of the movement were lead by the duo 
Joseph Oduho/Aggrey Jaden (SANU-outside) and William Deng (SANU-inside), and 
their final split in 1965 was a direct result of the pre-Round Table Conference 
events.135  
 
Deng was in Geneva when he, without the consent or knowledge of the rest of the 
SANU leadership, wrote to the transitional government of Prime Minister Khalifa in 
November 1964.136 In the letter he suggested to organize a round-table conference to 
try to solve the violent conflict in the South.137 In addition to this suggestion, Deng 
demanded that the transitional government grant a general amnesty for all Southern 
refugees and that SANU be recognized as a legitimate Sudanese political party and 
allowed to function in the South. The letter also announced that SANU accepted that 
the Northern and Southern regions of the Sudan were to be recognized as one state 
with both African and Arab heritages and thus “two distinct personalities, cultures and 
temperaments”.138 It was thus proposed that federation should be considered as the 
future constitutional relationship between Southern and Northern Sudan: “Unity in 
diversity is the answer to the Southern Problem, and this can be found in a federal 
solution.”139 
 
This initiative outraged the more ardent separatists within the SANU leadership. They 
did not want any peace conference at that time, and they certainly did not want 
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negotiations to take place inside Sudan, where they felt neither welcomed nor safe.140 
Additionally, many of the SANU leaders did not accept the principle of ‘unity in 
diversity’ as basis of a solution to the conflict, as they wanted separation and did not 
recognize the decision of unity that was initially made at the Juba Conference of 1947. 
Deng travelled to Khartoum and engaged in talks with the transitional government, in 
spite of those protests. 27 February 1965, Deng and his followers arrived in 
Khartoum. 141  The same evening, the SANU leadership in Kampala released a 
statement announcing that Deng was dismissed from the party. The separatists in 
SANU insisted on holding an eventual conference either in Southern Sudan or outside 
the country, and strongly resisted Deng’s talks with the transitional government.142  
 
The conflict between the two SANU’s only worsened after it became evident that the 
security situation did not allow for the conference to be held in Southern Sudan, and 
Deng and his followers still continued the meetings trying to organise for it to be 
arranged in Khartoum. It soon became obvious that the split in SANU in fact 
represented two separate parties, with differing aims and ideas.143 Not until after the 
RTC, though, were the two seen as separate parties. By then, Deng’s SANU came to 
be known as SANU (inside) while Jaden’s group were known as SANU (outside). 
SANU was at the RTC represented by William Deng, Elia Lupe, Elia Duang, Hilary 
U. Akwong, Nekanora Aguer, George Lomoro, Lawrence Wol Wol, George Kwanai, 
Oliver Albino and Aggrey Jaden, although Jaden left after holding his initial 
speech.144  
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SANU (inside) 
William Deng and his SANU (inside) consisted of those member of the ‘original’ 
SANU who supported a federal or con-federal solution for the country.145 This put 
them in a somewhat ‘middle-position’ at the RTC and TMC, between the 
uncompromising Northern unionists and Southern separatists. Indeed, some of the 
RTC- and TMC-discussions ended up with agreement on proposals initially given by 
SANU (inside).  
 
In his speech to the RTC on behalf of SANU (inside), William Deng claimed that 
there were only two possible solutions for the conflict: Separation or federation.146 In 
his line of arguments it was claimed that Northern and Southern Sudan were too 
different to be ruled by a unitary government, and that these differences were part of 
the explanation for the violent insurgency in the South. As federation was not 
contradictory to the OAU Charter nor the principles of the UN, SANU (inside) 
recommended that such a solution should be implemented in the Sudan, and Deng 
listed a range of powers that should be referred to Southern administration for this 
purpose.147 Deng proposed the setting up of a Southernized command that would 
operate under a unified Sudanese Army, and that a Constitutional Commission of 
Southerners and Northerners, led by a neutral, OAU-appointed Chair should be set up 
in order to find a suitable Constitution for the country.  
 
In addition, Deng presented a list of 22 “Immediate steps to be taken by the Sudan 
Government”, which included Southernization of Southern administration, police, 
prison officers and other public positions, selection of Southerners to be given 
education for such jobs, developmental initiatives in the South, such as agricultural 
plantations and factories, reorganisation and re-planning of the School system in the 
South, freedom for anyone to establish private schools and hospitals, Southernizing, 
strengthening and reorganising of Broadcasting and Information Offices in the South 
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and re-transferring Southern educational institutions in the North to the South.148 
Many of these suggestions actually became part of the RTC recommendations that the 
subsequent Khartoum governments ignored. 
 
The insistent attempts by SANU (inside) to initiate a conference that could possibly 
conclude the civil war in the South gained a lot of support among Southerners, a 
support which essentially forced SANU (outside) and the Southern Front to give in 
and attend in spite of their initial resistance.149  
 
SANU (outside) 
The resistance held by SANU (outside) against attending the RTC if held in 
Khartoum, originated in a range of arguments, one of them being the fear that they 
would end up being deceived by the Northerners to agree to something even less than 
federation. If this happened, it could give Northern politicians another signed 
document, just as that signed by the delegates at the Juba Conference, seemingly 
affirming that Southerners would accept unity without a popular vote being held. 
Khartoum as a venue for the conference was also perceived as strengthening the 
Northerners, as it would weaken the role of the international observers, who would be 
“in the embarrassing position of being guests of one of the contending sides”.150 It 
was owing to the pressure by Southern Front delegates that SANU (outside) finally 
arrived in Khartoum on March 15 to attend the conference.151 
 
SANU (outside) were willing to accept nothing short of separation as a solution to the 
civil war, and thus Deng’s initiative and subsequent statements that Southerners 
favoured federation were perceived as a fierce betrayal. The party claimed that they 
had learnt “[…] from hard practical experience over the years to be suspicious of the 
promises made by the Sudan Government.”152 Nevertheless, they finally agreed to 
sending a delegation to the conference, although the leader of their delegation, Aggrey 
Jaden, abruptly left Khartoum after holding a hostile introductory speech on behalf of 
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SANU (outside).153 In his speech to the RTC Jaden demanded elections in the South, 
to give the Southern people an opportunity to decide for themselves whether they 
wanted a future in union or federation with the Northern Sudan, or as an independent 
state. The Southern conflict, according to SANU (outside) was based on the vast 
racial, cultural and religious differences between Northern and Southern Sudan: 
“With this real division there are in fact two Sudans and the most important thing is 
that there can never be a basis of unity between the two.”154 This is an important 
aspect of the rhetoric of SANU (outside). Their insistence on the impossibility of a 
solution implying unity with the North was directly based on ethnic differences, and 
was hence likely to widen the gap between the warring parties and their constituencies, 
as it legitimized continued warfare. By affirming and adding to Southern 
preconceived images of their own as opposed to the Northern identity, they created a 
situation where there was in reality no solution other than fighting the war until it was 
won, thus leading them right into Kaufman’s “symbolic politics trap”. 
 
Jaden also approached the foreign observers, claiming that the conflict had already 
spread to neighbouring countries, a development that would continue were the 
Southerners not granted independence. The Southern Sudanese people were subject to 
colonialism and suppression by their Northern counterparts, and the international 
community was obliged to recognize their struggle for justice and freedom, Jaden 
claimed.  
 
SANU (outside) consisted by mid-1965 of two blocks. The majority block argued in 
favour of independence gained through diplomatic means, such as gaining support in 
neighbouring states. The second block, led by Joseph Oduho, called themselves 
‘extremists’, and supported the Anya-Nya strategy of winning self-determination 
through military means.155 In June 1965, the Oduho-led block separated from SANU 
(outside), and established the Azania Liberation Front (ALF).156 ALF claimed that the 
Anya-Nya was its military arm, and that they controlled the rebel movement 
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politically. They wanted to take a harder and more violent stance to achieve their 
separatist goal, and Jaden initiately denounced them for extremism. Jaden and his 
followers ultimately merged with ALF, making Oduho President and Jaden Vice-
President of the organization. Nonetheless, the situation once again was spoiled by the 
personal rivalries between Oduho and Jaden, when Jaden was dismissed from ALF in 
December 1965, after allegedly having met William Deng to discuss the Southern 
situation, without informing Oduho.  
 
The Southern Front 
Southern Front was established in Khartoum in November 1964, by Southern students 
and academics in Khartoum, with Gordon Abiei as President.157 The Southern Front 
leaders were quick to establish the party and made the most of the few months being 
the only registered party of Southerners in Khartoum.158 They utilized that position in 
various ways, for instance by refusing to accept Ambrose Wol as Minister in the 
transitional government, and pushing through their own candidate, Izbon Mondiri. 
When formally registered as a political party in June, 1965, Clement Mboro was 
registered as its president, Gordon Muortat its Vice-President and Hilary Logali its 
Secretary-General.159 Its support-base was mainly Southern civil servants and students 
living in Northern Sudan. 
 
Southern Front worked as a mouthpiece of SANU (outside) in Khartoum, and initially 
of the same opinion as SANU (outside) that the RTC should preferably be held 
outside the Sudan.160 It supported SANU (outside) in the crucial issues debated at the 
RTC, and continually through the negotiations at the TMC, where SANU (outside) 
were not represented. The Southern Front leadership felt a legitimate fear to be 
sidelined by Deng and his party, were the government to proceed with the 
negotiations without SANU (outside) and Southern Front. Possibly resulting from this 
fear, they were the most ardent lobbyist towards the SANU (outside) when it became 
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clear that the conference would proceed even without their participation.161 The party 
sent seven delegations to East Africa to convince SANU (outside) to attend the RTC, 
although it did not declare its full commitment to the holding of the Conference until 
6 March, 1965.162 When it finally assembled, the Southern Front attended the RTC 
with 9 delegates: Gordon Muortat, Abel Alier, Gordon Abiei, Othwonh Buogo, 
Othwonn Dak, Natale Olwak, Lubari Ramba, Bona Malwal and Romano Hassan.163 
After realising the failure of the RTC/TMC process, Gordon Muortat left Khartoum to 
join the rebel movement, as did many Southerners in that period.164  
 
The Southern Front and SANU (inside) had a number of differences and disputes 
throughout the RTC and the TMC-negotiations; for instance who were legitimate 
representatives to the TMC, and whether to demand federation or separation in the 
RTC/TMC negotiations. The Southern Front representatives in the TMC supported 
the claim of SANU (outside) that they, and not the leaders of SANU (inside), were the 
legitimate representatives in that Committee and they also proved persistent in their 
demand for self-determination with the possible outcome of separation, at both the 
RTC and the TMC. The Southern Front opposed Southern elections in 1965, claiming 
that the security situation was not satisfactory.165 
 
Other Southern Parties 
Some Southern parties were indeed registered in the wake of the October Revolution 
that advocated neither self-determination nor federation. None of these gained any 
significant support, though they were represented in government and in parliament in 
the 1960’s. 
 
The Sudan Unity Party (SUP) emerged as a political group in the aftermath of the 
October Revolution.166 Its leaders, Santino Deng and Philemon Majok, were among 
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the Southern unionists who were appointed by the Khartoum government to attend the 
RTC.167 The Northern parties insisted that the Southerners should be represented with 
‘Other Shades of Opinion’, than those presented by SANU (inside), SANU (outside) 
and the Southern Front. They put forward an ultimatum, saying that if this was not 
allowed, they would boycott the RTC. The Southern parties protested, saying that this 
was an attempt by the Northern Parties to confuse the public concerning Southern 
grievances and representation. The ultimatum was nevertheless obeyed, and the 
Transitional government appointed nine delegates to represent the SUP. As will be 
further discussed in Chapter 3 below, the SUP representatives after a heated 
discussion in the RTC declared that they had no objections to the views of the SANU 
and the Southern Front, and thus the negotiations proceeded without their 
participation.168 
 
Santino Deng and Philemon Majok both claimed that they represented large sections 
of the Southern population, although that was contradicted in elections: Deng failed to 
win his home constituency in both elections of 1966 and 1968, and Majok, who 
formed the Nile Unity Party for the purpose of running for the 1968 elections, won 
only one seat in parliament.169 SUP criticised the leaders of SANU and Southern 
Front of being self-absorbed and living safe and wealthy abroad while others 
sacrificed themselves for their cause in the war in the South. SUP supported unity 
with the North, and claimed that by giving power to native chiefs and local tribal 
divisions in the South, the Southern Problem would be solved, within a frame of unity. 
 
Buth Diu, in an attempt to restore the Liberal Party, founded the Free Southern Front 
after the October Revolution, without much success.170 The FSF joined SUP in its 
criticism against the SANU and Southern Front, claiming that no political or 
economic grievances were legitimate in Southern Sudan. Rather, the “wrong ideas 
about the North” among Southerners were the actual problem of the South.171 Both 
the SUP and the FSF were accused of lacking credibility, as their founders had 
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cooperated with the ‘Abboud regime, and because they claimed more support than 
they actually had when attempting to gain positions and power in Khartoum. FSF 
produced two offshoots in the period of 1965-1969: The Liberal Party and the 
Southern National Peace Party.172 
 
In addition, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) founded a Southern branch; The 
Sudan African Socialist Union (SASU). SASU was led by Joseph Garang, who won a 
Graduates’ seat in the 1965 elections, and later was appointed Minister of Works by 
Ja’far Nimeiri after the military coup of 1969.173  
 
The Northern Political Parties 
The most striking feature of Northern Sudanese politics is the sectarian influence that 
has been crucial for every democratic Sudanese government since independence. 
During the Condominium, both the British and the Egyptians acknowledged the 
power that the Ansar and the Khatmiyya held as result of their vast support-bases, and 
their policies towards those movements in the period of 1920-1955 had severe 
consequences for the sectarian usurping of wealth and power in the country.174 The 
sectarian leaders, the “two Sayyids”, built up huge fortunes through their cooperation 
with the imperial powers, fortunes which later enabled them to further increase their 
support-bases and maintain a firm grip on the political and economic power 
throughout the country.  
 
The fact that their constituencies were grounded in their religious movements had an 
important impact on Sudanese politics in the 1960’s, and effectively hindered a 
secular development. The Islamic rhetoric of Northern political parties created fear in 
the South, a feeling that was regularly reinforced when debates concerning secularism 
and religion compelled the traditionalist parties to side with the Islamist forces rather 
than those more conciliatory toward the Southern peoples. This even threatened the 
                                                 
172
 Mohamed Omer Beshir 1975: 31. 
173
 Mohamed Ali Mohamed Salih 1971 (MA thesis, University of Khartoum): 65. 
174
 M.W.Daly in M. W. Daly and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (eds.) 1993: 7.  
 49 
unity of the United National Front (UNF), when Islamic forces suggested purging of 
the communists from that movement.175 
 
National Unionist Party (NUP) 
The National Unionist Party (NUP) was initially the political offspring of the 
traditional sufi-brotherhood Khatmiyya, although it was a complex political party 
which drew its support from a variety of sections among the urban population: 
Khatmiyya members, Ashiqqa supporters as well as some extreme unionists supported 
the party in the 1950’s.176 It also drew significant support from the Blue Nile Province, 
and from the nomadic Kababish.177 The NUP proclaimed its support for union with 
Egypt, under the slogan ‘Unity of the Nile Valley’, and was a devoted opponent of the 
British colonisers. In the Sudanese general election held in November 1953, NUP 
gained majority in the Lower House, and the party formed government under the 
premiership of Isma’il al-Azhari. The NUP electoral victory in 1953 probably resulted 
mainly from their uncompromising criticism towards the British administration, as 
well as from fear that the Umma Party would reinstate a new Mahdist state if their 
power was not limited. In February 1956 internal conflicts between Ashiqqa’ and 
Khatmiyya supporters overthrew the al-Azhari-government. The Prime Minister’s 
secularist position was supported by the Ashiqqa faction inside the NUP, but soon 
became intolerable for Ali al-Mirghani, the head of the Khatmiyya, who ordered some 
of his key NUP partners to form a new political party; the People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP).178 After this break with the Mirghanis, the NUP relied on the educated middle-
class in the Northern cities, and was seen by many among the urban bourgeoisie as an 
alternative to the ‘reactionary’ sectarian parties.179  
 
Ideologically, the NUP attempted to position itself somewhere in-between the PDP 
and the Umma Party, its two sectarian rivals.180 In spite the fact that the NUP claimed 
to be the only secular voice among the traditional forces in Sudanese politics, it 
strongly supported Arabization and Islamization of the South. Indeed, al-Azhari, in 
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the NUP introductory speech to the RTC, was not afraid to alienate his Southern 
counterparts, as he stated:  
“I feel at this juncture obliged to declare that we are proud of our Arab origin, of our Arabism and of 
being Moslem. The Arabs came to this continent, as pioneers, to disseminate a genuine culture and 
promote sound principles which had shed enlightenment and civilization throughout Africa […].”181 
 
NUP representatives to the RTC were Ismail al-Azhari, Mohamed Ahmed al-Mardi 
and Mohamed Osman Yassin.182  
 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 
Formed by the Khatmiyya groups leaving the NUP, the PDP was blessed with the 
support of Ali al-Mirghani. Consequently, the party gained its main support in 
traditional Khatmiyya strongholds, the areas North and North-East of Khartoum, from 
the rural tribes in Kassala and Northern Provinces. 183  When the Azhari-led 
government left office in 1956, PDP and the Umma Party joined forces and formed a 
coalition government.184 The Secretary-General of the Umma Party, Abdullah Khalil, 
became premier of this government, which by Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub is labelled 
“the most catastrophic [alliance] in the history of Sudanese politics.” 185  The 
ideological orientation of the party has been vague and shifting: It has fluctuated 
between socialist sympathies and support for the more conservative ideas of the 
Umma Party. The PDP leadership decided to boycott the 1965 elections, probably 
because they wanted to enforce alterations of the electoral system to its advantage, as 
they forecasted they would be unable to compete with the number of parliamentary 
seats that the NUP and the Umma Party were likely to win in the existing system.186 
This led them into an alliance with the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) and some 
trade unions in an “alliance of progressive forces”, whose main aim was to counteract 
the ‘reactionary’ forces of society; the Umma Party, the NUP and the ICF. In August 
1965, the PDP also withdrew from the TMC, again together with the SCP, claiming 
                                                 
181
 Speeches of the Delegates and Foreign Observers: N.U.P. - El Azhari ("Sudan Informazioni" News 
Agency documents). 
182
 “Delegates at the Round-Table Conference on the South” ("Sudan Informazioni" News Agency 
documents). 
183
 Peter K. Bechtold 1976: 82. 
184
 Deng D. Akol Ruay 1994: 88. 
185
 Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub 1974: 176.  
186
 Peter K. Bechtold 1976: 218. 
 51 
that the lack of a cease-fire made it impossible to reach a solution to the conflict 
through constitutional and administrative reforms.187 
 
The PDP representatives at the RTC were Ali Abdel Rahman, al-Hadi Abdoun and al-
Fatih Aboud.188 The opening speech of Ali Abdel Rahman made less direct proposals 
than some of the other Northerners.189 Nevertheless, some important considerations 
about the North-South relationship were expressed. As an example, it went further 
than most other Northern delegates in openly claiming that adherents of Southern 
tribal religions were not to be considered religious. Ali Abdel Rahman said that 
although Muslims were a minority in the South, so were Christians, since, as he put it: 
“(…) the overwhelming majority which is well over 80% of the Southern population 
are still Heathen.”190  This statement shed some important light on the claims of 
religious freedoms in the Sudan, as it was to become an important issue during the 
deliberations to agree on a Constitution in 1967-68: The draft Constitution that the 
Northern parties agreed to in 1968 held an apparent Islamic tone, and was seen as a 
victory by the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party the Islamic Charter Front.191 
The final vote on this Constitution was only interrupted by the military coup of Ja’far 
Nimeiri in May 1968.  
 
In the meantime, in 1967, the NUP and the PDP had decided to re-merge, again under 
the leadership of al-Azhari, into the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).192 This party 
drifted away from the ‘secularist’ line of al-Azhari, and in the 1980s released a 
political pamphlet that strongly warned against separatist forces in the South, and 
their hatred against Islam. It also stated that assimilation of the South and the 
establishment of an Islamic state had been the party’s policy ever since independence, 
and should continue to be enforced in peripheries all over the country:  
“It is our top priority to speed up the spread of the Arabic language throughout the South and in the 
Nuba Mountains. In this era of modern national identities the importance of language as a means of 
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consolidating the Arab and Islamic culture is obvious. […] We regard the spread of Arabic in these 
areas as part of Jihad (wholly war) for the sake of AlLah [sic] and Arab nationalism. 
 
Our policies toward the South thus outlined must be followed very soon by similar ones towards the 
Nuba Mountains and Darfur.”193 
 
The Umma Party 
As accounted for above, the Umma Party lost some support and credibility in the 
1953 elections because of their support for and cooperation with the British colonial 
administration during the Condominium. Nevertheless, this was a temporary situation, 
as the Umma Party can be said to have subsequently developed into the most 
powerful of the sectarian parties. In spite of internal conflicts, it held power 
throughout both the parliamentary periods of the 1960s (1965-1969) and the 1980’s 
(1986-1989). Its main support-base has consistently been the Ansar, with their 
traditional strongholds in rural areas North and North-West of Khartoum, and the al-
Mahdi family has maintained key leadership in the party ever since its formation in 
1945 The Umma Party has in numerous occasions proved their power by mobilising 
Ansar supporters, moving them from the countryside and into the capital to attend 
threatening and violent protests.194 
 
Although clearly being an Islamic party, and arguably developing increasingly in an 
Islamist direction throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, the Umma Party was not actively 
working for an Islamic state in the Sudan in 1964-66, and can thus not be described as 
an Islamist party at that time. Nonetheless, its roots were undoubtedly sectarian, and 
its electoral victories were dependent on its support of the Ansar, a factor which 
probably was crucial to its decision to support the cry for an Islamic constitution 
proposed by Islamist forces like the Islamic Charter Front (ICF). 195  Thus, the 
continuation of the political system as it had established itself in the country since 
independence undoubtedly was in the interest of the Umma Party.  
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The crucial political differences between PDP and Umma Party policies lay in their 
positions on foreign policy. Traditionally, the Umma Party was more pro-Western, 
and opposed Egyptian influence in Sudanese affairs, while the PDP was more critical 
towards the British and supported a Sudanese-Egyptian union.  
 
The Umma Party suffered from fragmentation in the parliamentary period in the 
1960’s, a split that weakened the party, although it was based on personal power-
struggles more than on political differences.196 Nevertheless, as the party led all the 
changing coalition governments of the 1960’s, it held the largest share of 
responsibility for the policies led towards the South in that period. The party was, in 
line with the NUP and PDP, insistent on assimilation of pagan Southern societies, in 
order to obtain a national identity based on the Arab-Islamic culture and religion. 
Sadiq al-Mahdi, Umma Party Prime Minister in the period of July 1966-May 1967, 
although being seen as a ‘progressive’ force in the Umma Party in the 1960s, wrote in 
relation to this: “The dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one and its 
overpowering expression is Arab, and its nation will not have its entity identified and 
its prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival.”197 
 
At the RTC, the Umma Party delegates were Sadiq al-Mahdi, Dawood al-Khalifa and 
Abbas Hamad Nasr.198 Sadiq held the introductory speech on behalf of the party, in 
which he claimed that the final decision concerning unity between the two regions 
was taken at the Juba Conference of 1947, and that thus, separation or federation for 
the South was by 1965 “useless” demands.199 Sadiq proposed the setting-up of a 
regional government in the South, and coming to agreement on a specific proportion 
of the national budget to be spent on developing the South. He also proposed to admit 
“full freedom of worship” in the South and the “Sudanization and Africanization” of 
                                                 
196
 R.O. Collins, personal correspondence, March, 2007. This is indeed supported by the fact that 
although seemingly favouring more liberal politics, especially in religious issues, Sadiq continued 
much of the policies introduced by the first Mahgoub government (June 1965-July 1966). Moreover, as 
for the conflict in the South, Sadiq never proved to be a liberal. He disapproved of the report handed to 
him by the Twelve-Man Committee, refused to reconvene the Round-Table Conference, and instead 
called for a completely new conference: The Political Parties Conference of 1966. See Chapter 4 below 
for more information on this. 
197
 Dunstan M. Wai 1981: 117.  
198
 “Delegates at the Round-Table Conference on the South” ("Sudan Informazioni" News Agency 
documents). 
199
 Speeches of the Delegates and Foreign Observers: Sadik El Mahdi for the Umma Party ("Sudan 
Informazioni" News Agency documents). 
 54 
all missionary activities in the region, as measures to reconcile Southerners and 
Northerners and end the violence.  
 
The Islamic Charter Front (ICF) 
The Islamic Charter Front (ICF) was basically an umbrella organisation for a number 
of Islamist parties, although its main driving force was the Ikhwan; the Sudanese 
Muslim Brotherhood. The ICF was established as a political party immediately after 
the October Revolution, as a means for the Ikhwan to run in the coming elections. Its 
leader, Hasan al-Turabi, was a highly charismatic academic, who had returned to 
Khartoum in the fall of 1964, after finishing his Ph.D. in Constitutional law at 
Sorbonne. The Sudanese Ikhwan was an organisation of intellectuals, and held a strict 
focus on “the intellectual quality of the movement”.200  Logically, then, the main 
support-base of the ICF consisted of students and intellectuals, and of the 5 
Parliamentary seats the party won in the 1965 elections, 2 were won in the graduates’ 
constituencies, and the other 3 were won in the Khartoum, Kassala and Darfur 
territorial districts.201  
 
The outspoken aim of the ICF was the establishment of an Islamic state in the Sudan, 
the South included. For the 1965 elections the main issues it fronted were the 
establishment of an Islamic state and Shari’a, economic reforms and the peaceful 
solution of the conflict in the South.202 Being the main proponent in Sudanese politics 
of Shari’a and the establishment of an Islamic state in the Sudan, the ICF actively 
sought to put pressure on the sectarian parties to gain support for these demands. This 
was to a large degree a successful effort, considering the constitutional draft that was 
proposed by the constitutional committee in 1968, which held an outspoken Islamic 
tone. 
 
Turabi and other prominent Ikhwan members in the ‘Abboud period blamed the 
escalation of the conflict in the South on the military regime and were persistent in 
their demands for the returning to democratic rule. After the return to civilian rule, the 
party held an uncompromising attitude on the issues of a centralised government and 
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the position of the Arabic culture and the Islamic religion in the Sudanese society. By 
proposing such ideas at the RTC, while holding the Anya-Nya exclusively responsible 
for the continuation of violence in the South, the party fuelled Southern suspicions 
towards the intentions of Northern politicians. Even Northern Sudanese scholars have 
claimed that by insisting on Islamization measures, Islamists in the North played a 
direct role in spoiling the RTC negotiations.203 This was probably an additional effect 
of the prominent role played by Turabi during the constitutional and administrative 
negotiations at both the RTC and the TMC. As Head of Faculty of Law at the 
University of Khartoum, he has been seen as “the chief Northern negotiator” of those 
peacemaking processes.204  At the RTC, the ICF delegates were Hasan al-Turabi, 
Mohamed Yousif Mohamed and Osman Khalid.205 
 
The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) 
The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) was established in the late 1940’s, although 
under a variety of disguised names and outlooks during its earliest years.206 Although 
banned during the colonial period and until the October Revolution of 1964, the SCP 
developed a strategy that allowed it to work as a political organisation underground 
throughout those periods.207 This strategy involved infiltration of workers’ unions, 
and consequently associations that organised lawyers, doctors, teachers and engineers 
were infiltrated by communists during the ‘Abboud period. Consequently, the party 
gained a political and organisational advantage when the military government was 
overthrown and democracy was to be restored. As all political party-activity was 
outlawed by ‘Abboud, the SCP was the only party prepared to instantly fill the 
political vacuum that resulted from the fall of his regime. Thus, the party became a 
major force in the first transitional government (November, 1964 – February, 1965). 
 
One distinct feature of the SCP as compared to traditional communist parties is that 
the communist ideology it proposed was moulded in order to make it compatible with 
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Islam.208 This probably gained them some voters among some segments of workers 
and tenants as well as some quarters of urban-based teachers, students and women. 
Additionally, the SCP has traditionally been the one political Northern Sudanese party 
working for major social and economic reforms. While the traditionalist parties have 
by and large ignored the interests of workers and tenants, the SCP has been 
characterised as “the most persistent proponent” of the interests of those groups.209 
The SCP was the first political party to address the conflict in the South, when it 
proposed regional autonomy as a means to solve the conflict, in 1954. 210  This 
recommendation resulted from a special session for discussing the situation in the 
South, held by the central committee. That same year, the party also demanded equal 
pay for Southern workers and the Sudanization of teaching personnel in Southern 
Schools, proposals that were endorsed by Sudanese labour unions after independence. 
One condition was required, though: That a Socialist organisation was initially formed 
and established in the region.211 
 
At the RTC the SCP claimed the roots of the conflict in the South to be the racial, 
cultural and geographical differences between the North and the South, and their 
exploitation by the colonial regime. It was admitted that negligence of those 
differences by subsequent Northern governments had exacerbated the conflict 
between Northerners and Southerners, and that as a result of this the South had to be 
offered regional autonomy. The party suggested that while matters such as economic 
planning, foreign affairs and security should remain with central authorities, executive 
and legislative power over local affairs should be transferred to regional authorities.212 
An important political issue for the SCP was the struggle against the exploiting 
classes in the society, and the political and economic power that the traditionalist 
forces had usurped and utilized in the Sudan were claimed to be driving forces in the 
violent conflict in the South.  
 
Nevertheless, in line with the other Northern parties, the SCP rejected separation and 
federation for the Southern region. Joseph Garang, a prominent Southern leader in the 
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SCP who was executed by President Nimeiri in 1971, stated in relation to the question 
of separation or unity: “there is no real national entity in the South, and for this reason 
alone the principle of self-determination cannot apply.” 213  The SCP actively 
attempted to recruit Southerners, an effort that was not very successful. Most 
Southern political activists supported Southern organisations, like SANU(outside), 
SANU(inside), the Southern Front or the Anya-Nya, and the SCP was an zealous 
critic of those. According to one author, this made the SCP conclude that the lack of 
‘progressive forces’ in the South hindered the establishment of regional autonomy for 
the region.214  
 
The SCP joined the PDP in their cry for electoral alterations and suspension of the 
planned 1965 elections, as they held one Cabinet post in the transitional government, 
which was more than they could hope for after elections, and they hoped to lengthen 
this period.215 Nevertheless, as elections proceeded as planned, the SCP did not join 
the PDP boycott, and ended up winning 8 of the graduates’ seats.216 Still, the second 
parliamentary period (1964-69) became no success for the SCP, as the sectarian 
parties enacted a law declaring it unconstitutional on religious grounds, on 9 
December, 1965.217 Sudanese courts overruled parliament more than a year later, 22 
December 1966, but this decision was neglected by the government, and al-Azhari, 
who led the Supreme Council of State, reconfirmed the ban on 16 April 1967. 
 
The Professionals’ Front 
The National Front of the Professional Organisations (The Professionals’ Front) was 
proclaimed 25 October 1964, and was a coalition of academics and workers with 
leftist affiliations. 218  It was formed by student unionist, faculty members from 
Khartoum University and Khartoum Technical Institute as well as judges and lawyers. 
Peasants, workers and other professional organisations quickly joined the 
Professional’s Front, thus making it representative for large sections of the Northern 
Sudanese population. The infiltration of such organisations by the SCP resulted in a 
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vast majority of communists and communist sympathisers in the Executive Board of 
the Professionals’ Front, as 11 out of 15 members were affiliated with the leftist 
forces in the transitional period.219 Consequently, the means for the solution of the 
conflict in the South was to a large degree similar to that proposed by the SCP. 
Western powers and the traditionalist Sudanese parties were held responsible for the 
problems of the Sudanese society, and the insurgency in the South was no exception.  
 
The Professionals’ Front actively supported political reforms aimed at liberating 
Sudanese women and improving their opportunities and living conditions, and linked 
itself up to the women’s organisation of Fatima Ahmed Ibrahim.220 Consequently, 
many women supported the Professionals’ Front, especially young, educated women 
based in Khartoum. Nonetheless, the popular support of the Front was negligible in 
comparison to that of the traditionalist forces, a realisation that led to it taking on an 
increasingly radical agenda.  
 
At the RTC, the Professionals’ Front’s delegates were Mekkawi Mustafa, Abdulla al-
Sayed and Ibrahim Mohayad.221 Although the dominant position of communists in the 
leadership of the Professionals’ Front may have been what enabled the movement to 
grow into such power in the immediate post-‘Abboud period, this was also to become 
a main factor in its disintegration. When realising that they would not be able to 
diminish the support for the traditionalist parties, the leaders of the Front in January 
and February, 1965, gradually resorted to more radical policies. When realising that 
the Front actually promoted the interests of the Communist Party, and not merely anti-
traditionalist policies, some organisations and members withdrew their support for the 
organisation.222 Nonetheless, the organisation was represented at both the RTC and 
the TMC.  
 
This chapter has painted a picture of the main political groups involved in the RTC 
and the TMC, and pointed out their political views on the North-South conflict. This 
is meant to prepare for an understanding of the various interests and positions that 
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were expressed during the negotiations in 1965-66, that will be closely examined in 
the following chapters. 
 60 
CHAPTER 3: THE ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCE 
 
As accounted for in the previous chapter, the October revolution led to significant 
changes in Khartoum’s attitude towards the South. While ‘Abboud refused to 
recognize there was a Southern problem in the Sudan, the transitional government of 
Sirr al-Khatim Khalifa chose a completely different strategy, publicly acknowledging 
that there was a conflict, and that it needed a political rather than a military 
solution.223 This renewed position in Khartoum had a range of consequences: For the 
first time a Khartoum government had acknowledged that the Southerners had 
genuine grievances, Southerners themselves were allowed to influence the selection 
of representatives from their region in government and the Prime Minister came up 
with immediate measures to ease the North-South-relationship. Another consequence 
of these concessions was that they made possible the Round-Table Conference (RTC). 
It is the proceedings and outcome of the RTC that will be given the main focus in this 
chapter. To begin with, however, the chapter will account for the historical and 
political context in which the RTC was convened. 
 
The October Revolution and the New Democratic Experiment 
The parliamentary periods of independent Sudan (1956-58, 1964-69 and 1986-89) 
have been short and frustrating, characterized by political bickering, devastating 
power struggles as well as riots or civil war. Even though the first parliamentary 
period (1956-1958) had been a disturbing experience for the Sudanese people, both 
Southerners and Northerners expressed relief and joy when the repressive regime of 
‘Abboud fell in October 1964. Nevertheless, public opinion was suspicious towards 
the national disintegration party politics had led to in the 1950s. Thus, the aim of the 
United National Front (UNF), when appointing the transitional government, was that 
the cabinet members should be diverse and representative of public opinion.224  
 
Sirr al-Khatim Khalifa was chosen, then, because of his integrity and knowledge of 
the Southern region, as well as the trust he enjoyed among the Southern population. 
Khalifa has been described as being seriously concerned about the increasingly 
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violent situation in the South.225 He indeed seemed seriously concerned about finding 
a political solution to the problem, as he already 10 November, 1964 issued a 
statement on the South, recognizing the cultural and ethnic differences between the 
Northern and the Southern regions.226 In this statement he additionally appealed for 
peace and negotiations, and stated that the only way to solve the conflict would be 
through political means. 
 
Nonetheless, the transitional government was clear about their lack of mandate to 
make constitutional decisions. For instance, the Minister of Information, Khalafalla 
Babikir, stated 22 December, 1964, the transitional government was “not empowered 
to adopt a solution for the question of the South […] However, it will spare no effort 
in creating an atmosphere for a bound solution.”227 Hence, in spite the fact that the 
transitional government had too weak a mandate to make any constitutional decisions, 
the policies implemented during his few months in power to a large degree went along 
the lines of Southern desires. Among the measures implemented in this period were 
the releasing of political prisoners; granting of a general amnesty to all Southerners in 
exile; returning freedoms of speech and press and repealing of the ban on political 
parties.228  
 
However, the UNF was fragmented, and soon internal conflicts and power-struggles 
would restrict the reformation of the Sudanese political system. The two camps within 
the UNF were led by different and opposing forces, which clashed in verbal conflicts 
immediately after their original common goal was reached, namely the overthrow of 
the military regime. On the one side was the Professionals’ Front, which represented 
the radical and “modern sector forces: organised labour, tenant farmers’ unions, white 
collar and professional organisations.”229  These forces advocated extensive social, 
economic and political reforms, such as anti-corruption measures for the military and 
the civil services, an Act of Unlawful Enrichment, agrarian reforms, lowering of the 
                                                 
225
 Mohamed Ali Mohamed Salih 1971 (MA thesis, University of Khartoum): 58. See also Dunstan M. 
Wai 1981: 98. 
226
 Mohamed Ali Mohamed Salih 1971 (MA thesis, University of Khartoum): 58. 
227
 Khalafalla Babikir, as quoted in Ibid.: 62. 
228
 Dunstan M. Wai 1981: 97. Both freedoms of press and speech were attacked in some serious events 
later: The massacres in Juba and Wau; the assassination of William Deng; the banning of the Southern 
newspaper The Vigilant; and the banning of the Sudanese Communist Party were but some of the 
actions carried through by successive governments in the period 1965-1969. 
229
 Abdel Salam Sidahmed 1996: 77. 
 62 
universal suffrage rights and the inclusion of women into this. Such reforms were 
opposed by the Traditionalists within the UNF, because they were seen to threaten 
their interests. As Sidahmed explains, these divergent opinions originated in their 
different motivations for the overthrow of ‘Abboud: The Traditionalist forces saw in 
this “the long awaited opportunity to regain office”, while the ultimate aim of the 
Professionals’ Front was to establish a new and strengthened democratic system that 
would hopefully counteract the devastating corruption and personal power-struggles 
experienced in the 1950’s.230 
 
The radical forces held the majority in the transitional government, and thus 
seemingly had the upper hand. The other camp constituted the traditionalist parties 
and the Islamic Charter Front (ICF), parties that strongly resisted the abovementioned 
reforms proposed by the radicals. The breakthrough, which led to their eventual 
seizure of power, became their insistence on the ‘National Charter’ paragraph setting 
the transitional period to six months, and the date for elections to 31 March, 1965. 
This period was by the radicals considered to be too short to enable them to 
implement their extensive programme, and attempts were made to postpone the 
elections. This initiated a landslide of protests by the right-wing forces, demanding 
that the transitional government resign if they intended to evade the ‘National 
Charter’. This developed into a mere power-struggle, which ultimately forced the 
non-partisan Prime Minister Khalifa to resign, on 18 February, 1965. The transitional 
government was dissolved, and a new one appointed, this time with a right-wing 
majority: The PDP, NUP, Umma Party and the Southern Front gained three ministers 
each, and the ICF and SCP were given two each.231 Khalifa was reinstated as Prime 
Minister, but this time the majority of his government had a completely different 
agenda. The tables had turned, and once again the traditional, sectarian forces 
constituted the inner circles of power in Khartoum. 
 
Round-Table Conference: Initiative and preparations 
In the letter that William Deng wrote to the transitional government in November 
1965, seemingly on behalf of SANU though really on his own initiative, he proposed 
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the convening of a round-table conference, to enable the political leaders on each side 
of the Southern conflict to meet and attempt to end the violence.232 Believing that 
Deng spoke on behalf of the entire SANU, the Prime Minister welcomed his initiative, 
and began preparing for the convening of the first political attempt to conclude the 
Southern civil war. 233  Several dates were considered, but the conference was 
repeatedly delayed, due to a variety of reasons: The visit of Queen Elizabeth on 8 
February, a planned Southern Front conference in Malakal on 13 February and lastly, 
the work to convince the reluctant SANU(outside) to attend.234  The date for the 
Conference was finally, subsequent to the arrival of Deng and his supporters in 
Khartoum, set to 16 March. The venue of the conference was also uncertain until after 
the arrival of SANU(inside) to Khartoum. In spite of the original demand of the 
Southerners that the conference be held either in Southern Sudan or outside the 
country, the secretariat soon realised that the security situation in Southern Sudan was 
insufficient for holding such negotiations there, and it was decided to arrange for the 
conference to be held in Khartoum.235 
 
Dawood Abdel Latif had returned from Kampala 26 January, 1965 with a 
prenegotiated agreement signed by William Deng, Michael Wal Duany and Elia Lupe, 
seemingly on behalf of SANU. 236  On 28 January, 1965, Latif met with all the 
Northern parties to discuss the arrangements. They agreed to the procedural proposals 
of SANU(inside) that were brought to them by Latif, and appointed a secretariat, 
which was to be led by the respected academic Mohamed Omer Beshir.237 One month 
later, the Vice-Chancellor of Khartoum University, Professor El Nazeer Dafalla was 
appointed Chairman, and 7 March, 1965 joint preparatory negotiations were held 
between all the Northern political parties, SANU(inside) and the Southern Front. This 
meeting ended with a formulation of the main objective of the Conference: “to discuss 
the Southern Question with a view to reaching an agreement which shall satisfy the 
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regional interests of the South as well as the national interests of the Sudan”.238 This 
formulation was brought up as a complaint at the RTC by the Southern Front, as will 
be accounted for below. 
  
The statement released by the parties after the meeting on 7 March also announced 
their agreement that the conflict in the South was an internal one, which had to be 
solved democratically and without foreign interference, and appealed to SANU 
(outside) to join the conference.239  
 
The work of the Round-Table Conference 
The Round-Table Conference (RTC) convened at 16 March, and lasted until 30 
March, 1965. It was intended to give Northerners and Southerners a possibility to 
meet and present each others’ views and proposals, in order to try to find a peaceful 
solution to the so-called Southern Problem, which all parties to the conflict seemingly 
agreed was a political one.  
 
The Conference was attended by 27 Southern and 18 Northern delegates.240 The 27 
Southern delegates represented four different parties: Two factions of the Sudan 
African National Union –SANU (inside) and SANU (outside) - the Southern Front, as 
well as the ‘Other Shades of Opinion’, a Northern-appointed coalition of the Sudan 
Unity Party (SUP) and the Free Southern Front (FSF). 241  The Northerners were 
represented by 18 delegates from six Northern parties. These were the Sudan 
Communist Party (SCP), the National Unionist Party (NUP), the Umma Party, 
Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP), the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) and the 
Professionals’ Front.  
 
The Southern representation became one of the initial RTC conflicts, as the SUP and 
FSF objected to their exclusion from the Conference, and publicly denounced on its 
opening day “the representation of seperationists [sic] alone, and the expulsion of 
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unionist elements.”242 The Northerners probably saw in this an opportunity to weaken 
the Southern delegation further, and declared that they were not content with the 
representation of SANU and the Southern Front. Many Southerners did not support 
the views of those parties, they claimed, and thus ‘Other Shades of Opinion’ should 
be represented in the Southern delegation. Some sort of agreement was finally 
reached on this issue, when both parties allowed the government to appoint nine 
additional Southern delegates (3 from each Southern Province) to participate in the 
Conference, although without the right to vote. This decision was opposed, though, as 
the SUP and FSF declared that there was in fact no ‘Southern Problem’, and that they 
would not guarantee their support of the RTC agreement were it to propose federation 
or separation. Some Northern voices also protested to this agreement, claiming it to be 
“a regretable [sic] surrender by the Government to the orders of the SANU […]”, and 
that “[…] it is one of a series of concessions to SANU that will, in the end, cost us 
dearly.”243 Nonetheless, after days debating issues of procedure and representation, 
when negotiations began on 18 March, both the SUP and the FSF had turned on their 
heels as they declared they had no additional view to those of SANU and the Southern 
Front. This u-turn was probably taken out of fear of being condemned in their home 
constituencies, as one ‘OSO’-representative stated: “I am now just considered as a 
Northerner, because I have been chosen by the North. […] But I have to go to the 
South; or shall I remain here indefinitely?”244 
 
Another conflict that arose during the opening days of the conference was a 
disagreement over how to guarantee responsibility for the final agreement.245 The 
Southerners wanted to submit the resolutions to the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU), to ensure national commitment to the solution and international involvement 
in the conflict. The Northerners opposed this, stating that the OAU would be an 
inappropriate organ to involve in this process, because the conflict was an internal one, 
which did not involve other countries. Moreover, the resolutions would be distributed 
to the observers to provide the kind of guarantee that the Southerners were asking for. 
As William Deng supported this last suggestion, the discussion cooled down, and it 
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was agreed that the issue would be decided upon when the final solution was reached. 
Nonetheless, no claims for additional guarantees were raised when the conference 
finally announced its resolutions. 
 
The abovementioned formulation, which stated that the main aim of the conference 
was to “reach an agreement which shall satisfy the regional interest of the South, as 
well as the national interest of the Sudan”, was also subject to conflict during the 
opening days of the conference.246 This formulation implicated problems that would 
be central in the debates of the RTC, as the content of the terms “regional interests of 
the South” and “national interests of the Sudan” were given no explicit definitions. 
Naturally, the delegates defined both the national interests and the Southern interests 
differently. The Southerners complained that the formulation implicated a 
precondition of unity, which they did not accept. The Northerners, on the other hand, 
claimed that the intention of this conference was to study the conflict with the aim to 
find a solution that would serve the interest of the Sudan as a whole. Hasan al-Turabi 
(ICF) claimed that if the final analysis concluded that separation for the South would 
be the solution that best served the interest of the Sudan, the Northerners might 
actually have to agree to separation. This debate finally ended with the following 
formulation: ”to discuss the Southern Question with a view to reaching an agreement 
which shall satisfy the regional interests of the South as well as the special interests of 
the Sudan.”247 
 
Introductory Speeches 
During the first five days of the RTC, in the midst of these conflicts of representations 
and procedure, each party held an introductory speech, stating their views on the 
causes of, and possible solutions to, the conflict. The strategy of the Northern parties 
was more co-ordinated than that of the Southerners, diverging only on minor issues, 
even though they were represented with a variety of political parties, from the 
Communist Party to the Islamist ICF. The following will point out the main 
arguments of the Southerners and the Northerners, and distinguish their differences, 
both between the two main blocks and internal disagreements, between the different 
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parties within each. Two of the most basic issues debated at the RTC will be given the 
main focus: The historical perceptions forming the basis of their arguments; and the 
question of unity or separation.  
 
Historical Perceptions 
The inaugural speech of Prime Minister Khalifa was a carefully worded speech, 
which was prepared by the secretariat and, according to one author: “[…] aimed at 
giving the Problem an objective outlook; to express the North’s seriousness and 
sincerity; to inform the observers of the wide dimensions of the Southern Problem; 
and to reprimand the extremist Southern delegates for their insufficient, misleading 
and distated [sic] evidence.”248 
 
The impression that this speech intended to give of the feelings of unity among the 
Sudanese people was romanticised and not very realistic, considering the increasingly 
violent rebellion that was going on in the South: 
“[…] there is complete and absolute agreement between all sincere Sudanese whether they come from 
the North or the South, or from the East or the West –as to the necessity of hard and consistent work 
for the advancement of this country and for the happiness of all the Sudanese people irrespective of 
their differences in religious belief, tribal dialects or racial origins.”249 
 
Further, this speech put the heavy load of responsibility of the conflict in the South on 
the colonial powers and European Missionaries, when calling their activities in the 
South before 1946 “[…] an organised part of an evil policy which was evolved by the 
imperialists for the purpose of destroying all human cultural and economic links 
between Northern and Southern Sudanese”.250 The speech acknowledged the lack of 
success that Northern governments since independence had in solving the conflict in 
the South, and criticised those Parliamentary governments of failing to address the 
root causes of the dissatisfaction in the Southern region. It also blamed the ‘Abboud 
regime for the increasing violence in the South in that period, while stating that its 
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decision to handle the conflict mainly as a security matter fuelled the conflict to an 
unprecedented extent.251 
 
The Southern delegates at the RTC claimed that their hostility towards the Arab 
Northern elite originated from several factors, one of them being the lack of 
development that the region had suffered from since independence. In this issue 
Aggrey Jaden went into a most detailed description of the measures undertaken to 
develop the South, and stated that “By the actions of the Government, Southerners 
can only conclude that their land is to remain undeveloped. The colonial government 
was very slow in developing the South; but since independence almost no progress at 
all can be recorded.”252  
 
One of the thorniest issues in the relationship between Northerners and Southerners, 
and certainly the most important one in fuelling hostility in the South towards the 
North, was the Sudanese history of slave trade. The slave trade had been a constant 
and devastating factor in the societies of the Southern Sudan particularly since the 
mid-19th Century and the participation by Northerners in that trade was still not 
forgotten by the Southern people. The main reason why this was still so important to 
the Southerners was, as the Southern Front put it, that “nothing has been done to 
demonstrate clearly a change of heart among the responsible offspring of those who 
were responsible for it“.253 The speeches of SANU(inside) and SANU(outside) were 
equally concerned with this issue, although the parties differed on what consequence 
–federation or separation –should be drawn from that historical experience.  
 
According to the Southern delegates, another historic event that had fuelled Southern 
suspicion towards the intentions of the Northerners was the promise Southerners had 
been given on the eve of independence, of considering a federated status for the South. 
William Deng claimed that this broken promise had become a proof to Southerners of 
                                                 
251
 This claim has been supported by various researchers. R.O. Collins, for instance, has stated that the 
Southern conflict did not exist until the ‘Abboud regime decided to handle Southern discontent 
militarily. R.O. Collins 2007: 23. 
252
 Speeches of the Delegates and Foreign Observers: Aggrey Jaden ("Sudan Informazioni" News 
Agency documents). 
253
 Speeches of the Delegates and Foreign Observers: Southern Front ("Sudan Informazioni" News 
Agency documents).  
 69 
the intentions of Northern Sudanese to dominate and assimilate the Southern 
population.254 
 
The speeches of the Southern Front and SANU (outside) also particularly stressed that 
the process towards independence as well as the ten years since it was proclaimed, 
had only given them further reasons to mistrust the Northern educated elite, by 
making unforgivable mistakes that had made restoration of trust between the parties 
almost impossible. 
 
The Northern delegates at the RTC stressed that the slave trade was not a history of 
one-way abuse: Southerners, British, Egyptians and Northern (Arab) Sudanese were 
equally involved in the trade. Northern delegates argued that whatever responsibility 
should be put upon the shoulders of earlier generations of Northern Muslims, the 
present generation would certainly not defend nor take part of any such practice, and 
therefore the hostility among the Southern delegates were unjust and misplaced. The 
real responsibility lay on the British, and their ‘Southern policy’, the Northerners 
claimed. This policy had grave consequences for the image of Northerners among the 
Southern population, as it isolated the Southern region, refused Northerners access, 
refused developmental measures such as education and the modernisation of their 
economy, and restricted the preaching of Islam and the spread of the Arab culture 
there. This denied development in the Southern region equal to that of the rest of the 
country. The Juba Conference was seen by the Northern delegates as a “turning point 
in the relationship between North and South” 255, and all the Northern introductory 
speeches stated that the direction of that relationship was finally decided by the 
Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1953. From then on, the Northerners said, it was settled that 
Northern and Southern Sudan would be one united country after independence.  
 
All the Northern parties concluded that the backwardness of the Southern region was 
inherited by them from the British, and not the main responsibility of the Northerners. 
Quite the contrary, the Northerners had strived to even out those unjust developmental 
differences inflicted on the country by the British, and made serious attempts to end 
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the hostilities in the South towards  the North since independence. As a delegate of 
the Professionals’ Front stated:  
“So since 1947 the Sudan, North and South, had been striving to achieve independence until their 
efforts were crowned with success at the beginning of 1956. And despite the hardship we had 
experienced in 1955 due to the mutiny, the northern Sudanese had been in full realisation of the 
immense problem they had inherited and had, therefore, been trying to provide a solution for it by 
peaceful means […].”256 
 
Nevertheless, it is possible to trace some nuances in-between the Northern parties in 
this issue. Firstly, the inauguration speech of Khalifa, although briefly and vaguely, 
criticized the Northern governments of the 1950’s for their lack of success in 
addressing the problem adequately. Sadiq al-Mahdi (Umma Party) blamed the 
Northern government of 1953-56 (the aforementioned NUP-government led by al-
Azhari257) of neglecting Southern grievances, and consequently disrupting North-
South trust and cooperation after independence.258 For the post-1956 governments, 
though, Sadiq claimed, in line with his Northern compatriots, that it had been the 
intent of the Northerners to consider a federated solution for the South, but this 
process was interrupted by the military coup in 1958.259 Similarly, al-Azhari (NUP) 
claimed that the NUP and the other Northern parties had taken their pledge to 
consider federation for the South seriously, though the 1958 military coup interrupted 
the constitutional work that would have solved that question.260 
 
The speech of Sadiq al-Mahdi was a particularly detailed review of the history of 
North-South relationship since the 19th Century. Sadiq stressed particularly the 
penetration of Islam and the Arab culture and the Arabic language as processes of 
cultural exchange: “This exchange had a bright and civilizing side which tried to 
spread the religion and [sic] the North and Arabic language; but its evil, dark side was 
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slavery.”261 As the spread of the Islamic religion and the Arab culture and the Arabic 
language was claimed to be a “bright and civilizing” effect of intercultural exchange 
between North and South, the spread of Christianity and Western culture in the South 
was seen as imperialist policies aiming at suppression and subjugation of the 
Sudanese people: “(…) European Imperialism had a crusading aspect that largely 
affected the directions it took and the organised way in which it imposed its language 
and culture cannot be ignored.”262  
 
Claiming good intentions and indeed giving some concessions to their responsibility 
for the conflict and the need for a change in the relationship between Northern and 
Southern Sudan, the Northern delegates were unanimous on the issues of unity and 
national identity. Although they admitted the Sudan was an Afro-Arab nation, the 
civilizing and enlightening effect of Arabization and Islamization in Sudan 
particularly and in Africa in general, came up as an issue in all the Northern 
introductory speeches. Concluding from the history of the Sudan, the People’s 
Democratic Party clearly stated their view of what Sudanese national unity should be 
built upon in the future:  
“Arabism which prevails over Sudan does not rest on any racialism […]; the homogeneity of Arabism 
constitutes our common feelings, enshrines our joint history, nourishes the uniformity of our culture 
and sustains the integrity of our legacy; all these entities are reflected on our lingua franca as a mirror 
image.”263 
 
Certainly, such statements did not contribute to assure the Southern delegates of the 
future status of African cultures and religions in a united Sudan.  
 
Unity or Separation 
The Southern delegates claimed that the decision to unite Northern and Southern 
Sudan had been a result of British imperialist interests: “As usual with Britain, […] 
she imposes unity where it is not wanted and divides where unity is demanded as it 
suits her imperial interests”, Gordon Mortat stated in his introductory speech on 
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behalf of the Southern Front.264 Mortat’s claim was nevertheless that the Northerners 
could not hide behind the failures of colonial policies: “Unfortunately the attitude 
adopted by the National Governments toward the South since 1954 has not faired any 
better; indeed it can be described as having been instrumental to our present 
difficulties.”265 
 
All Southern parties at the RTC agreed that the Juba Conference of 1947 was invalid 
as historical evidence of Sudanese unity. 266  As every Southerner at the Juba 
Conference had been handpicked by the British they had no proper mandate to 
represent the Southern population, the Southern delegates stated. Without such a 
mandate, nobody could be said to have the legal right to take a decision which were of 
such importance for the future of 3-4 million people. Hence, that conference could not 
be perceived as legally binding. Aggrey Jaden stated that the British had already 
decided in favour of unity before the Juba Conference, and William Deng, the most 
modest of the Southern representatives, said: ”[...] it is surprising to find educated 
Northern Sudanese arguing that the South had opted to unite with the North at that 
Conference.”267 Southern delegates also claimed that those Southerners who in 1947 
agreed to consider unity, had changed their minds after witnessing the consequences 
that decision had for the region. 
 
As for the ultimate solution of the country, the issue of unity or separation, the 
Southern parties diverged. SANU(inside) argued in favour of unity, although within a 
federated system of government, with significant powers transferred to the Southern 
Regional government. The Southern Front and SANU(outside) wanted separation.  
 
The Northern delegates argued that Northern and Southern Sudan shared a common 
historical legacy, and thus was intended to stay one united country. They considered it 
a question of choice between a peaceful solution implying unity and a violent solution 
implying the possibility of separation. Separation was not considered possible within 
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a peaceful solution. As the PDP leader, Ali Abdel Rahman stated in his introductory 
speech: “We are ready to contribute to the planning of the necessary steps should the 
Conference declare that the Sudan is an indivisible unity with its present boundries 
[sic]; and at the same time the Conference has to expunge from its dictionary these 
two words, namely Separation and Federation.”268 The Northern delegates argued in 
favour of a centralised system of government based on OAU principles of African 
unity because that would be the most efficient system, economically as well as 
administratively. Also considering the present situation, i.e. that the Sudan was a poor 
country, they concluded that the state could not afford to spend such resources on 
mere administration. Additionally, the Northern delegates considered both the 
proposed federal solution and the suggested elections, as being concealed attempts by 
the Southerners to achieve their ultimate aim of separation. 
 
The Foreign Observers 
In spite of the insistence by the Northerners on the national nature of the conflict, 
foreign observers were invited to the RTC. The initiative for their invitation was taken 
in William Deng’s letter to the Transitional government, in which one of the 
preconditions for the convening of a round-table conference was the presence of 
foreign observers from fellow African countries.269 The Northerners, then, suggested 
inviting Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Algeria and the United Arab Republic 
(Egypt).270 The daily newspaper Al-Rai Al-A’am reported that the Northern parties by 
inviting foreign observers wanted to provide the Southerners assurance of their good 
intents, to assure African countries of Sudanese commitment to African unity and to 
offer the observers the opportunity to influence and soften the separatist ideals among 
the Southerners.271  
 
The countries that sent observers to the RTC were Ghana, Kenya, Algeria, Tanzania, 
United Arab Republic (Egypt), Nigeria and Uganda. 272  These countries all faced 
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somewhat similar problems, although on diverse scales, and the observers generally 
expressed common interest with the Northern Sudanese in maintaining African unity. 
One author describes that the observers functioned as “[…] tacitly at least, a useful 
support for the Northern parties.”273  
 
In a speech on behalf of the RTC observers given at the second meeting, on 17 March, 
Mr. Welbeck, the Ghanaian Minister of Information defined their general view on 
their role at the Conference, when he said: “We have come here to offer our services 
to all parties concerned. We have not come here to dictate you terms as members or 
Ministers of a Government […].”274 This speech demonstrates how the initial intent of 
the observers was to assist the parties and obtain knowledge of the Sudanese conflict, 
though not to intervene in the negotiations by putting pressure on any of the parties.  
 
The observers held few powers to put pressure on the negotiating parties or provide 
security guarantees that may have motivated the parties for making concessions and 
introducing compromises. Nonetheless, as negotiations developed and became 
gradually more difficult, their initial strategy was somewhat changed, and they began 
intervening more directly in the negotiations.275 Unfortuneately, this intervention did 
not address any of the core issues to the conflict, but rather disagreements over 
procedure and emotional engagement based on mutual suspicion. For instance, at the 
fourth RTC meeting, on March 19, the observers asked for a meeting with the heads 
of each party.276 At this meeting they encouraged the parties to handle the problem as 
one of underdevelopment, and gave some examples of how their own countries had 
strived with similar problems. Moreover, they insisted that any separatist solution 
should be excluded, as Salih states; “The Uganda Observer said he did not know how 
the problem would be solved; however, that should be peacefully, within unity and as 
soon as possible.” 277  Thus, the foremost means of pressure undertaken by the 
observers was underlining their opposition to a separatist solution, which they claimed 
would threaten African unity.  
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Through five days, the political parties made their speeches, although interrupted by 
discussions and disagreements: According to the Northern newspaper 
‘Advance’, ”much delay was owing to discussions over questions of procedure”.278 
This was indeed true, as it had become evening, 21 March, before the two sides were 
prepared to present their proposals to the Conference.279  
 
Southern Schemes of Proposals280 
The Southern parties came up with two slightly different proposals for the RTC to 
consider. The first one was rejected by the Northerners, on the basis that it was 
“separatist”.281 After studying the Northern proposals, the Southern delegates made 
some adjustments to their original scheme, which they allegedly wanted to function as 
a reconciliatory proposal, expecting the Northerners would take an equally 
conciliatory stance, to go into negotiations on the issues in which they differed.282 
This did not happen. The Northern delegates never came up with alternative proposals. 
The RTC was fixed in a deadlock, and many issues remained unresolved and were 
referred to further discussion by the Twelve-Man Committee (TMC). 
 
The first SANU/Southern Front proposal underlined the importance of complete 
regional control of finance and economic planning, foreign affairs, the armed forces 
as well as internal security. The background for these demands was, according to the 
proposal, the experience of the policies of the past 10 years of independence. Because 
none of the various Khartoum Governments since independence had managed to 
secure the interests of the Southern region adequately, SANU and the Southern Front 
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proposed that the region itself should be in control of these institutions.283  Their 
proposal argued in favour of a “voluntary union” between the North and the South, 
which would have in common some institutions, as infrastructure, transport and 
agreements on free movement of people, services and goods.  
 
This proposal also suggested Southern elections, with three possible outcomes: 
Federation, unity with the North or separation “(to become an independent state)”.284 
In their second proposal, the Southerners included as a fourth possible choice: 
“Regional government”, which implied the constitutional and administrative systems 
suggested by the Northerners. The Northerners rejected any elections that opened for 
secession, as they suspected these suggestions were covered attempts by the Southern 
politicians to achieve separation. The first proposals of the Southerners also asked for 
the lifting of the state of emergency, that all Southern public officials be transferred to 
the South and that a commission should be set up “to select suitable Northern 
administrators to work in the South where there are no Southerners to fill the 
posts.” 285  The Northerners agreed that lifting the state of emergency and 
Southernization of the regions’ administration were necessary, but rejected that such 
measures were possible in the existing circumstances, with fighting still going on 
between the Anya-Nya and the National Army. They were consistent in their demand 
that the fighting had to stop and the rebels had to lay down their arms, before any 
political measures were possible to implement. 
 
Northern Scheme of Proposals286 
The Northerners argued that the first proposal from the Southern delegates was an 
outright demand for separation –or at the least keeping the door open for separation at 
any time, by the wish of the Southern leadership –and this was not an issue that was 
negotiable. They based their proposal on their views that neither a centralized nor a 
federal solution was applicable in Sudan. The military regime of ‘Abboud had, 
according to them, proved to the Sudanese people that a centralized system of 
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government led to military resistance in the South, based on “legitimate wishes for 
local autonomy”. 287  This uprising, the proposal argued, could be ended through 
allowing regional authorities to have decisive power in local affairs. Likewise, a 
federal system of government was rejected, on the reasons that it was a too expensive 
system for a country as poor as Sudan, and also that Northern Sudanese felt “that 
federation was a step towards separation (…).”288 
 
The Northern proposals contained, rather, a system they called ‘Regional 
Government’. Under this system the executive powers were shared between the 
Regional and the Central authorities. The Regional government was given the power 
to regulate a number of issues, under the condition they should be subject to national 
legislation. The list of powers given to the Regional government included 
establishment and administration of elementary schools, sports and arts events and 
museums and libraries, all health services except hospitals, land use and flood 
prevention, animal protection and preservation establishment of local and through 
roads, sewage systems, water, electricity and power supply, village planning, and 
“Recruitment and use of local police subject to the right of the Central Government to 
take over when necessary.”289 
 
Powers to be retained by the Central government were, among others, foreign 
relations, control of the army and police forces, as well as taxation and natural 
resources. All these issues were rejected by the Southerners, claiming that if any real 
power sharing principles were to be implemented, regional control of these matters 
were of crucial importance: “The experience of the last decade has shown that 
tranquillity and economic progress cannot be achieved unless the South has complete 
control of: a) Finance and Economic Planning  b) Foreign Affairs  c) Armed Forces  d) 
Internal Security (police and prisons)”.290 
 
The Northern proposal also guaranteed the Southern region a representation in 
Parliament proportionate to its population as compared with the rest of the country, 
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that the position of Vice-President should always be given to a Southerner, and that at 
least three of the Ministers in Cabinet should be Southerners. Religious freedom and 
equalization of wages and opportunities of employment was guaranteed, as well as 
freedom of movement and the establishment of a university in the South.  
 
The proposal listed five “urgent measures” to be taken, which should precede the 
implementation of the new system of government: Cessation of violence and the 
handling over of arms prior to the lifting of the state of emergency; the repatriation 
and rehabilitation of refugees (from Uganda especially291); Southernization of the 
administration whenever qualified Southerners were available; resettlement of 
dislocated civilians in the South; and immediate steps to allay famine the South. The 
first of these constituted one of the most debated issues of the Conference, and was 
one of the issues that were not agreed upon, neither at the RTC nor during the 48 
meetings of the Twelve-Man Committee that followed it. The Southerners argued that 
the armed uprising in the South was a result of the lack of measures taken by the 
central government to share its power. Therefore, they argued, it would be impossible 
for the politicians to disarm the rebels prior to the implementation of the required 
power-sharing principles. 292  They suggested a “Programme for Immediate 
Implementations”, which contained the Southernization of the country’s 
administration, police corps and prison wardens, directorship of Southern education as 
well as the Information service.293 This proposal was rejected by the Northerners, who 
argued that the main immediate task had to be the ending of Anya-Nya violence, 
before any political programme could be implemented. 
 
The ‘Special Minute’ 
On 29 March 1965, the day before the closing session of the RTC it was decided to 
appoint a Twelve-Man Committee (TMC) that would continue the work of the RTC 
on the issues that the latter had failed to agree upon. Seemingly, the conferees had 
come to a kind of ‘silent agreement’ about the most basic conflict of the RTC; the one 
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concerning unity or separation for the Southern region. Both Beshir and Salih states 
that while the Northerners continued to insist upon unity, the separatist Southerners 
had realised that their counterpart would never agree to separation.294 Nonetheless, 
none of the parties insisted upon stating this agreement explicitly in public, especially 
the Southerners, who feared that the Southern movement would disintegrate even 
further if it became clear to everyone that the RTC delegates had agreed to rule out 
separation.295 
 
Thus, agreement was made to draw a secret ‘Special Minute’, which was signed by 
Yosif Mohamed Ali, who was eventually going to be the Chairman of the TMC. It 
stated that the TMC would attempt to agree on a constitutional and administrative 
system suitable to the Sudan, and although this would not be officially declared, it 
was a clear understanding among the RTC delegates that “The terms of the said 
committee do not include the consideration of the two extremes –that is to say, 
separation and the status quo.”296 
 
The Round-Table Conference Resolutions 
The introduction of the RTC Resolutions announced that the Conference had reached 
agreement on three issues: The importance of national conciliation; that solving the 
differences of the parties was still possible; and that peaceful means was the only way 
to solve the conflict.297 Drawing from these considerations, the resolutions listed a 
range of measures that were agreed upon by the delegates and thus should be 
implemented by the Sudanese government. 
 
This included a list of practical measures that would contribute to “normalise the 
situation in the South”: Resettlement of Ugandan refugees, diplomatic efforts should 
be directed towards other neighbouring countries, aiming to reach agreements for 
settlement of all refugees in those countries, resettlement of internal refugees, making 
requests to the Sudanese government to make efforts for alleviating famine by 
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investigating its “inherent causes” and making necessary steps to hinder it in the 
future, and lastly, the retransfer of all Southern schools in the North back to the South.  
 
The Resolutions followed up this by giving 13 points of “lines of policy” that should 
be adopted by the Sudanese government. These recommended that Southerners 
should be given training for and jobs in Southern police and prisons, administration, 
the military, public health, forest officers and games and fisheries officers, and 
additionally that they should receive wages equal to those of their Northern 
counterparts. These issues were not mentioned in the Northern Scheme of Proposals, 
as similar suggestions were in fact rejected by the Northern delegates when proposed 
by the Southerners, on the reason that the most urgent task at that time was the 
disarmament of the Anya-Nya. Nevertheless, these measures were in the RTC 
Resolutions proposed as the three initial points in a list of “lines of policy” 
recommended to the government.  
 
Additionally, a fourth point of agreement that was recommended to be adopted as a 
line of policy by the government was the establishment of freedom of religion and 
missionary activities “within the laws of the land”. Fifthly, it was recommended to 
allow any private person or organisation to open schools, and sixthly it was 
recommended to allow freedom of movement throughout the country. Points seven 
and eight recommended the opening of a University as well as Girls’ Secondary 
schools in the South and an Agricultural school in Malakal. It was also recommended 
to re-open the Yambio Agricultural school, Juba Training Centre and Malakal 
Veterinary Centre, and that all Southern schools were to be headed by “qualified 
Southerners”. In this respect, it was specifically underlined that Arabic-skills were not 
to be required for promotions to top jobs in educational institutions. The following 
lines of policies recommended for adoption by the government were to find jobs for 
the unemployed and national and regional councils to speed up economic 
development, nationally as well as regionally. Under the latter point it was 
recommended that the government take into consideration different developmental 
schemes presented from 1954 onwards. The Azande scheme in particular was 
recommended to be taken into consideration. Lastly, it was recommended that the 
government should give “priority and facilities to the local population in the 
exploitation of land.”  
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In the Resolutions the delegates declared their determination to resolve the conflict 
and execute the policies agreed upon. They also declared their preparedness “to go 
into a peace campaign to tour the South, to pacify and normalize” and that they would 
make serious attempts to end the violence within a timescale of 2 months. 
 
It was declared that the delegates had not come to agreement on any suitable 
constitutional and administrative system for the country, and that this task was 
referred to a Twelve-Man Committee, which was to end its work within three months. 
The conference was nevertheless depicted a success in some respects; in giving the 
political leaders the possibility to meet and present to each other, and to the observers 
from neighbouring countries, their grievances and views; in calming suspicions and 
establishing a basis for understanding between the parties; and lastly, in informing the 
civilian population in the entire country of the facts, in order to enable them to, as 
formulated in the RTC report: “appreciate the problem and see it in its true 
perspective.” 
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CHAPTER 4: THE TWELVE-MAN COMMITTEE 
 
The Resolutions of the Round-Table Conference (RTC) appointed the Twelve-Man 
Committee (TMC), intending it to spend three months to propose a constitutional and 
administrative set-up for the country which would prepare both parties to put down 
their weapons and cooperate to establish law and order in the South. From the 
beginning, though, these intentions were not given top priority by Sudanese 
politicians.  
 
The work of the TMC was supposed to begin immediately after the end of the RTC, 
and it was supposed to finish its work within 3 months.298 Nevertheless, it took nearly 
two months from the conclusion of the RTC until the first TMC meeting. The reason 
for this was given to be that the government and the Northern politicians were 
preoccupied with the General Elections, which were conducted in April.299 As will be 
argued in this thesis, this is only one of the indications that the conclusion of the civil 
war was not considered the most important issue by the responsible actors in the 
conflict. No matter how sincere Prime Minister Khalifa might have been on this issue, 
his engagement in solving the civil war peacefully did not rub off on the Northern 
politicians who succeeded him in power. The Southerners, on the other hand, were 
militarily and politically stronger than ever, and had seemingly no intention to stop 
the warfare on the basis of an uncertain peace treaty. 
 
Elections and Political Confusion 
Elections were held in Northern Sudan 21 April, 1965, resulting in a coalition 
government formed by NUP and the Umma Party.300 Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub 
gained the premiership, and the new government took office 14 June, 1965. PDP 
boycotted these elections, and formed, together with SCP, who had gained only 8 
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seats in Parliament, 301  the Socialist Democratic Group, which was an opposition 
group protesting against the Maghoub government.302  
 
Due to the continuing and increasingly intensifying warfare, elections were suspended 
in the South, leaving unanswered the question as to which political party was the most 
representative of Southern public opinion. Nonetheless, the Southern parties in 
Khartoum managed to negotiate conditions enabling them to keep the representation 
that they had in the Transitional Government.303 Mahgoub proposed to give SANU 
(inside), the Southern Front and the Liberal Party one Minister each, but while 
claiming to be the major representative of the Southern people, both SANU (inside) 
and the Southern Front demanded all three seats. The Southern Front stated that they 
declined “cocktail representation of the Southern parties in the Coalition 
Government”, thus rejecting their position, which was then handed over to SANU 
(inside).304 Andrew Wieu and Alfred Wol from SANU (inside) were then given two 
Ministries in the government, but both withdrew because they rejected the 
participation of the third Southern Minister that Mahgoub appointed; Buth Diu from 
the Liberal Party.305 Consequently, in the end, the Southern party with probably the 
narrowest support-base of them all were the only one represented in the first Mahgoub 
government.  
 
The Mahgoub governments (June 1965-July 1966 and May 1967-May 1969) chose 
force as the main remedy for solving the conflict, and thus, as has been repeatedly 
suggested, signalled that they had learnt nothing from the conduct of previous 
governments towards the South.306  Mahgoub consistently labelled the Anya-Nyas 
‘terrorists’, and was insistent on the need to fight them by force. 307  Statements 
Mahgoub made in the press and elsewhere about the civil war and the government’s 
approach to it repeatedly frustrated the work of the TMC. As shown in this study, the 
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Prime Minister’s conduct towards the work of the TMC fuelled the distrust among 
Southerners and hardened the forces at the negotiating table.  
 
While keeping representatives in the TMC, and thus seemingly trying to make peace 
through political compromises, all the Northern parties in the National Assembly 
voted in favour of the military offensive that was conducted in the South during 
summer 1965. The gravest incidents in the South during the work of the TMC were 
the massacres in Juba on 8 July and in Wau on 12 July, 1965. Both have in retrospect 
been claimed to have been deliberate military actions aiming at slaughtering educated 
Southerners. 308  If that allegation was true, it is certainly safe to say that both 
offensives were successful in that respect: The massacre in Juba killed some 1400 
Southerners, many of whom were among the educated Southern elite, and in Wau 
four days later, 76 educated Southerners were killed. R.O. Collins suggests that it is 
likely that the military offensive in the South enjoyed support by Northerners in 
general, although without realising the huge suffering those policies inflicted on the 
Southern civilian population.309 One example of such support is given in a series of 
political articles printed in the Newspaper Al-Ayam in April and May, 1965.310 
 
25 July, 1966 the young Sadiq al-Mahdi, nephew of the Imam Hadi Abdal Rahman al-
Mahdi, instigated a successful vote of no confidence against Mahgoub, and 
subsequently gained the premiership for little less than a year. Sadiq’s policies 
towards the South were somewhat more conciliatory than those of Mahgoub, 
attempting for instance to put some restraint on the conduct of the army towards 
civilians. He gained some support among some Southerners because of this, 
especially from William Deng’s SANU (inside), who joined his government as part of 
a coalition.311 Sadiq was quite controversial even in religio-political issues, arguing in 
favour of a secular government unrestricted by sectarian influences. He also, at least 
formally, adopted a more positive attitude towards the TMC, as he reportedly 
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described the work of the TMC as “the only serious task that was done during the last 
eight months, which deserves being proud of.”312 
 
Nevertheless, his government did little to implement the TMC resolutions and never 
reconvened the RTC, as agreed to by the parties in March 1965. Instead, an ‘All-
Parties Conference’ was convened in November 1966, after which the Constitution 
Committee began its work, which ultimately ended in a proposed Islamic 
Constitution. 313  These Committees were unsuccessfully resisted, and eventually 
boycotted, by the Southern political leadership. Sadiq never managed to mobilise his 
supporters into sufficient action on behalf of his vision of a secular Umma Party, and 
the Umma Party split became increasingly more threatening to his power until he 
ultimately lost this power-struggle and had to return the premiership to Mahgoub in 
May 1967. Mahgoub returned to his previous policies, reinstating in the South the 
emergency laws that Sadiq had abandoned.314 Consequently, warfare in the South 
increased, and the possibilities of implementing a compromise deal diminished, as 
events in the South increased recruitment and support of the Anya-Nya among 
Southern civilians. 
 
This was the political context of which the members of the TMC spent 48 meetings 
spread over more than a year, debating a possible constitutional and administrative 
basis on which to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Throughout 1965 and 1966, 
the situation in the South developed more and more into a regular civil war, with 
heavy fighting between the armed forces and the increasingly coordinated guerrilla 
movement.  
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The Work of the Twelve-Man Committee 
The ultimate aim was that the TMC and eventually a reconvened Round-Table 
Conference, should agree on a working democratic system that would fulfil the 
aspirations of both sides to the extent which was needed to secure a lasting peace. 
Additionally, the TMC was meant to function as a “watch committee” on behalf of 
the RTC, to follow up the elected government on its implementation of the measures 
that were so far recommended. Lastly, the Committee was supposed to agree on 
practically oriented plans on three issues: How to normalize conditions; what 
measures to implement to be able to lift the state of emergency; and the procedures 
for establishing law and order in the South.315 These were all difficult tasks, and they 
were not made easier by the decision that all resolutions had to be passed 
unanimously. This decision put the TMC in a number of difficult and indeed some 
dead-locked situations that harmed the legitimacy of the Committee and its trust 
among the Sudanese people, both in the South and in the North.316 It has nevertheless 
been argued that this was the best possible solution considering the need for national 
consensus on the issues that were to be solved.317 
 
Legitimacy of the TMC Members 
The first meeting of the Twelve-Man Committee (TMC) was held 22 May, 1965. The 
Committee held 48 meetings altogether, the last one on 12 June, 1966. The Twelve 
Men were Hassan al-Turabi (Islamic Charter Front); Mohamed Ahmed El Mardi 
(National Unionist Party); al-Fatih Abboud (Peoples Democratic Party); Abdulla al-
Sayed (Professional’s Front); Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud (Sudanese Communist Party); 
Mohamed Daawood al-Khalifa (UMMA Party); Hilary U. Akwong (SANU); 
Nekanora Aguer (SANU); Andrew W. Riang Wieu (SANU); Natale Olwak (Southern 
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Front); Bona Malwal W. Ring (Southern Front); and Gordon Abiei Makwac 
(Southern Front).318  
 
The first meeting was initiated by a speech to the members by Prime Minister Khalifa. 
He informed the Committee of its terms of reference, and stated that the security 
situation in the South still was unsatisfying, and violence was still on the increase. He 
added that the government had begun implementing the RTC resolutions. Subsequent 
to the Prime Minister’s speech, the discussions began. The initial debate revolved 
around the Southern representation in the committee, as rivalries inside SANU was 
still not settled, and the Southern Front complained, on behalf of SANU(outside), that 
the latter should be given seats in the Committee. The protest of SANU(outside) was 
based in their view that William Deng, Andrew Wieu and Nekanora Aguer were not 
legitimate representatives of SANU, as they had been dismissed from the party, and 
did not have the mandate to represent it in the Committee.319 Bona Malwal of the 
Southern Front supported this allegation, probably because their views would gain 
more weight were the SANU(outside) part of the committee, as their opinions 
concurred with the Southern Front on the most crucial issues. Nevertheless, Peter 
Akol, who was sent to Khartoum by SANU(outside) to attend as their member of the 
TMC, was rejected, and the Southern representatives throughout the process ended up 
to be SANU(inside) and the Southern Front, thus excluding completely the political 
exile movement. The Northern parties demanded that if SANU(outside) was to send 
members to the TMC they had to register as a political party inside the country and 
renounce their aim of a separatist solution. Santino Deng from the Sudan Unity Party 
also made an attempt to be represented in the TMC, but was turned down by both of 
the Prime Minister and the TMC, on the ground that the party had been excluded from 
active representation in the RTC negotiations.320  
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Internal Disintegration 
At the 2nd meeting, the TMC members discussed the role and work of the Committee, 
and how it should relate to the continued violence in the South. This issue would 
prove to become a disintegrating factor in the Committee, as the violence increased 
and the TMC members never got through to the combatants to make them commit 
themselves to a cease-fire. The Southerners said that the Committee was responsible 
for coming to an agreement on practical measures that could lead to a cease-fire.321 
Such discussions never convinced the SCP and PDP, though, and the lack of a cease-
fire eventually led to the withdrawal of those two Northern parties. 
 
On 21 June, 1965, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) announced that they wanted 
to withdraw from the Committee and call for the freezing of the RTC resolutions. The 
party sent a delegate to some meetings throughout the summer, but delivered a letter 
finally confirming their withdrawal 19 August, 1965.322 The reason they gave was the 
continued violence in the South. They argued that the activities of the RTC/TMC 
should be frozen and that peace should be established “as an initial condition for 
seeking a peaceful democratic solution”.323 This letter also stated firmly that the SCP 
did not condemn Anya-Nya violence one-sidedly, but even the military offensive in 
the South by the national army. As long as both parties to the conflict resorted to 
violence, the TMC would be unable to make any difference, it was claimed. In July, 
the PDP also withdrew from the TMC. Their letter explained their withdrawal by the 
continued violence in the South, and stated that the security situation made it 
impossible to find a political solution to the conflict. It also brought up the three-
month time limit that the TMC was given by the RTC, and pointed to the fact that this 
time-limit had expired.324 The remaining members of the TMC wrote a press release 
in September, stating their reactions and counterarguments towards the withdrawals. 
These were mainly concerned with the terms of reference of the TMC, as well as 
arguing that the insufficient security situation in the South was the main reason for the 
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peace initiative, and hence continued violence was an insufficient reason for 
withdrawal:  
“The bad condition of security in the South was the main reason for calling the conference and forming 
the committee. It is not reasonable then that its existence will have to depend on a change of the state 
of affairs beforehand. We all condemn violence. But violence should not be given as a reason for 
boycotting the committee, Ignoring the national duty of reaching a solution which is the only way of 
finally making an end to violence.”325 
 
This statement may be the closest the TMC came to agreeing to condemnation of 
violence. The statement also urged the SCP and PDP to reconsider and carry on their 
work in the TMC.  
 
Security Debates 
It seems that the TMC discussions over security measures worked to fuel feelings of 
enmity and distrust between the parties. None of these debates ended with conclusions 
or agreements: It seems they rather motivated the parties to go even further in 
resorting to symbolic statements and less into the real issues at stake. For instance, at 
the 10th meeting Andrew Riang Wieu (SANU) initiated such a debate, when 
suggesting that the TMC should condemn all acts of violence in the South, by the 
Anya-Nya as well as by government forces.326  
 
Potentially a constructive suggestion, this nevertheless ended in an intense fight which 
ultimately resulted in resignation on the issue among the committee members. Lubari 
Ramba (Southern Front) defended Anya-Nya activities by stating that the insurgents 
were “nothing but a group of men who have resorted to arms when all other means 
have failed”. The Northerners followed up this by calling the Anya-Nya “terrorists”. 
The Northerners had already stated, for the first time in the 2nd TMC meeting, that the 
national army could not be condemned, as that would weaken the army and thus lead 
to an increase in the violence.327 This argument was repeated in this discussion in the 
10th meeting, when Hasan al-Turabi (ICF), supported by other Northerners, stated that 
they could not condemn the army for resorting to force when the Anya-Nya 
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deliberately continued to upset peace and order. The core of the matter was thus the 
disagreement on who was to blame for the intensified violence, and Dawood al-
Khalifa (Umma Party) claimed that the reason for the increased violence was 
basically the weak links between the Southern politicians and the Anya-Nya.328 At the 
end of the 10th meeting it was suggested that the committee should admit they had 
failed to agree on security matters and that they from then on wanted to focus their 
efforts on an agreement on the administrative and constitutional set-up. Even this 
suggestion lapsed, though, as the SCP member voted against it. 
 
The Principle of Self-Determination 
As the TMC members seemed to be unable to agree on security measures, they 
decided to prioritize their efforts with their proposal for a Scheme for a constitutional 
and administrative set-up. This work was begun at the 12th meeting, when each party 
presented their Schemes of proposals.329 It was decided that each party would present 
a list with their proposals of which powers should be retained with the Central 
authorities and which powers should be transferred to Regional authorities. These lists 
were then to be discussed and merged into a common proposal for constitutional and 
administrative set-up, which would in turn, be presented to the reconvened Round-
Table Conference. This was the same approach to these issues as had been taken at 
the RTC, only now the parties would attempt to agree on those powers that had 
previously ended with disagreement. When initiating this work, the Chair informed 
the Committee that the resolution of the undisclosed ‘Special Minute’ of the RTC 
would apply as part of the TMC terms of reference. Hence, he would dismiss 
Schemes that proposed Separation or the continuation of the status quo.330 
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This work initiated another TMC controversy. A discussion over whether the schemes 
proposed by the ICF and the Southern Front fell outside of those terms of reference, 
resulted in the dismissal of both schemes. The complaints were brought up by Hasan 
Turabi (ICF) and then also by Abel Alier (Southern Front), and were particularly 
discussed at the 13th , 14th and 15th TMC meetings, and finally decided at the 18th 
meeting.331 Turabi objected that the Southern Front scheme suggested a separatist 
solution, while Alier claimed that the ICF scheme proposed an administrative set-up 
for the country which represented a continuation of the status quo. The TMC Chair 
gave his rulings concerning those proposals at the 14th and 15th meetings respectively. 
As for the Scheme of the Southern Front, the Chair ruled that since it suggested 
elections that opened for secession, it could not be considered by the TMC.332 The 
ICF Scheme was also rejected by the Chair, who concluded that it not only preserved 
the status quo, but actually offered the Southern region less power than it held by the 
current system of government.333 As both schemes were deemed unsatisfactory, the 
two parties were requested to adjust their proposals into compliance with the RTC 
terms of reference. Hasan al-Turabi of the ICF responded to this request by declaring 
that they would support the NUP scheme. Abel Alier and the Southern Front wanted 
to rewrite their scheme, but failed to do so within the time-limit set by the Chair.  
 
At the 18th TMC meeting, 30 September, 1965, this debate culminated in a heated 
discussion over the right to self-determination and the consequences of this principle 
for the Southern Sudanese people. The Northern representatives argued that even the 
second Southern Front scheme contained the possibility of separation: As it opened 
for elections on that issue, the Northerners demanded it should be rejected like the 
first one. Abel Alier and the Sothern Front continued to insist on the right of the 
Southern Sudanese to make their own decision (through elections) on the final 
solution to the conflict. Umma Party representative, Mohamed Dawood al-Khalifa, 
argued that: ”The Southern Sudanese are not a separate Sudanese nation and therefore 
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cannot justify self-determination.”334 The Southern Front representatives continue to 
claim that their main view was merely that the proposals agreed upon by the TMC 
should be presented to the Southern people for a vote, so that they would have the 
possibility to state their opinion regarding the final agreement. This idea was rejected 
by the entire TMC, and all the members claimed that this was an attempt to secretly 
claim the right of separation, which was publicly known to be the ultimate aim of the 
Southern Front. William Deng tried to convince Alier that the Southern Front should 
support the SANU scheme, so that they avoid further delays in their work. This 
request was turned down by Alier, who then alleged that this was an attempt to 
pressure the Southern Front to reject a principle that they were determined to defend. 
Nevertheless, after a long discussion concerning the Southern Front position on the 
question of self-determination (whether that principle came within or outside the 
TMC terms of reference), the Committee agreed to base their discussions of power-
sharing on the schemes of NUP and SANU (inside).335  
 
Distribution of Powers 
The work that ultimately laid the foundation for the main part of the TMC report were 
the negotiations that attempted to find a constitutional and administrative system that 
would satisfy both Southerners and Northerners. This work begun with the two 
schemes that were finally agreed to, although reluctantly, by the parties; the schemes 
that had been presented by NUP, which became the Northern scheme, and the scheme 
initially presented by SANU (inside), which became the Southern scheme in these 
negotiations. Later in this process the two negotiating parties amended their schemes 
and presented new ones, attempting to finalize an agreement on the relationship 
between Central and Regional authorities.336 
 
The main content of the Northern scheme was decentralization of powers by the 
establishment of Regional governments in each province, which would have one 
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elected assembly as well as one executive assembly. Consequently, this split the 
South into three separate Regions, that each would be ruled by separate administrative 
and political organs. According to this scheme, the central authorities would maintain 
“the important powers, leaving to the regions powers as elementary education, public 
health, local commerce, utilization of agricultural land, animal wealth and forest 
development.”337  
 
The Southern scheme, then, proposed a federal system of government, within which 
each Region would be administered by a Prime Minister, an executive council, a 
governor and a legislature, and that this political and bureaucratic system would have 
powers to control: “local government administration, police, prisons, public health, 
agriculture, pre-university education, public information, industrial development, 
cooperative societies, arms imports and control, export and import excise duties, roads 
and regional communications, courts, public services and other less important 
powers.”338  
 
Moreover, the Southern scheme proposed that the three Southern provinces would be 
united as one Southern region, while the six Northern provinces would constitute one 
Region. The geographical division of the country into Regions was to become one of 
the most important differences that the two sides would prove unable to agree on. The 
Northerners insisted that the Regions in the entire country would be divided by the 
provincial borders, and thus the South should be ruled as three separate Regions: 
Equatoria, Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile. To allow the South to be administered as 
one single Region, the Northerners argued, would only maintain the image among 
many of the division of the country in two opposing Regions, and encourage the 
conflict rather than conclude it. According to Abel Alier, this was an attempt to split 
the Southerners so that they would become more easily manipulated, as 
“balkanization of the South was the key to the survival and continuation of national 
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identity.”339 As a compromise solution, the Southerners suggested that the country be 
divided into four Regions: South (Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile 
provinces), North (Khartoum and Northern provinces), West (Kordofan and Darfur 
provinces) and East (Blue Nile and Kassala Provinces).340 As stated in the TMC 
report, the parties never reached agreement on this issue.  
 
At the 18th TMC meeting the negotiations attempting to merge the two schemes began, 
resulting in agreement on the powers that should be exclusive for the Central 
government.341 At the 20th meeting, held on 13 October, 1965 Abel Alier said that the 
Southern Front endorsed those powers to remain Central if guarantees were given to 
make sure that they were exercised in accordance with the general interests of the 
country. 342  The system of administration of the Regional rule was also decided 
without any significant obstacles, except the issue of procedures for election of its 
Head Executive: The Northerners suggested that he should be appointed by Central 
authorities, after consultation with the Regional authorities. The Southerners 
demanded that the Regional Assembly should appoint him, regardless of the opinion 
of the Central government. As accounted for in the TMC Report, this issue remained 
unresolved.343  
 
Another point that led to lengthy discussions was the issue of financial relationship 
between the Central and the Regional authorities. The Southerners wanted to secure 
the Regions’ freedoms to undertake economic investments unrestricted by the Central 
authorities. The Southern Front’s economist, Hilary Logali, stated that Regional 
authorities should be able to plan and implement economic investments in their own 
Region: “For instance, we want power to decide about the sugar scheme at Mongalla 
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rather than Geneid.” 344  To achieve such financial independence, the Regional 
authorities should have the possibility to collect regional taxes, independent from 
Central interference. This was rejected by the Northerners, as they saw it as based on 
principles of federation, which they did not accept as suitable for  the Sudan.345 The 
Northerners claimed that the Southern proposal on this issue would place the Central 
authorities at the mercy of the Regions, and thus argued that all tax revenues should 
come under the authority of the Central government before being redistributed to the 
Regions. As Abdullah al-Sayed (Professionals’ Front) put it: “the Center is the father 
of the regions.”346 During the same meeting, Turabi (ICF) came clear in his opinion 
that the authority of the Centre had to be absolute, although the Region would be 
secured from domination except in exceptional circumstances. Logali answered to this 
by reminding the TMC of the Southern Front stand that “whatever plan is approved 
should be submitted to the Southern people in a referendum.” SANU(inside) and 
Southern Front joined forces in their insistence that the Central government should 
not have the sole authority to legislate and enforce taxation –Regional authorities 
should be free to exercise such powers to ensure their development and autonomy.  
 
The committee agreed that a financial expert should be called for this issue, to clarify 
to the TMC members the practical implications of different policies on this topic.347 
The committee met with experts, without coming any closer to agreement. In the end, 
the only agreements that were made on this issue was the recommendation to appoint 
an expert committee to recommend a suitable financial arrangement under the system 
of government proposed by the TMC, and the appointing of a Central Development 
Commission, to ensure regional development.348  
 
The constitutional relationship between the Central and Regional authorities was 
finally agreed to after lengthy debates. It was decided that Central authorities would 
be sovereign and only subject to the Constitution. Nevertheless, the relationship 
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between Central and Regional authorities would be implemented in the National 
Constitution, and thus amendments in this relationship would only be possible by 
gaining a two-thirds majority in parliament. This was meant to function as a 
Constitutional safeguard that would guarantee Regional authorities from unwarranted 
interference by the Central government.349 Moreover, at the 42nd meeting, held on 15 
March, 1966, the Committee agreed that their proposed constitutional and 
administrative system should regulate the relationship between the Central 
government and all Regions –not only between North and South.350 
 
Governmental Response to the Twelve-Man Committee 
22 June, 1965, the Maghoub government took office in Khartoum. This government 
was to be remembered for its ruthless and uncompromising policies in the South, 
attitudes that were also reflected in its relationship with the TMC. At its second 
meeting the TMC members discussed security measures, and realised that there was a 
good deal of confusion concerning the realities on the ground in the South.351 The 
Committe then asked the government for a report on the security situation. It would 
take time, though, before such a report was presented to the Committee. 
 
Prime Minister Mahgoub delayed until the 9th TMC meeting, on 22 July, 1965, before 
he reported to the TMC on the security situation in the South and the measures taken 
by the government to improve that situation.352 In his report the Prime Minister then 
said that the security situation in the South was unsatisfying, and that this was the 
main factor that had hindered implementation of RTC resolutions. He stated that the 
government wanted a peaceful solution to the civil war, and that such a solution had 
to be found within a united Sudan. Mahgoub also said that the government was 
focused on upholding security in the Southern region. In the following discussion, 
Mahgoub maintained that the violence in the South was mainly the responsibility of 
the Southern insurgents, and that violence towards civilians had increased since 
February. The immediate step that the government would make was therefore to grant 
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general amnesty for a period of 15 days to rebels who wanted to surrender their arms. 
After this amnesty-period had expired, the government would turn to force to crush 
the mutiny. During this discussion Andrew W. Riang of SANU said that since the 
problem was a political one, a political solution was needed, and mere force would 
not solve the conflict. He said that as long as no political measures were agreed to, no 
insurgent would lay down his arms, out of fear that the peacemaking process would 
fail: “One cannot ask one to lay down his arms before peace terms are negotiated.”353 
To this, the Prime Minister responded: “Does this mean you do not agree on laying 
down arms?” He then put forward a big amount of documents that he claimed were 
proof that Southern politicians such as William Deng had encouraged the insurgents 
to keep on to their arms for at least 5 more years: “hold on to your arms for the next 
five years beginning from now. We have proved to the Arabs we are strong politically 
and are not afraid to defend our land when necessary. The Arabs have learned a lesson 
and it is most unlikely they will resort to army rule again”.354 This discussion ended 
with this, as no Southerner rejected the accusations of the Prime Minister. 
 
When faced with criticism towards the government’s use of force in the South, 
Mahgoub answered that “my government’s policy is to maintain security and disarm 
lawbreakers. If the mutineers insist on not laying down arms my government will not 
fold their arms and stand aside”. This coincides with the policies led by the Mahgoub 
government throughout its period, which was more insistent on attempts to crush the 
Anya-Nya by force, than ending the war by implementing political and administrative 
measures.  
 
In his statement Mahgoub also reminded the committee of their terms of reference, 
and said that when the TMC had agreed on a constitutional and administrative set-up 
for the country, his government would arrange a reconvened Round-Table Conference, 
in November at the latest. This was not followed up by the Prime Minister, though. A 
second RTC was never convened, and the cooperation between the TMC and the 
government was to become gradually more difficult throughout the winter of 1965/66.  
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The Southerners inside the TMC repeatedly brought up the issue of the reconvening 
of the RTC. For instance, at the 23rd TMC meeting, Abel Alier complained that their 
work was dragging on without sufficient progress, and that the Prime Minister should 
be reminded of his responsibility to reconvene the RTC. 355  This lead to a big 
argument whether the TMC should ask the government to set a date for the RTC2, a 
suggestion that Hasan al-Turabi (ICF) opposed. The Chair seemed to agree with 
Turabi, and stated that the major task of finding an appropriate administrative and 
constitutional system should be finished before the government reconvened the RTC. 
Nonetheless, the Southern members insisted on asking the Prime Minister to set a date 
for the conference, and it was agreed to ask Mahgoub to find a date in mid-December 
or early January, 1966. This did not happen, though, and Mahgoub, when meeting the 
TMC on 15 January, for the first time indicated that he might not reconvene a second 
RTC after receiving the TMC report, when stating: “[…] the members of this 
Committee represent the different views in the country. If you can come to an 
agreement that is acceptable to all the parties we might not need to call a 
Conference.”356  
 
Mahgoub met with the Committee again in November, and then again in January, 
consistently arguing that implementation of measures agreed to by the RTC and TMC 
depended on the security situation, which was still unsatisfactory. When asked, at the 
33rd TMC meeting, 15 January, 1966 for a time-span as for when peace could be 
achieved, the Prime Minister answered: “this depends on the good will of the 
Southerners. It can be achieved in three months time.”357 This answer did not assure 
the Southerners about the intentions of the government, and surely strengthened their 
suspicion towards the willingness of their Northern counterpart to finding a peaceful 
solution.  
 
The TMC delegates repeatedly discussed how the Prime Minister seemed uninterested 
in meeting them, and how he made statements to the press denouncing the committee 
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and its lack of progress.358 At several meetings suggestions that the TMC should 
dissolve because of governmental disinterest and public criticism against the 
committee came up. It was a dominant opinion among the TMC members that if the 
government had no intentions to reconvene the RTC, there was no need for them to 
continue their work. 359  2 March, 1966 the Prime Minister was quoted in the 
newspaper Al-Rai Al-A’am saying: “The committee has failed in its task and […] it is 
revolving on a vicious circle.”360 This was taken up by Abdel Latif al-Khalifa, who 
suggested that the committee should resign in protest. Al-Khalifa’s suggestion was 
resisted, though, and met with suspicion by Lubari Ramba: “Resignation, of course, 
may be what some people are aiming at unless everyone is in favor of lodging a 
protest to the Prime Minister.”361 It was suggested that they should publicly protest 
against the Prime Minister’s statement, to prove to the public that he was wrong, 
when Hilary Logali stated that the Prime Minister might actually be right: “we have 
not carried out our duty as we should; we have not reached an agreement. On the 
contrary we might be in the same position as when we began.”362 
 
As for making the gap between the TMC and the government complete, Prime 
Minister Mahgoub in April, 1966 gave a public statement saying that the government 
had its own plan to end the war, and that it would not consider the TMC proposals 
binding. This made the TMC members furious, and threatened to overthrow the entire 
committee. 363  In June, 1966, the Prime Minister presented a constitutional and 
administrative plan that had been worked out by the government, in an interview 
printed in the weekly newspaper Al-Rai Al-A’am. 364  This plan was totally 
uncoordinated with the work that the TMC had been doing in this respect, and fuelled 
the conflict between the government and the TMC. According to this interview, the 
main content of Mahgoub’s plan was that the central government would maintain 
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powers over foreign affairs, defence, planning and economy, and higher education. 
Nonetheless, a Regional government would be established in each province, that 
would be given the power to run local affairs like elementary and intermediate 
education, roads, security and unspecialized hospitals. The details of this plan was 
never revealed to the public, and neither did this government implement it, as Sadiq 
al-Mahdi managed to outvote Mahgoub and establish a new Umma-led government 
by 25 July. 
 
The Report of the Twelve-Man Committee 
The TMC report that was submitted to Prime Minister Mahgoub 26 June, 1966 
contained a summary of the work of the Committee, and the agreements and 
disagreements that resulted from it. Concerning the discussions on the role of the 
TMC and its responsibility for the security situation in the South, the report accounted 
for the differences that remained unresolved: The Northerners in the Committee 
adopted the position that the establishment of law and order was a pre-requisite for the 
implementation of the RTC resolutions. The Southerners, on the other hand, were of 
the opinion that only through the implementation of those resolutions could law and 
order be established. 
 
Similarly, the report recapitulated the differences among the TMC members on the 
condemnation of violence. It declared that the Committee was unanimous in 
condemnation of violence, although they differed on who were the perpetrators of 
such actions, and thus who to condemn. The Northerners, it is recalled, argued that the 
“terrorist organisation, the Anya Nya, should be condemned.”365  The Southerners 
argued that not only should the Anya-Nya be condemned, rather also the 
government’s army. The report stated that disagreement remained in this issue, in 
spite of lengthy and detailed discussions. Nevertheless, it was agreement on who were 
responsible for establishing law and order in the South, and that responsibility lay not 
upon the TMC. Rather, one of the most distinct remarks of the report was its 
denunciation of the government’s effort to achieve an end to the violence: “Unless the 
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Government adopted an attitude of utmost cooperation it was unlikely that any efforts 
by the Committee in this respect could bear fruit. And the circumstances were not the 
most favourable for such an attitude.” As shown in this Chapter, the Maghoub 
government offered the TMC no help in its efforts, but rather counteracted it, by 
aggressive policies in the South as well as through statements in the media about the 
failure of the Committee. Even before the TMC had concluded its work, Mahgoub 
stated that the Committee was “responsible for the failure of not reaching a peaceful 
solution for the Southern Problem”.366  
 
As the responsibility for the security situation lay on the government, and the TMC 
could not agree on recommendations on this issue, the Committee decided to shift the 
focus of its efforts onto “its first and main term of reference”: The Constitutional and 
Administrative set-up for the country. The starting point of these discussions was the 
decision made in the ‘Special Session’ of the Round-Table Conference, 29 March 
1965: That ‘the two extremes’ –separation and the status quo –were unacceptable 
solutions for the Sudan and were thus outside the TMC terms of reference. The 
Report recapitulated that four Schemes of proposals were submitted to the Committee, 
on behalf of SANU, ICF, the Southern Front and NUP, as the Umma Party decided to 
adopt the principles of their partner in government, NUP. When complaints were 
proposed towards the Schemes of the Southern Front and ICF, the Chairman decided 
that both Schemes were outside the terms of reference, and thus set them aside. 
Consequently, ICF adopted the NUP Scheme and the Southern Front adopted the 
Scheme proposed by SANU.  
 
Distribution of Powers 
Throughout these discussions it became clear that this work should be separated into 
two tasks: Firstly, the distribution of powers to the Central and Regional authorities, 
and secondly, the relationship between the two. It was agreed to split powers in three 
categories: Central, Concurrent and Regional powers. The Committee agreed on a list 
of eight specific powers to be exercised by Central authorities: National defence, 
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external affairs, currency, communications and tele-communications, foreign trade, 
nationality, customs, and inter-regional trade.  
 
Concurrent Powers 
Further, it was agreed on a list of three main areas of powers that should be 
concurrent between the Central and the Regional authorities: Security forces, 
education, and public health. It was agreed that national legislature should enact the 
organisation of security forces, including recruitment and use of both national and 
local police forces. The Head National Executive should maintain ultimate powers 
over all security forces, and be allowed, “in certain circumstances”, to place any such 
force under his direct command. An additional remark was given, stating that 
Regional authorities should have the powers of recruitment and use of local police 
forces, subject to the legislation given by Central authorities. The Southern Front 
noted specifically that their view maintained to be that Regional authorities should be 
allowed to organise and run Home Guards to assist the security forces. This was 
rejected by the Northern parties. 
 
Educational policy was to be subject to Central authorities, which would legislate and 
organise “Syllabuses, National Planning of Education, Definition of Standards and 
Qualifications.” The TMC also agreed that the powers to administrate all education 
lower than secondary stage should be transferred to Regional authorities, that 
secondary education should be a concurrent responsibility while power of higher 
education should be maintained by Central authorities. The Southern Front explicitly 
stated that some Regional distinctive characters in particular reflected on education, 
and that the Region should be given the opportunity to adjust educational policies to 
such characteristics. This was rejected by the Northern parties. 
 
Powers to legislate and administrate public health was also agreed to be divided 
between the Central and Regional authorities. The powers to lay out general policies 
and plans for the health sector were to be maintained by the Central government. 
Similarly, the Centre should continue to have the main responsibility for medical 
education and training, registration of all health personnel as well as control and 
supervision of assisted medical projects, national policy for nutrition, control of drugs 
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and poisons, medical research and control of epidemics, registration of births and 
deaths and licensing and supervision of hospitals throughout the country. Regional 
authorities were admitted the powers to establish and run hospitals concurrently with 
the Central authorities, although subject to legislation, licensing and supervision by 
the latter. Moreover, the Region was admitted the powers to control endemic diseases, 
environmental health services, school health services, health education, maternity and 
child-welfare services, supervision of markets, training of village midwifes and 
training of medical assistants and opening of dispensaries. 
 
In the field labelled ‘Antiquities’ it was decided that both Central and Regional 
authorities should be allowed to carry out excavations. Similarly, the field of Labour 
was to be concurrent: Policy was to be laid down by the Centre, while Regional 
authorities should execute labour policies as legislated by the Centre. 
 
Regional Powers 
The powers that the TMC agreed to transfer to Regional authorities were listed as 
follows: Regional and local government administration, Regional public information, 
promotion of tourism, museums and zoos, exhibitions, establishment of local roads 
and maintenance of main roads, town and village planning, protection of forests, 
crops and pastures (although subject to national legislation), protection and 
development of animal resources (also subject to national legislation), land utilization 
and agricultural development in accordance with the national plan for development, 
study and development of languages and local culture and, finally, commerce and 
industry. The Southern Front maintained their stand that Regional authorities should 
be allowed to establish cultural relations with other countries on their own initiative, 
without interference by the Central authorities. This was rejected by the Northern 
parties. 
 
The Regional government was to be divided in legislative and executive assemblies. 
The members of the legislative body were to be chosen through direct elections, and 
they were to enact Regional law and supervise and set down policy for the local 
executive assembly. It was agreed that members of the executive assembly were to be 
elected, by the members of the legislative assembly, who also held the power to 
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dismiss them. Regarding the process of selecting the Head Executive, the differences 
between Southerners and Northerners were recapitulated in the report, as this issue 
was never agreed upon. The Southerners argued that the Regional Assembly should 
select two candidates for the Central government to choose one. The Northerners 
wanted the Central government to appoint the Head Executive “after consultations 
with the Region.” 
 
When according for their view on the relationship between the Regional and Central 
authorities, the TMC report emphasized that the main consideration in this question 
had been how to “protect the vital interests of the Nation”, while at the same time 
safeguarding the Regional government from unnecessary interference by the Centre. 
This dilemma was solved by proposing that the power-sharing accounted for above 
would be implemented in the national constitution, which could not be amended 
without a Parliamentary majority of two-thirds. Thus, although the Regional powers 
would be subject to Central sovereignty, the fact that the Central government would 
be subject to the constitution, would secure the Region against any unfounded 
interference. Additionally, it was to be stated in the constitution that any judicial 
changes that interfered with Regional powers be done only after consultation with 
those Regional authorities concerned. The Southern Front accepted this model only if 
their proposed geographical division was adopted. 
 
A clause on an eventual emergency situation admitted the Centre the possibility to 
suspend Regional powers or dissolve the Regional Assembly. For the latter, a 
condition was added that elections were to be held within one month of the 
Emergency. Any emergency had to be acknowledged by Parliament within two weeks. 
 
Other Unresolved Issues 
The financial arrangements between the Central and Regional authorities were not 
agreed upon, so the Committee recommended that an expert committee be appointed 
“to study and recommend the financial arrangements which shall be adopted under 
our proposed system of government.” Additionally, it was recommended to assign a 
Central Development Commission, which should contain proportional Regional 
representation. 
 105 
 
The disagreement on Regional geography, with extensive details of the arguments of 
each delegation, was recorded in the report. The main disagreement of this issue was 
the size of the Southern region, as the Southern members insisted that it remained one 
Region, while the Northerners wanted to split it in three, according to the existing 
provincial borders. Disagreement remained on this issue. 
 
In an introductory letter attached to the TMC Report, which was directed to the Prime 
Minister and signed by the Chairman of the TMC, the Committee asked for the 
reconvening of the Round-Table Conference (RTC). 367  Neither Maghoub nor his 
successor Sadiq al-Mahdi reconvened the RTC. Instead, Sadiq al-Mahdi appointed 
two new Commissions that were to follow up the RTC/TMC resolutions and work out 
solutions on those issues that remained unresolved: The Political Parties Conference 
(October 1966) and the National Constitution Commission (February 1967-January 
1968).  
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
It has been claimed that the parliamentary period of the 1960s (June 1965-May 1969) 
was the worst period of the first civil war.368 Presumably this resulted from a variety 
of factors: The excessive use of military force by the government, the increasing 
recruitment and arms access experienced by the Anya-Nya, the lack of legitimacy of 
the Southern politicians and the lack of information accessed by the civilian 
population in the North, who probably supported the military offensive without 
realising its devastating effects. Paradoxically, there was an ongoing peacemaking 
process in the country throughout these developments. This chapter will analyse the 
actors and events described in chapters 2, 3 and 4 in light of the theories accounted for 
in Chapter 1, with particular emphasis on Barbara Walter’s ‘Credible Commitment 
Theory’ and Stuart Kaufman’s theory of the ‘Symbolic Politics Trap’. This will 
clarify the events accounted for in the previous chapters with regard to answering the 
main research question put forward by this thesis: Why did the peacemaking effort of 
the Round-Table Conference (RTC) and the Twelve-Man Committee (TMC) fail to 
deliver peace in Southern Sudan? 
 
The Initiating phase 
It is commonly accepted that the most critical initial condition for a peacemaking 
effort to succeed is finding the ripe time for negotiation, which presupposes that both 
sides are sufficiently motivated for peacemaking.369 According to Walter, the two 
factors that often motivate combatants to end the war and work towards peace, and as 
such affect the ripeness of the situation, are the costs of war and a military stalemate.  
 
Much can be said about these factors in the Sudanese context of the 1960s. As for the 
costs of war, they are normally measured by the duration of the war and the number 
of war-related deaths. In 1965 the combatants probably did not consider any of these 
factors to have reached unbearable levels. As discussed in this thesis, the warfare was 
still not intense enough to be accurately labelled a civil war, as the Anya-Nya factions 
were fragmented and inefficient and still suffered from a crippling shortage of arms. 
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The numbers of casualties of this war are difficult to determine, especially for the 
period of 1955-1965. In fact, no reliable estimate has yet been proposed for this 
period. It is unlikely, though, considering the intensity of the warfare, that by 1965 the 
war-related deaths were high enough to motivate the combatants to commit 
themselves to a compromise. Similarly, a military stalemate was not yet reached, as 
the Anya-Nya experienced an increase in both their recruitment and arms supply 
during this period, and thus were encouraged in their belief that they could win the 
conflict militarily. 
 
As accounted for in Chapter 1, the effectiveness of democratic institutions is an 
additional factor that has been perceived as significant for combatants to enter 
negotiations, although Walter from her quantitative tests concludes that this cannot be 
legitimately claimed as a general rule.370 In this particular case, the regimes change 
that followed the overthrow of the military regime of ‘Abboud in 1964 was essential 
to the mere possibility of a peace process. ‘Abboud consistently addressed the 
Southern rebellion as a security issue, and violently pursued Islamization and 
Arabization in the South in an attempt to end the conflict by a military victory. These 
policies became decisive for the popular discontent that eventually ended in 
‘Abboud’s overthrow. Because of this, the parliamentary regime that followed could 
not ignore the violent uprising that took place in the Southern provinces of the country. 
Prime Minister Khalifa’s government was the first independent Sudanese government 
to admit that there existed a problem in the Southern region, and the idea of the 
peacemaking effort of 1965-1966 was born from this realisation. Nonetheless, it 
would be too hasty to conclude that this resulted from the democratic nature of the 
new regime: After all, the RTC/TMC process failed, and the conflict developed from 
being a fragmented uprising in 1964 into an outright civil war by 1969.371 Thus, the 
conflict was still there, and even more pressing, when the military again changed the 
political map in the Sudan and rid itself of the parliamentary system of government in 
1969. This regime, led by Ja’far Nimeiri, in spite of being highly undemocratic, 
entered negotiations which actually materialised in implementation and peace. Thus, 
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the Sudanese case supports Walter’s conclusion that democracy is not necessarily 
suggestive of successful peacemaking.  
 
Although Walter and Kaufman mainly focus on the implementing phase in their 
theories of civil war resolution, both agree that finding the right time is crucial to the 
prospects for success of any peacemaking effort. A peace process should arise from a 
certain political mood, though: “Once the balance of power favors those who want 
peace, the time is right for a ceasefire”, Kaufman claims.372 It seems safe to conclude 
that this was not the case in the Sudan in 1965: SANU (outside) were practically 
forced to enter the negotiations, to prevent William Deng from ‘hi-jacking’ the party 
and leave the separatists in the movement totally powerless in exile.373 The Southern 
Front was also hesitant to endorse the RTC initiative, as the party decided to attend 
the conference as late as 6 March, 1965 –only nine days before the conference began. 
Even the sincerity of SANU (inside) may be subject to doubts. William Deng and his 
supporters must have known that they held few powers to actually enforce 
implementation of an eventual agreement, and thus, they were probably motivated, at 
least partly, by this chance to assume power over SANU while simultaneously 
gaining representation and possibly influence on political power in Khartoum.  
 
The Southern political parties had no sufficient powers over the Anya-Nya to enforce 
any cease-fire during the negotiations, and it seems legitimate to ask: How were they 
then supposed to enforce implementation of the final agreement? The fragmentation 
of the Southern political movement, coupled with their insufficient power to control 
the rebels in the Southern bush, also had the effect of weakening their negotiating 
ability and revealing to their counterpart, the Northerners, that they probably were 
unable to enforce implementation of any signed agreement. Consequently, as the 
Northerners became aware of one of the severe weaknesses of the Southern 
movement, they exploited this for what it was worth, for instance by demanding that 
Southern unionists be represented at the RTC.374 As this thesis has argued, that move 
was probably an attempt to confuse public opinion about the legitimacy of SANU and 
                                                 
372
 Stuart J. Kaufman 2006: 207.  
373
 Although Deng ultimately managed to gain sole control of SANU: By August 1965 SANU (outside) 
had disintegrated due to personal and tribal rivalries. See Chapter 2 above. 
374
 See Chapter 3 above. 
 109 
the Southern Front, in order to weaken the Southerners even further, as the support of 
those unionist Southerners was negligible.  
 
In consequence, Southern fragmentation was clearly an obstacle to the RTC. Their 
internal rivalries and disagreements even surfaced inside the conference room: For 
instance, Aggrey Jaden, leader of the SANU (outside)-delegation, left the RTC after 
holding a hostile introductory speech, thus ignoring the need for a unified Southern 
negotiating strategy. By this act, he clearly signalled that he had no trust that the 
negotiations would be successful. SANU (inside) and Southern Front were equally 
doubtful, though somewhat more willing to make an effort, in spite of Alier’s 
statement in retrospect, suggesting that nobody believed that any of the 
recommendations resulting from the RTC were likely to be implemented.375  
 
Arguably, the Northerners were equally unengaged and uncommitted, focusing at the 
RTC mainly on positioning themselves for the April elections. Possibly out of fear for 
losing voters, they rejected any responsibility for the current violence, and presented 
only one suggestion for a solution, signalling that they had nothing to give. The TMC 
suffered from a similar lack of Northern commitment: The parties represented in 
government were also represented in the TMC, but the government still showed no 
interest in implementing resolutions during the TMC negotiations -despite the fact 
that all agreements were made unanimously in that committee.  
 
The Negotiating phase 
Although it is commonly accepted that finding the ripe time for negotiations is a 
crucial factor in conflict resolution, many researchers argue that the most critical 
phase in a peacemaking process is the negotiating phase.376 These authors argue that a 
key to successful peacemaking is that the negotiations solve the root causes of the 
conflict. Identity issues, divisibility of the stakes and the presence and role of 
mediators are three key factors that work to complicate this phase.  
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As accounted for in Chapter 1, the emotional character of identity-issues adds a layer 
of complexity to a civil war, which makes it much more difficult to conclude.377 Such 
questions were, and still are, highly relevant to the Sudanese conflict. Both Southern 
and Northern Sudanese in the 1960s were aware of and sensitive to the cultural and 
religious differences between their regions. The Southerners put a lot of weight on 
this problem, and argued that it had contributed to the smouldering conflict ever since 
the first contact between African and Arabised Sudanese. 378  Especially the most 
extreme Southerners, SANU (outside) and the Southern Front, emphasized this aspect 
of the conflict. They claimed that the Arab disrespect for the Southern Sudanese 
people and their cultures and religions was an inherent root of the conflict, and 
concluded on the basis of this that the conflict could not be solved without allowing 
the South to separate. SANU (inside), representing the more moderate Southern view, 
supported the claim proposed by the Southern separatists that the conflict had roots in 
the ethnic and cultural differences between the South and the North, but were 
nevertheless convinced that a federation that implied the transferring of significant 
powers to the South might provide sufficient assurance to the South to convince the 
Southern rebels to put down their arms.  
 
The Northerners, on the contrary, denied that the conflict was based on any racial or 
ethnic factors. They claimed that the national unity and amicable atmosphere between 
different ethnic groups in the North essentially proved that Arabism was no racial 
concept. Indeed, at the RTC even the modest Prime Minister Khalifa went so far as to 
completely deny the presence of ethnic conflicts among the Sudanese people. 379 
Nonetheless, at the National Committee for the Constitution in 1967-68, the Northern 
parties were all concerned with the question of the Sudanese identity as an Islamic 
one, and insisted upon the Arab-Islamic nature of the state. This indicates that the 
stand they officially took at the RTC and the TMC may have been an attempt to prove 
to the outside world that they had no intentions to treat non-Muslim and non-Arab 
Sudanese unfairly, rather than an attempt to prove it to the Southerners.  
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Considering this in light of Kaufman’s theory of the ‘Symbolic politics trap’, it 
becomes clear that the Sudanese civil war fits well into his definition of an ethnic civil 
war, in his words: “[…] a war where the key issues at stake –that is, the express 
reason political power is being contested –involve ethnic markers such as language or 
religion or the status of ethnic groups themselves.”380 One of the core arguments that 
Kaufman makes is that civil wars are essentially wars between conflicting societies, 
and not merely their leaders, and that ethnic civil wars are particularly linked to 
hostile mass feelings that work as driving forces of such wars. Thus, to be able to 
conclude ethnic civil wars, those enemy images that work to legitimize the warfare 
must be counteracted, and one crucial factor in this process is to encourage the 
political and military leaders and the populations of the conflicting societies to alter 
both their understandings of their own identity as well as that of their adversary. This 
is critical for the process of forgiveness and reconciliation, Kaufman claims, as the 
ultimate aim of civil war resolution is to enable conflicting societies to build new and 
positive relationships within which they can live at peace rather than war.  
 
Studying the speeches, discussions and attitudes that were expressed at the RTC and 
TMC, it becomes clear that the Sudanese politicians failed to deliver such a vision for 
their societies. Neither the strategy of the separatist Southerners nor that of the 
Northerners contributed to the process of enabling Southerners and Northerners to 
replace their hostility with understanding of their counterpart. Both built upon 
victimization inside their own constituencies; the separatist Southerners by 
continuously repeating their message of the exploiting and hostile Arab-Islamic 
Sudanese whose main aim was to subjugate and ultimately assimilate the Southern 
languages, cultures and religions, and the Northerners by refusing to admit any 
responsibility for the present conflict, while claiming that any Southern demand for 
self-determination or federation were essentially attempts to divide the country. This, 
linked with the lack of factual information provided to the civilian population about 
the conflict probably worked to increase the gulf between the Southern and the 
Northern societies, and even to legitimise the war in both societies.381  
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The divisibility of the stakes in this conflict is a factor that is intimately linked to the 
former issue: As the perceptions of the root causes of the conflict differed greatly, the 
conception of the contested stakes themselves were sources of conflict. The 
Southerners claimed that the stakes were in fact indivisible, as they contested the mere 
foundation of the Sudanese state itself. They claimed that the Sudan was in fact two 
nations and that thus the Southerners should be allowed to separate and form their 
own state. The consequence of this would logically be that no powers were divided; 
all powers over the Southern society and state would be transferred to the Southern 
political and military leadership. SANU (inside) on the other hand argued that drastic 
changes in distribution of powers were needed, but that this was possible to organize 
within a united Sudan. This was also the outspoken view of the Northern delegates to 
the RTC and TMC, and as this thesis has showed, such an agreement of division of 
powers was indeed signed in the end. Had SANU (outside) been allowed to 
participate in the TMC, though, the situation might have been different, considering 
their uncompromising stance at the RTC. Nonetheless, the TMC did succeed in 
convincing the Southern Front to compromise, and bearing that in mind it is possible 
that SANU (outside) would adopt the same attitude, had they been given a chance of 
representation in the TMC.  
 
Barbara Walter’s study found that third-party security guarantees is one of the two 
key factors to achieve a lasting peace agreement. The second is power-sharing 
pacts.382 In the end, the TMC went a long way in agreeing to the latter, which is 
essentially substantiated by the fact that a range of the agreements of the TMC report 
were successfully implemented as part of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. 
According to Walter, this is not unusual: Combatants in civil conflicts often come to 
mutual agreements designed to solve the root causes of their conflicts. The real 
obstacle occurs when these agreements are to be implemented, she claims: 
“Negotiations fail because combatants cannot credibly promise to abide by terms that 
create numerous opportunities for exploitation after the treaty is signed and 
implementation begins.”383 Such security guarantees were absent at the RTC and the 
TMC, and given the level of distrust that remained between the parties throughout the 
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process, it is unsurprising that the implementation of its agreements was unsuccessful. 
A necessary precondition that might, in Walter’s opinion, weigh up for this obstacle, 
is involving a strong third party to the negotiations. This element was neglected by the 
parties at the RTC and TMC. 
 
In fact, the absence of third-party intermediaries was a deliberate choice made by the 
the RTC and TMC participants. Especially the Northerners (who indeed constituted 
the stronger of the two parties) insisted on maintaining the national character of the 
conflict, and resolutely resisted to involve international bodies or actors. This is seen, 
for instance, in their refusal to submitting the RTC recommendations to the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and in their rejection of the Ghanaian offer to 
mediate in August 1965.384 The role of the observers at the RTC was clearly a weak 
one, although they at some occasions encouraged the parties to suppress their hostile 
attitudes and attempt to find solutions based on increased development and special 
safeguards for the South. They actively pushed for unity, probably because of fears 
that ideas of separation would spread into their own countries and lead to regional 
disintegration. This bias probably made the Southern separatists suspicious towards 
the role of the negotiators, and maybe even to the seriousness of the negotiations 
themselves. Thus, rather than playing a role in committing the parties to the process 
and ensuring safeguards for the implementation phase, the presence of the observers 
and the role they undertook by openly supporting the main claim of the Northerners 
probably reinforced Southern distrust. Moreover, while it increased the suspicion 
among the most ardent Southern separatists, it probably also strengthened the most 
uncompromising Northerners in their quest for a centralised system of government.  
 
A case that can exemplify this is the agreement that was made at the ‘Special Minute’ 
on the final day of the RTC. According to this agreement, all parties agreed that both 
separatism and continuation of the status quo were unacceptable solutions to the 
conflict. Nonetheless, by the time of the TMC, both the separatist Southern Front and 
the Islamist ICF neglected that agreement, and presented proposals that opened for 
those outcomes. This shows how the participants even during the negotiation process 
itself, neglected vital agreements that were necessary for the continuation of their 
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deliberations. Both the Southern Front and the ICF were aware of the agreement made 
at the RTC ‘Special Minute’, and thus both must have known that their proposals to 
the TMC would be contested and that in effect they would slow down the progress of 
their work. This might be seen as an expression of insincerity and distrust on their part. 
According to Walter, such attitudes should be dealt with through a mediator who is 
strong enough to push the parties in a constructive direction. Although the Chairman 
of the TMC was responsible for making decisions to solve such situations, and indeed 
took action to mediate when progress was slow, he held no means of sanctioning 
actors that counteracted the progress, and likewise he acquired no means of providing 
positive incentives for the parties, should they succeed.  
 
As seen in Chapter 2, it was William Deng who first suggested inviting observers 
from neighbouring African countries to the RTC.385 This may seem as quite a paradox, 
considering that the governments of Sudan’s neighbouring countries were likely to 
support the Northerners in such a conference, especially on their insistence on unity: 
Most of them were, after all, plagued with similar problems as the Sudanese, and were 
unlikely to support separatist forces that might disturb the power balance and newly 
drawn borders of the region. On the other hand, from the perspective of William Deng, 
it might have been pure self-interest that made him come up with such a suggestion. 
Considering the personal and political power struggles within the SANU, strong 
forces arguing against the separatist aims of Deng’s opponents inside that party might 
well tip the balance in his favour, and strengthen his position in the game of Sudanese 
politics. Thus, the fact that the observers actively took side against the Southern 
separatists, probably fit the aims of William Deng, although it also served the purpose 
of the Northerners. As it split the already fragmented Southern movement even 
further, it probably also had consequences for the prevailing mistrust between the 
Southern separatists and the Northerners, by convincing the former of the lack of 
seriousness of their counterpart and strengthening their already strongly felt identity 
as a suppressed people surrounded by enemies. 
 
Hence, it is obvious that the mistrust between the parties remained throughout this 
peacemaking process, and according to Walter’s theory of ‘Credible Commitment’, 
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this might have been avoided had a strong third party been involved. A comparison 
with the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 may actually validate this claim.386 An 
important and immediate task for a mediator would be to gain the trust of both parties 
to the conflict; only then could the parties begin to trust the process, which is needed 
for them to ultimately gain confidence in each other. As Donald Rothchild argues in 
his study of the Addis Ababa Agreement, the mediators made a range of efforts 
aiming to achieve the trust of the combatants prior to those negotiations, and these 
efforts proved essential to the outcome.387 In the negotiations for the Addis Ababa 
Agreement both state and nonstate actors contributed substantially, and the 
combination of these, according to Rothchild, had a positive effect on the 
peacemaking process. The nonstate actors were the World Council of Churches 
(WCC) and the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), and both were crucial in 
affording an informal mediating body that were in no position to threaten or coerce 
any of the combatants. This, coupled with their intimate knowledge of the conflict, 
enabled those organisations to achieve the needed trust by both parties and thus 
became crucial to the first step of convincing the government to participate in the 
peacemaking process.  
 
Nonetheless, Rothchild points to significant weaknesses that limited the possibility of 
the nonstate mediators to contribute to the negotiations: “Even though they were able 
to enhance communication, help to build a consensus, draft possible agreements, 
facilitate reciprocal concessions, and draw the actor’s attention to issues on which 
agreement existed, they were unable to guarantee any agreements reached, and they 
were in no position to enforce them.”388 The state actor that pushed those negotiations 
forward when dead-locked was Ethiopia –one of Sudan’s neighbouring countries that 
were not invited to join the RTC as part of the delegation of observers. Like the 
observer countries to the RTC the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie also feared 
secessionist groups inside his country, though he solved this differently than the 
former: He insisted that he remain a supporter of the negotiation efforts, though not 
officially labelled a mediator. He nonetheless mediated directly when the parties got 
trapped in a dead-lock. By this strategy, he solved an impasse on the question of the 
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future of the Sudanese army, as Selassie met separately with the two delegations and 
proposed a compromise solution in which he played a role as guarantor of the safety 
of Southern rebels returning to the Sudan as part of the agreement. Thus, this 
combination of informal NGOs and a strong and trusted state actor made a 
significantly beneficial contribution to the negotiations leading to the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, which in the end implemented a peace agreement quite similar to the 
TMC recommendations. This indicates that the absence of such mediators possibly 
weakened the negotiation process of 1965-66.  
 
The Implementing phase 
One significant factor that complicates this issue is the political and military contexts 
of these two otherwise comparable negotiation processes. Both parties to the 
negotiations were radically different in 1965-66 and in 1972. In the RTC/TMC the 
Southerners were represented by Southern political parties that were insufficiently 
representative of, and thus unable to control, the Southern military movement. By the 
beginning of the Addis Ababa negotiations, Joseph Lagu had obtained control of both 
the political and military wings of the Southern resistance movement. Hence, a united 
Southern resistance movement existed, probably for the first time in the history of the 
Southern Sudanese insurgency. Although it might seem reasonable to conclude that 
the Anya-Nya should have been represented at the RTC/TMC in order to add the 
needed implementability to the final treaty, it is certainly true, as Hayer suggests, that 
the Southern military resistance movement had no unified leadership, strategy or fixed 
ideology at that time, and thus their involvement in the peacemaking process might 
have been impossible.389 Moreover, as accounted for in this thesis, the Northern party 
to the conflict was in 1965-66 represented by a variety of political parties, all with 
their different personal and political perceptions and agendas, and probably most 
important: Significantly influenced by the sectarian power base of the main political 
parties. By 1972, the sectarian parties had been swept off stage, and replaced by a 
military government led by President Ja’far Nimeiri. Additionally, Nimeiri was 
pushed by both internal and external forces to end what had by then developed into a 
full-scale civil war in the South.  
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Considering these factors, it would be an overstatement to claim that the absence of 
strong mediators was the single factor that tipped the scale in favour of the 
warmongers rather than the peace-seekers in the Sudan in 1965-66. As already 
mentioned above, the rational grievances of the Southern politicians were to a large 
degree met by the compromises agreed upon in the recommendations that the TMC 
presented to the Prime Minister in June, 1966. Although some disagreements still 
remained, compromises were reached that may have functioned as a framework for a 
new administrative and constitutional system in the Sudan. One issue that was 
neglected in those recommendations, though, was how to conciliate the populations of 
Southern and Northern Sudan, to enable their societies to cooperate and function in a 
productive and positive relationship.  
 
As pointed to above, the Sudanese politicians negotiating at the RTC/TMC process 
remained suspicious towards each other, and neither the Prime Minister nor the exiled 
Southern politicians and military leaders worked in any way to calm the hostile 
emotions that had built up in their societies throughout the last ten years. Quite the 
contrary, even those directly involved in the negotiations on diverse occasions made 
statements to the media that were critical towards the talks that were conducted inside 
the TMC. Such statements were made by both Hasan al-Turabi (ICF), Prime Minister 
Mahgoub (Umma Party) and Gordon Muortat (Southern Front) during the TMC 
negotiations.390 Hence, actors that were directly and personally responsible for the 
success or failure of the RTC/TMC process deliberately counteracted the efforts, and 
effectively worked as spoilers of the peacemaking process.  
 
The rhetoric resorted to by some of the actors is also likely to have worked to 
undermine conciliation between the conflicting societies. As seen in this study, 
leading Sudanese media printed editorials and articles that were severely critical 
against admitting concessions to the out-group.391 Kaufman argues that prohibiting 
such statements and articles in mass media is important for the successful 
implementation of a peace agreement. As they work to fuel popular hostility, they 
contribute to the undermining of both the peace process and the implementation of its 
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eventual agreement, because it counteracts any effort to prepare the masses in the 
conflicting societies on how and why peace should be preferred before war.  
 
Kaufman recommends a detailed plan for conciliation efforts that he considers likely 
to increase the probability of successful implementation of ethnic civil wars.392 No 
such conciliation efforts were instigated during the RTC and TMC negotiations. 
Rather, the violence increased steadily throughout 1965 and 1966. As Kaufman states, 
continuation of the violence works as a spoiling factor to any peacemaking effort, as it 
leads to suffering which, in turn, increases hostility between the conflicting societies. 
This is the main reason why a cease-fire is necessary as a precondition for peace 
negotiations, and thus, this factor can be added to the list of factors that prevented 
effective peacemaking in the Sudan in 1965-1966.  
 
It is likely that the ineffectiveness of the Sudanese democratic institutions added to 
this situation and worsened the conditions for peacemaking in 1965-1966. Personal 
conflicts materialised in a constant bickering for power, often on personal rather than 
political reasons, and such power-struggles led to a highly unstable political situation. 
The insistence by the Umma Party, NUP and the ICF on holding elections only in the 
Northern parts of the country in April 1965 and the fragmentation inside the Umma 
Party, which resulted in three different governments over a period of four years, 
substantiate the claim that the political system was weak and ineffective: The political 
parties were preoccupied with ensuring or consolidating their own power rather than 
solving the larger issues, especially that of the Southern conflict, which held deep 
roots into the question of national identity and what it meant to be a Sudanese. 
Possibly, the root causes of this problem can be found in the Sudanese democratic 
system. The sectarian nature of Sudanese politics, referred to several times in this 
thesis, created stable constituencies based perhaps more on religious affiliations than 
on political convictions. However, the sectarian political leaders could not totally 
overlook the practical political interests of their voters; in fact, sectarian politics 
required that the leaders were more concerned with sect and party than with the 
country as a whole. That is why sectarianism has been such a destabilizing political 
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factor in the Sudan since independence. This weakness in the Sudanese democratic 
system was influential in undermining the work of the RTC and TMC. 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis has accounted for the background and perceptions among the actors of the 
Round-Table Conference (RTC) and the Twelve-Man Committee (TMC). It has also 
given a historical presentation of those peace negotiations: Their political context, 
their proceedings, and their main subjects of discussion. The primary sources that 
have laid the ground for this thesis has never previously been analysed with the 
intention to discover the reasons for the failure of this peacemaking process, and some 
of the conclusions arrived at in this Chapter introduce new perspectives on this 
question.  
 
Despite the sincerity of Prime Minister Khalifa when initiating the RTC, the timing 
was probably detrimental to its success, as he might have been among the few directly 
implicated actors who honestly believed in a political solution to the problem at that 
time. As argued above, none of the conditions that are perceived to be critical for a 
successful initiating phase were fulfilled at the convening of the RTC/TMC 
peacemaking effort. The relatively low costs of war, the imbalance of the military 
strength between the combatants and, adding to this, the sectarian basis of Sudanese 
politics, which implied that the sectarian political leaders were more concerned with 
their own sectarian interests than with national concerns, were all signs that this peace 
process had small chances for success from the beginning. 
 
When negotiations finally began, they suffered from low motivation on both sides. 
Both Southerners and Northerners exploited this opportunity for personal or political 
agendas, and although a treaty was finally signed, it is unlikely that the politicians 
believed in its implementation. The distrust between Northerners and Southerners 
prevailed throughout the negotiations and beyond their conclusion, and some of the 
negotiators expressed their doubts publicly even while the negotiations were still in 
progress. The hate and mistrust that they by such actions facilitated among their own 
constituencies probably laid the ground for increased support for the war among the 
Northern and Southern populations, as they were likely to strengthen the preconceived, 
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conflicting and hostile identities felt by the populations of those societies. In light of 
the theories of Walter and Kaufman, it seems likely that if this peacemaking effort 
were to have had a chance of being successfully implemented it would have had to 
deal with this hate and suspicion, both among the Sudanese leaders and among the 
Southern and Northern populations. As shown in this thesis, Kaufman argues that 
conciliation is imperative for successful peacemaking in ethnic civil wars because 
such wars are partially driven by ‘mythical beliefs’ about the out-group and that such 
conceptions must be replaced by more positive ideas based on better information 
about the facts of war as well as about the adversaries. In order to achieve this, it is 
likely that an influential mediator who enjoyed the respect of both Southerners and 
Northerners would have been required. Thus, the absence of such a mediator was 
probably one of the factors that contributed to the failure of the parties to refrain from 
hate-speeches and other obstructing activities. (Within the frames of this thesis, it is 
not possible to answer whether this would have been possible under the prevailing 
circumstances. This is probably an important issue to address, though, in future 
analyses of for instance the ‘Naivasha’ agreement of 2005, the result of which still 
remains to see, as the period of implementation is still in progress.) 
 
Arguably, as long as both the Anya-Nya and the government ignored the work and the 
resolutions of the RTC and the TMC, the work of the politicians was of little value to 
the situation on the ground. As there was no effective cease-fire during the negotiating 
process, and neither the government nor the Anya-Nya were directly represented in it, 
it seems evident that achieving peace was not, in fact, a priority of any of the parties 
to the conflict.  
 
So why, then, did the politicians spend so much time on these meetings? One possible 
explanation is that the TMC worked as an alibi for their alleged wish for a political 
solution, and that it thus legitimised continued fighting in the eyes of both the people 
and the politicians. As an ongoing negotiation process seemingly led them nowhere, 
the combatants could face their constituencies and claim that the out-group was to 
blame for the lack of results, and as long as the political option seemed to be a waste, 
the only solution left was to continue the warfare. Such excuses, that were exploited 
by both parties to justify their ‘right’ to continue fighting, could only be put forward 
and given any weight because of the absence of alternatives. So, there is a chance that 
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the RTC and TMC, although initiated as a sincere attempt to find a peaceful solution 
to the South-North conflict, ended up as quite the contrary: Fuelling the conflict into a 
full-scale civil war and simultaneously providing for the spoilers of the peacemaking 
effort a justification of the increasingly intensified fighting. As they were ‘Making 
Peace while Waging War’, the politicians undermined their own peacemaking efforts. 
For the same reason, the possibility of implementing the final agreement, which was 
weak from the beginning, was more or less annulled during the process. 
 
The work of the RTC and the TMC were results of the first official recognition of the 
North-South divide in Sudan, and their resolutions and recommendations constituted 
the first systematic recording of the main issues, positions and depth of the conflict. 
This process of consciousnessraising may have contributed to or facilitated the 
negotiations in 1972 as well as the outcome of them. Whether they also had 
significance for the peacemaking process leading to the ‘Naivasha’ agreement of 2005 
is an interesting question, which future research could clarify. 
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Sudan for the Solution of the Southern Problem. 
 [Dated 22 August, 1965.] 
 Durham Special Collections' Reference: G//S 1187 – Box 22/5b – A. (South 
1/45/315.) 
 
Letter from Yousif Mohamed Ali, Chairman of the 12-Man Committee concerning Dr 
Turabi’s objections to the submission of the Southern Front. 
[Dated September 1, 1965.] 
Durham Special Collections' Reference: G//S 1187 - Box 26/4b – 9. (South 
1/44/311) 
 
Objection to scheme of proposals submitted by the Islamic Charter Front.  
 [Dated September 1, 1965.] 
Durham Special Collections' Reference: G//S 1187 - Box 26/4 – 10. (South 
1/44/312) 
 
Reply to Scheme of Proposals submitted by the Islamic Charter Front. 
 [Dated 1 September, 1965, signed Islamic Charter Front.] 
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Durham Special Collections' Reference: G//S 1187 - Box 26/4. (South 
1/44/313.) 
 
Letter from Yousif Mohamed Ali, Chairman of the 12-Man Committee concerning  
the Southern Front’s onjection [sic] to the scheme submitted by the Islamic 
Charter Front.  
[Dated September 9, 1965.] 
Durham Special Collections' Reference: G//S 1187 - Box 26/4b – 11. (South 
1/44/314.) 
 
Stand of the Southern Front. 
 [Dated 26 September, 1965.] 
Durham Special Collections' Reference: G//S 1187 – Box 22/5b – B. (South 
1/45/316.) 
 
Note by Sudan African National Union on Distribution of Powers between Central 
and Regional Governments of future Sudan. 
 [October, 1965.] 
Durham Special Collections' Reference: G//S 1187 – Box 22/5b – C. (South 
1/45/317.)  
 
The National Committee for the Constitution. Project of the Permanent Constitution 
submitted to the Constituent Assembly. January 1968. 
[Note added on the front page: “This is a preliminary translation which shall 
be revised and vetted according to the final Arabic text as adopted by the 
Constituent Assembly.”] 
 Durham Special Collections' Reference: G//S 1187 - Box 36/8 – J. 
 
The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan as Amended by the 
South Sudan Liberation Movement. 
[Note added on the front page: “This is an unofficial text ratified by General 
Joseph Lagu, Leader of the South Sudan Liberation Movement and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Anya-Nya, and Abel Alier on behalf of President 
Gaafar Nimeiry of the Democratic Rep. of the Sudan, on Monday 27 March, 
1972, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.” 
Another note, added by R.O. Collins, and attached to the document, states: 
“This is the document which Joseph Lagu took to Addis Ababa to obtain 
amendments on the Agreement already signed by the Government and Anya-
Nya delegations. But Nimeiry had already issued, as a national law, the 27th 
Feb. agreement (“made under my hands”). The new proposals – which shows 
the true feeling of the SSLM on the issue – were not accepted, except by some 
verbal assurances.  
 The reason why Lagu accepted the 27th Feb agreement is still unknown. 
It is feared that strong pressures forced him to accept what in fact amounts to a 
total, unconditionate [sic] surrender.”] 
Durham Special Collections' Reference: G//S 1187 - Box 23/3. 
 
“Dup Policy Document on the South.”  
Printed in Newsudan: Organ of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement 
(Pilot Issue, October 1986): Pp. 20-21.  
 126 
 
Durhan Special Collections' Reference: Medu*17/3/PRESSURE GROUPS.  
 
 
Sources from the library of Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 
University of Bergen: 
 
• “Sudan Informazioni” News Agency Documents (Document Collection): 
Round-Table Conference on the Southern Sudan. Khartoum March 16-25, 
1965: 
o “From Northern Sudan Arab Papers.” Pages 5-34. 
o “From Southern Papers.” Pages 35-80. 
o “Arab Criticism on the Round-Table Conference.” Pages 81-107. 
o “Southern Criticism on the Round-Table Conference.” Pages 108-111. 
o “Delegates at the Round-Table Conference on the South.” Page 112. 
o “Observers from African Countries.” Page 113. 
o “SANU’s (William Deng’s) Conditions for attending the Round-Table 
Conference on the Southern Question.” Page 113. 
 
o Speeches of the Delegates and Foreign Observers:  
 
1. Chairman El Nazeer Dafalla. Pages 115-118. 
2. Prime Minister, Sirr El Khatim El Khalifa. Pages 119-126. 
3. Sadik El Mahdi for the Umma Party. Pages 127-131. 
4. Professionals' Front. Pages 132-140. 
5. Aggrey Jaden. Pages 141-147. 
6. William Deng. Pages 148-153. 
7. Southern Front. Pages 154-162. 
8. People's Democratic Party. Pages 163-170. 
9. Communist Party. Pages 171-180. 
10. Islamic Charter Front. Pages 181-187. 
11. N.U.P. – El Azhari. Pages 188-193. 
12. Mr. Welbeck from Ghana. Pages 194-195. 
13. Comment of the Chairman on Mr. Welbeck’s speech. Page 196. 
14. Felix Onama on behalf of the Observers. Page 197. 
15. Yousif Maitama Sule, from Nigeria. Pages 198-200 
 
o Schemes of Proposals and Resolutions at the Round-Table Conference 
of Khartoum:  
1. First Proposals by the Southern Delegation. Pages 201-202. 
2. Scheme of Proposals by the Northern Political Parties. Pages 
203-206. 
3. Reply to the Scheme by the Southern Representatives. Pages 
207-208. 
4. Scheme of Proposals by SANU and Southern Front. Pages 209-
211. 
5. SANU and Southern Front’s proposals for immediate 
implementation. Page 212. 
6. Principles of Federalism by K.C. Wheare. Pages 215-218. 
7. Resolutions of the Round-Table Conference. Pages 219-223. 
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o The Round-Table Conference in the Foreign Press: Pages 224-226 
1. ‘Uganda Argus’: 2.3.1965 and 3.3.1965. 
2. ‘The Times’: 13.3.1965, 8.3.1965, 15.3.1965, 18.3.1965, 
24.3.1965, 30.3.1965 and 31.3.1965. 
3. ‘The Daily Telegraph’: 25.3.1965. 
4. ‘Grass Curtain’: May 1970. 
 
“The Anya-Nya Struggle. Background, Objectives and Motives.” Undated political 
pamphlet. 
 
Report of the Commission of Enquiry: Southern Sudan Disturbances August 1955. 
 
 
Miscellaneous: 
 
“1930 Memorandum On Southern Policy.” Letter from the Civil Secretary’s Office to 
the Governors of Upper Nile, Mongalla and Bahr al Ghazal Provinces, dated 
January 25th, 1930.  
Appendix no. 1 in Dunstan M. Wai, ed., 1973. 
 
Deng, William, 1964: Letter from Sudan African National Union (Sanu) to Prime 
Minister of the Sudan on Political Relations between North and South. 
Appendix no. 10 in M.O. Beshir 1968: The Southern Sudan: Background to 
Conflict. 
 
Recommendations of the 12-Man Committee to the Chairman of the Round Table 
Conference in the South. June 1966.  
Round-Table Conference Papers, National Records Office, Khartoum. 
 
Wawa, Yosa 2005: The Southern Sudanese Pursuits of Self-Determination. 
Documents in Political History. Kampala: Marianum Press Ltd. 
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